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Abstract
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The influence of topology and
information diffusion on
networked game dynamics
This thesis studies the influence of topology and information diffusion on the strategic
interactions of agents in a population. It shows that there exists a reciprocal relationship
between the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of a population
of players. The structure of a population of players is abstracted by the topology and
the information flow of the networks of players while the dynamics are denoted by the
strategic interactions of the players in the population. While topology represents a static
structure, the information flows are used to model a more dynamic and volatile structure
of the population. In order to evaluate the influence of topology and information flow on
networked game dynamics, strategic games are simulated on populations of players where
the players are distributed in a non-homogeneous spatial arrangement. Game theory,
network science and information theory are the three pillars of science used to build the
underlying theoretical basis in this research.
A study of evolution of the coordination of strategic players is the first part of this re-
search where the topology or the structure of the population is shown to be critical in
defining the coordination among the players. Next, the effect of network topology on the
evolutionary stability of strategies is studied in detail. The evolutionary stability of a
strategy determines its ability to withstand potentially competitive strategies. Based on
the results obtained, it is shown that network topology plays a key role in determining the
evolutionary stability of a particular strategy in a population of players. Then, the effect
of network topology on the optimum placement of strategies is studied. Using genetic opti-
misation, it is shown that the placement of strategies in a spatially distributed population
of players is crucial in maximising the collective payoff of the population. This further
suggests that the topology of the social structure is critical in determining its networked
game dynamics.
Exploring further the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked
games, the non-optimal or bounded rationality of players is modelled using topological
and directed information flow of the network. While network topology defines a more
static form, information flows are used to model a more volatile and dynamic form of
the population. These models are then applied to demonstrate how the scale-free and
small-world networks emerge in randomly connected populations of players who operate
iii
under bounded rationality. It is also shown that the strategic interactions with multiple
equilibrium states are directly affected by network topology. Thus, the topological and
information theoretic interpretations of bounded rationality suggest the topology, infor-
mation diffusion and the strategic interactions of socio-economical structures are cyclically
interdependent.
Acknowledgements
As with most PhD journeys, mine had its fair share of hurdles, obstacles and confusions.
However, as time passes, one begins to see more clearly as the clouds of uncertainty and
unpredictability slowly fade away. I’m both relieved and humbled to reach the end of
this long journey, filled with a nervous excitement on what the future might bring. This
journey would not have been possible if not for the sacrifices, support and guidance of
many people who actively contributed to the successful completion of my thesis. Thanks
to them, I feel I made the fullest use of this endeavour of creating new knowledge. I owe
my heartfelt gratitude to those who were by my side, patiently and resiliently, throughout
this journey. Let me attempt to acknowledge their efforts.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Mahendra Piraveenan and Proffes-
sor Liaquat Hossain, for the guidance they provided me throughout this journey. Dr
Piraveenan always made sure that I did not fall short of harnessing my full potential,
throughout my candidature. His insightful suggestions made sure that I could have pub-
lications of significant impact through meaningful research. This thesis would not have
materialised if not for his meticulous contributions in shaping and refining the ideas that
originated through the countless discussions we had. I would also like to show my grati-
tude to Professor Mikhail Prokopenkov, Dr Michael Harre and Dr Shahadat Uddin of the
Complex Systems Research group for their invaluable support and guidance that they of-
fered to me whenever I reached out to them for help. I’m also grateful to Professor Sanjay
Chawla of the School of IT for his comments and suggestions that helped me immensely to
formulate my ideas. Further, I was deeply inspired by the epistemological theory of ‘Con-
structive Relativism’[65] by Dr. Nalin De Silva, in forming the philosophical foundation
for some of the key concepts discussed in this thesis.
The work environment I had in the university was productive and entertaining. I would
like to thank Yamuna Subramanium, Upul Senanayake, Gnana Kumar, Arif Khan, Rabi-
ul and Andrew Leula for their support and unwavering friendship which enabled me to
endure all the hard times. I would fail my duty if I don’t thank the administrative staff of
the faculty including but not limited to Catherine, Christine, Madelon, Linda and Maria.
None of this would have been possible without the lecturers from the University of Moratuwa
and University of Colombo, who inspired me to pursue research. My sincere gratitude goes
to Dr Chamath Keppetiyagama, who has always been supportive and accessible supervi-
sor. I’m grateful to the staff of the Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
University of Moratuwa for all they’ve done for me. Tracing back to my school days, I’m
forever grateful to the wonderful panel of teachers I had in Royal College, Colombo.
iv
vWith research, you often tend to live in your own world filled with questions, but time to
time, you need to break that bubble to proceed further. For me, my friends have always
been that and more. I’m thankful to Rasika Wimalasena, Hiran Milinda and Nilusha
Nanayakkara for always providing a home for me whenever I needed one. I’m thankful to
Kithsiri Ehelepola for understanding me and supporting me when I needed it the most.
During my candidature, many friends helped me and I’m grateful to all of you. You all
deserve to be mentioned by name, however I’m unable to do that and I hope you’ll forgive
me for that.
Finally, I cannot thank my loving wife Yashasvi and my dear parents and family enough
for standing by me all the time and making it possible for me to pursue this PhD. Had it
not been for you, I dread to imagine where I would be and the fact that you are always
there for me no matter what, makes me strong.
To everyone who helped.
Publications
The following publications and manuscripts-under-review have resulted from the candida-
ture for this degree:
1. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, “Modelling networked systems using
the Topologically Distributed Bounded Rationality Framework”, In Review.*
2. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, “Emergence of scale-free characteristics in socio-
ecological systems with bounded rationality” Nature - Scientific Reports, Vol. 5, no.
10448, 2015.*
3. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Harre´, M. Piraveenan, “Influence modelling using bounded
rationality in social networks” IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances
in Social Networks, pp. 33–40, 2015.*
4. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, M. Harre`, “Influence of topology in the evolution
of coordination in complex networks under information diffusion constraints” The
European Physical Journal B, vol. 87.1, pp. 1–15, 2014.*
5. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, “Evolutionary stable strategies in net-
worked games: the influence of topology”, Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft
Computing Research, vol. 5.2, pp. 83–95, 2015.*
6. D. Kasthurirathna, H. Nguyen, M. Piraveenan, U. Senanayake, “Optimisation of
strategy placements for public good in complex networks”, Proceedings of the 2014
International Conference on Social Computing, p. 1, ACM 2014*.
7. D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, “Topological stability of evolutionarily unstable
strategies”. 2014 IEEE Symposium on Evolving and Autonomous Learning Systems
(EALS), pp. 35-42, 2014*.
8. U Senanayake, P Szot, M Piraveenan, D Kasthurirathna, “The performance of page
rank algorithm under degree preserving perturbations”. IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computational Intelligence (FOCI), pp. 24–29, 2014.
9. G. Thedchanamoorthy, M. Piraveenan, D. Kasthururathna, U. Senanayake, “Node
Assortativity in Complex Networks: An Alternative Approach”, Procedia Computer
Science, vol. 29, pp. 2449–2461, 2014.
vii
viii
10. D. Kasthururathna, M. Piraveenan, “Cyclic Preferential attachment in complex net-
works”, Procedia Computer Science, vol. 18, pp. 2086–2094, 2013.
11. D. Kasthururathna, M. Piraveenan, “Centrality and composition of four-node motifs
in metabolic networks”, Procedia Computer Science, vol. 18, pp. 409–418, 2013.
12. G Thedchanamoorthy, D. Kasthururathna, M. Piraveenan, “Standard deviations of
degree differences as indicators of mixing patterns in complex networks”, IEEE/ACM
International conference of Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining, pp.
1202–1208, 2013.
13. D. Kasthururathna, M. Piraveenan, M. Harre`, “Evolution of coordination in scale-
free and small-world networks under information diffusion constriants”, IEEE/ACM
International conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, pp.
183–189, 2013.*
14. D. Kasthururathna, A. Dong, M. Piraveenan, I.Y. Tumer, “The failure tolerance of
mechatronic software systems to random and targeted attacks”, ASME 2013 Inter-
national Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information
in Engineering Conference, pp. V005T06A036–V005T06A036, 2013.
15. D. Kasthururathna, A. Dong, M. Piraveenan, I.Y. Tumer, “Network robustness and
topological characteristics in scale-free networks”, IEEE Conference on Evolving and
Adaptive Intelligent Systems (EAIS), pp. 122–129, 2013.
16. M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, K.S. Chung, D. Kasthurirathna, “Quantifying encircling
behaviour in complex networks”, IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence
in Cyber Security, pp. 9–14, 2013.
17. M. Piraveenan, S. Uddin, K.S. Chung, D. Kasthurirathna, “On the influence of
topological characteristics on robustness of complex networks”, Journal of Artificial
Intelligence and Soft Computing Research, vol. 3.2, pp. 89–100, 2013.
The papers marked with an asterick (*) have directly contributed to this thesis.
Contents
Declaration i
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
Publications vii
Contents ix
List of Figures x
List of Tables xi
Nomenclature xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivating examples for networked game analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Online auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Political campaigns in social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3 Financial markets and social behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Significance of the topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Research question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 The Structure and the Methodology of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Major Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ix
CONTENTS x
2 Background 13
2.1 Complex Systems and Complex Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2 Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.3 Self-organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Complex Networks: Modeling Complex systems as networks . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Real-world Complex Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Information Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Technological Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.4 Biological Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Network properties and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1 Centrality Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.2 Degree Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Clustering coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.4 Average Path length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.5 Assortativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.6 Network Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Network models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Random networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.2 Scale-free networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.3 Small-world networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6.2 Cooperative and Non-cooperative game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.3 Normal form and extensive form games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.4 Pure strategy and Mixed strategy games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6.5 Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.6 Prisoner’s dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.7 Coordination game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
CONTENTS xi
2.7 Rationality of self-interested players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7.1 Bounded rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7.2 Generalisations of Nash equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.7.3 Bayesian-Nash equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7.4  Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.7.5 Quantal response equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.8 Evolutionary game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.8.1 Evolutionary stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8.2 Replicator dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.8.3 Networked Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.9 Information theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.9.1 Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.9.2 Joint entropy and conditional entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.9.3 Local information dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3 The influence of topology on the evolution of coordination in complex
networks under information diffusion constraints 68
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Studying games on networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.1 Pre-evolutionary balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.2 Evolution of coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5.3 Drivers of coordination and node degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5.4 Influence of information diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5.5 Influence of timelag in information diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
CONTENTS xii
4 The influence of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strate-
gies 97
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2.1 Evolutionary Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2.2 Zero-determinant strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3 Evolutionary processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.1 The Death-birth Moran process [169] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.2 Stochastic strategy adoption process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4 Network analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5 The influence of network topology on the optimisation of public good in
complex networks 114
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2.1 Genetic algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3 Research Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6 Topological distribution of bounded rationality in network-based games128
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2.1 Games among players with bounded rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2.2 Relationship between rationality and social interaction . . . . . . . . 132
6.3 Modelling bounded rationality as a topological attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.4.1 Calculating QRE equilibrium of a strategic interaction . . . . . . . . 136
6.4.2 Measuring the divergence of QRE from Nash equilibrium . . . . . . 138
CONTENTS xiii
6.4.3 Measuring scale-free correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.5 Analysis and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.5.1 Comparing network topologies based on their average divergence
from Nash equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.5.2 Evolution of system divergence under the Baraba`si-Albert model . . 143
6.5.3 Network growth model based on bounded rationality and conver-
gence towards Nash Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.5.4 Optimising network topology for maximum system rationality . . . . 150
6.5.5 Network topology and fraction of links with multiple equilibria . . . 158
6.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7 Applications of topologically distributed bounded rationality in network-
based games 168
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.3 Applications of topologically interpreted bounded rationality . . . . . . . . 171
7.3.1 Peer-to-peer network formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.3.2 Protection against security threats in networks . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.3.3 Routing in a peer-to-peer overlay network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8 Information theoretical interpretation of bounded rationality in network-
based games 186
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.2.1 Information transfer and transfer entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.2.2 Random boolean networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.2.3 Phase transitions in random boolean networks . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.3 Quantifying bounded rationality as an information theoretic measure . . . . 190
8.3.1 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy as a link
parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.3.2 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy as a node
parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.3.3 Transfer entropy from direct neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
CONTENTS xiv
8.3.4 Transfer entropy from indirect neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.3.5 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy from
multi-hop neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.4 Using information theoretic measures to predict the equilibria of potential
interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
8.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9 Conclusions 199
9.1 Summary of contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
9.1.1 The influence of network topology on the evolution of coordination
in networked games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
9.1.2 The influence of network topology on the evolutionary stability of
strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
9.1.3 The influence of network topology on the optimisation of public good
in complex networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
9.1.4 The influence of network topology on the bounded rationality of
networked players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
9.1.5 Applications of topologically distributed bounded rationality . . . . 211
9.1.6 Information theoretical analysis of bounded rationality in network-
based games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
9.1.7 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A Modelling of social influence using bounded rationality 216
A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
A.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.2.1 Influence modelling in social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.2.2 Linear threshold model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.2.3 Independent Cascade model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
A.2.4 Page-Rank based influence models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.2.5 Game theoretic influence models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.3 Modelling social influence using bounded rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A.3.1 Modelling social influence under opposing influencers using bounded
rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
CONTENTS xv
A.3.2 Modelling strategic influence using bounded rationality . . . . . . . 224
A.4 Optimizing social influence using bounded rationality models . . . . . . . . 225
A.4.1 Complexity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
A.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
A.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
A.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
List of Figures
2.1 Eulers seven bridges of Konigsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Basic topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Different representations of networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 The degree distributions of a random network and a Scale-free network. . . 29
2.5 The variation from a regular lattice to a total random network . . . . . . . 33
2.6 Sample payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7 An extensive form representation of a game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.8 Matching pennies game where mixed strategies are used. . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.9 Game with multiple Nash equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.10 Payoff matrix of a prisoner’s dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.11 Variations of the coordination game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.12 Step and quantal response functions of the matching pennies game. . . . . . 55
2.13 Payoff matrix of the Hawk-Dove game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 The average score of coordinators and non-coordinators in scale-free networks. 79
3.2 Proportion of coordinators against the time-step for different types of net-
works considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 Average payoff of coordinators against the time-step for different types of
networks considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4 Information content in the network against the time-step for different types
of networks considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for five classes of
networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.6 Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for hierarchical-
modular networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES xvii
3.7 Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for small-world
networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.8 Evolution of coordinators by degree for four classes of networks . . . . . . . 88
3.9 Average degrees of coordinators/non-coordinators against time-step. . . . . 89
3.10 The influence of the information diffusion parameter, α, on the proportion
of coordinators during evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.11 Proportion of coordinators against the time delay parameter λ for different
classes of networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.1 The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy in
well-mixed and Scale-free populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2 The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in
scale-free populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3 The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in a
well-mixed population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in
scale-free populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5 The evolution of GC and cooperator strategies competing against the Pavlov
strategy, in SF populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6 The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy . . . . 111
5.1 The variation of cumulative network payoff of a collection of random strat-
egy distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.2 The variation of the average degrees of the cooperators and defectors . . . . 121
5.3 The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4 The variation of the average degrees of the cooperators and defectors . . . . 122
5.5 The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network of players . . . . 122
5.6 The variation of the average degrees of the network of players . . . . . . . . 123
5.7 The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network of players . . . . 124
5.8 The variation of the average degrees of the network of players . . . . . . . . 124
6.1 The payoff matrix of a generic normal-form game which involves two players.132
6.2 The variation of the cooperation probability of a player in the PD game . . 138
6.3 The Nash-QRE divergence with varying β . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 The variation of average Nash-QRE divergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
LIST OF FIGURES xviii
6.5 The variation of the scale-free exponent of the network . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.6 The variation of the scale-free R-squared correlation of the network . . . . . 147
6.7 The variation of scale-free exponent and the R-squared correlation . . . . . 149
6.8 The variation of network assortativity over network size . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.9 The evolution of scale-free properties over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.10 The evolution of the CC and average path length of a network over time . . 154
6.11 The evolution of scale-free properties over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.12 The evolution of the CC and the average path length over time . . . . . . . 157
6.13 The variation of player 1’s coordination probability when the rationality
parameter of player 2 is fixed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.14 The variation of the fraction of links with multiple equilibria . . . . . . . . 160
6.15 Correlation between the scale-freeness of networks and the fraction of links
with multiple equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.16 Fraction of links with multiple equilibria against ‘scale-freeness’ . . . . . . . 163
7.1 The evolution of the scale-free exponent and the R-squared correlation . . . 177
7.2 The variation of the fraction of overlay requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.1 Variation of divergence based on the average degree and the bias parameter. 195
8.2 Variation of divergence based on the average degree K and the bias param-
eter r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
A.1 The variation of the probability of following against the payoff of the active
state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.2 The variation of the probability of following against the distance from seed 232
A.3 The variation of the probability of following against the average distance
from seeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.4 The probability of cooperation against the distance from the cooperator seed234
A.5 The variation of coordination against the average distance from cooperators 235
List of Tables
6.1 The average Nash-QRE divergence for different rationality functions. . . . . 143
A.1 The average probability of following the seed in different topologies . . . . . 231
A.2 The average probability of following the seed in different topologies. . . . . 232
A.3 The average probability of following the randomly placed seeds in different
topologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.4 The average probability of cooperation in different topologies when the
cooperator seed is placed at the hub. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
A.5 The average probability of cooperation when the cooperator seeds are ran-
domly placed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
xix
Nomenclature
Notation
P (a) Probability of the event a
P (a, b) Probability of the event a
⋂
b
P (a|b) Probability of the event a given event b
Typefaces
X,Y, Z Variable names
x, y, z Specific values taken by the variables X,Y, Z
X,Y,Z Sets of variables
x,y, z Values to X,Y,Z
Abbreviations
TE Transfer Entropy
AIS Active Information Storage
MI Mutual Information
GRN Gene Regulatory Network
BA model Barabasi Albert model
QRE Quantal Response Equilibrium
NE Nash Equilibrium
TDBR Topologically Distributed Bounded Rationality
BR Bounded Rationality
ER Random
Networks
Erdo˝s-Re`nyi Random Networks
Variables Used
r Assortativity of a network
N Number of nodes in a network
K Degree of a node (the number of links of a node). In the case of directed
networks, this is typically used to denote the degree of the target node.
xx
NOMENCLATURE xxi
γ Scale free exponent of a network
Chapter 1
Introduction
We are all connected and we all make decisions. These two factors are not only true for
humans, but also all living beings. Further, these two qualities may be attributed to all
autonomous systems, such as robots and even distributed sensors. Thus, connectivity and
decision-making may be the two most critical components of a biological and even an
artificial existence. Interconnectedness and decision making are interwoven aspects of any
social structure. For example, a person is judged by the friends they have. To refine this
further, it could be said that a person’s behaviour and actions are judged by the friends
they have. On the other hand, a person’s friends or associates are determined by the
behaviour or actions of that person. The nature of this reciprocal relationship between
the interconnectedness and the decision making of individuals or autonomous agents in
general is the central research question that drives this thesis.
Strategic decision-making scenarios among spatially distributed players are abundant in
real-world socio-economic systems. Depending on the relationships that are formed among
strategic players, their decisions may vary drastically. In turn, the strategic interactions
that are formed among players may affect the networks that they form over time. In the
following section, three different scenarios where strategic decision making and the inter-
connectivity among populations of player are described, in order to justify the motivation
for this work.
1
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1.1 Motivating examples for networked game analysis
1.1.1 Online auctions
Electronic commerce continues to grow at a rapid pace[19]. Online auctions are one of the
most successful forms of electronic commerce. The rapid growth of these markets can be
attributed to three factors. The first is that the online auctions provide a less costly way
for buyers and sellers on locally thin markets, such as specialised collectibles, to meet. For
instance, in May 1997, nearly $500,000 worth of Beanie babies was sold on eBay, totaling
6.6% of eBay’s total sales. The second factor is that online auction sites substitute for
more traditional market intermediaries such as specialty dealers in antiques, sports cards
and other collectibles.
The third and perhaps the most relevant attribute with respect to this work is that online
auctions provide a collaborative framework for exchanging information among the bidders.
Most online auctions sites have large message boards which can be used to share informa-
tion among bidders and get an idea of the behavioural patterns of the other players in the
auctioning environment. Thus, the connectivity and information exchange among players
or bidders play a key role in the strategic decisions made by them in placing bids.
Game theory has been extensively used to model auctions, including online auctions.
Generally, players are modelled as buyers (bidders) and sellers. The action set available for
each player is the set of bid functions. Under game theoretic models, auctions are studied
under two broad categories: private value auctions and common value auctions. In private
value auctions, each bidder knows his or her value for the object and the bidders differ in
their values for the object. Examples of items that are auctioned under this category are
memorabilia and consumption items. Broadly speaking, this is the game theoretic auction
model followed in online auctions. In common value auctions, the item has a single though
unknown value and the bidders differ in their estimates of the true value of the object.
Examples of such auctions are the frequency spectrum auctions and drilling auctions.
In both of these auctions models, the implicit information exchange among bidders and
sellers is critical. The social networks that exist among these players have a key role in
this implicit information exchange. In turn, such information exchange determines the
‘rationality’ of the decisions made by the players in the auctioning environment. Thus,
studying the effect of the topological structure and the information flow among players in
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an auctioning environment is critical in accurately modelling and predicting the auctioning
games.
1.1.2 Political campaigns in social media
Political campaigns are increasingly making use of online social media campaigns. A well-
known example of the usage of social media in politics is the presidential campaign of
Barack Obama in 2008[60]. He had a landslide victory, partially due to the huge support
that he gained from online social media. Another example of how social media can affect
the outcome of an election was observed in 2006, USA midterm elections. 85% of all
candidates running for the senate had online presence and 32% posted their advertising
content on Facebook.
There are various arguments about the role of social media in political campaigns. Bennett
[34] suggests that the organisational weakness of online social networks may provide a
core resource for new political groups with scarce resources. On the other hand, Bimber
[36] argues that while online social networks may increase the fragmentation of political
systems, it may not entirely erode the influence of the political elites, institutions and
organised groups. It is widely accepted that online social networks are changing the
way political advocacy and activism are practised, given that they make many aspects of
lobbying, campaigning and organising more effective and efficient [34, 95, 106].
Another aspect of social media that has recently gained much interest is its ability to
shape public opinion and even organise social groups to bring about political change. The
so called Arab spring, which is a series of public uprisings that occurred in middle-east
countries in 2011-12, is a perfect example where the strength of social media contributed
to topple a government and bringing about the transition of political power by rallying
public support and shaping public opinion via social media. In one study, Howard et al.
[110], analysed over three million tweets, gigabytes of Youtube videos and thousands of
blog posts and found that social media played a key role in facilitating the public protests
and overthrowing the governments in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring. The key
findings of that study were that:
1. Social media played a central role in shaping the political debates in the Arab Spring;
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2. A spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the
ground; and
3. Social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders.
Thus, it is evident that the social interactions facilitated by social media have opened
up a revolutionary trend in political campaigning. On some occasions, the social media
campaigns that organise political protests and political movements have not been based on
advanced online portals such as Facebook, but on simple text messages on mobile phones.
For example, during the impeachment of the Philippine president Joseph Estrada in 2001,
a crippling protest was arranged in Manila by a text message that was circulated among
the public[229].
In organising public protests, the power of social media is extremely effective. As the
decentralised nature of message forwarding and information-sharing on social media makes
it extremely difficult for centralised government structures to control. Also, the speed
and effectiveness of information-sharing via social media can be extremely versatile in
organising public protests.
Game theory has extensively been used to model the social interactions in political cam-
paigns. For instance, Becker [31] proposes a theory of competition among political pressure
groups. He suggests that political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in
producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of
persons in different groups and the dead-weight cost of taxes and subsidies. Storm [243]
proposes a behavioural theory of competitive political parties, which he suggests as a uni-
fied theory of the organisational and institutional factors that constrain party behaviour
in parliamentary democracies. Behavioural game theory has been applied to online social
media to model public interactions in a political setting. For instance, the Colonel Brotto
game, which models the allocation of limited resources by two presidential candidates in
a political campaign, has been deployed and analysed on Facebook [136]. The analysis
has concluded that the results from the Facebook based Brotto game are consistent with
the previous studies of the game. Although there have always been strategic interactions
in political campaigns, social media provides an outlet where these interactions can be
quantified and measured. It should be also noted that in a population, not everybody
responds in the same manner to the campaigns. Thus, there is a heterogeneity of the
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rationality of players in a political campaign or a protest campaign, if these campaigns
are modelled as behavioural games. Therefore, political campaigns that take place over
populations of players connected in a spatially distributed structure provide an interesting
avenue of research where the topology and information flow among players is critical in
predicting the outcome of the game.
1.1.3 Financial markets and social behaviour
Stock markets are an important asset in financial markets. One of the key research ques-
tions related to stock markets is whether stock prices can be predicted. Recent advances
in the socio-economic theory of finance, behavioural economics and behavioural finance
may be critical in predicting the behaviour of the stock markets. Recent research suggests
that the information extracted from social media may be vital in predicting the changes
in various economic and commercial systems[48].
There are four aspects to consider in a stock options market that is socially constructed:
the behavioural postulates of the market, models of micro-networks, models of macro-
networks, and consequences of the network structure. The behavioural postulates refer to
the basic assumptions of the nature of the market actors. Micro-networks are the structure
of the egocentric networks, where networks are formed from the perspective of individual
actors. Macro-networks depict the overall structure of the market that emerges from the
micro-network formations [20]. Consequences are the effects of the market networks on
the price determination.
In the ideal stock market, players or actors are assumed to be perfectly rational. In
reality, market actors may be described more realistically by two behavioural assumptions
suggested in the transaction cost approach. Those are[262]:
• The recognition that human agents are subjected to bounded rationality; and
• The assumption that at least some agents are given to opportunism.
These two postulates are extremely relevant to the stock options market. The floor partic-
ipants, such as the stockbrokers are aware of their limitations in receiving, processing and
responding to market information. Thus, the exchange of key information plays a vital
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role in determining the rationality of the decisions made by these players. For example,
noise and the physical separation of potential trading partners have been cited as two
major obstacles in the efficient communication of offers to buy and sell. Additionally, in
a dynamic market environment, a floor participant may not be able to fully survey all
potential trading partners.
What makes the information exchange in informal social networks is even more critical
in decision-making in stock options is the uncertainty of the markets [48]. Because stock
markets are designed to be extremely competitive, they naturally create an environment
of extreme uncertainty for brokers and traders. Stock price volatility and market size
also contribute to the instability of the market, contributing to the relative significance of
information exchanged through informal social networks.
Game theory has been used extensively to model and predict the stock markets and
financial markets in general. For instance, evolutionary game theory has been effectively
used to model the stock market mechanisms using the minority model [271]. In this model,
after everybody has chosen a side independently, those who are in the minority side would
win. Another evolutionary game that has been proposed to model stock markets is the
prototype trading model. In this model, each player is initially given the same amount of
capital in two forms; cash and stock, while all trading consists of switching back and forth
between cash and stock. Each player would have a strategy that makes recommendation
for buying and selling a certain amount of stock for the next timestep.
While game theory could be used to effectively model stock trading in stock markets, the
players in a stock market are boundedly rational due to the limitations of the information
flow in their social networks. These two factors make a strong case for considering the
network structures and information flows in modelling financial markets as network-based
games.
1.2 Significance of the topic
As evident from the case studies discussed above, the intertwining of social networks and
strategic decision making scenarios are abundant in real life. When populations of players
interact with each other strategically, the variation of rationality among them plays a key
role in the outcome of the decisions and the status of the population as a whole. The
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variation of the topological features also affects the exchange of information among the
players. Depending on the population that is observed, different topologies are critical in
determining how the players interact among each other in a strategic game.
While the scale-free topology has been observed in most real-world populations, its sig-
nificance is seldom explored in strategic games played in populations of players. The
impact of scale-free networks and random networks on strategic games is an interesting
research question that needs to be explored in order to accurately predict the behaviour
and the outcome of strategies. Further, in doing this the effect of network topology on the
evolutionary outcome of the games can be investigated.
Another aspect that is intertwined with network topology and information flow is the
rationality of players in a population. The effect of network topology and information
flow on determining the rationality of nodes is an important research question that is
critical in predicting the outcome of strategic interactions in populations of players; thus,
these aspects of strategic games are addressed in this work.
In order to broadly capture the above aspects of the strategic decision-making of au-
tonomous agents, this research studies the topological and information theoretic aspects
of network based games. The applications of such analysis varies across different disci-
plines ranging from politics to entertainment, as suggested by the above-mentioned case
studies and examples.
1.3 Research question
This research is built of three pillars of science: network science, game theory and in-
formation theory. These three pillars are interwoven to model real-world socio-economic
systems, which consist of strategic players that are topologically distributed and operate
under information diffusion constraints. Since these these disciplines are interrelated in
some way, the research question of this study incorporates the theoretical aspects of all
three disciplines. In particular, we focus on the two aspects of Network science, which
is network topology and information diffusion. Network topology is the structure or the
organisation of nodes in a spatial arrangement. Information diffusion deals with the flow
of information through the network. We examine the question on how does the network
topology and information diffusion in a network affect a strategic game played over that
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network. It is important to note that the discussion is not limited to evolutionary games
although evolutionary games are a critical component of it. Instead, evolutionary games
as well as the equilibrium aspects of network games from a micro to macro perspective are
looked at. This broad research question is broken down into the following sub questions.
1. How does the network topology and information diffusion of a population of players
affect the evolution of coordination in the population of players?
2. How is the evolutionary stability of strategies affected by the network topology of
a population of players and what are the other topological effects that are critical in
determining the evolutionary stability of a strategy?
3. What is the optimum method to distribute the contending strategies in a heterogeneous
network of players in order to maximise the common public good of the population?
4. How can the bounded rationality of players be modelled using their topological be-
haviour? What are the emergent topological properties that arise from such a model and
what are the possible applications of such a topological model of bounded rationality?
5. How can the bounded rationality of players be modelled based on the directed infor-
mation flow and what are the topological and functional implications of such a model?
The subsequent chapters from chapter 3 to chapter 8 address each of these questions in
detail.
1.4 The Structure and the Methodology of the thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter one introduces the thesis and provides a
background and the motivation for this work, including an introduction to the research
question and the structure of the thesis. Chapter two discusses the background knowledge
of the work in the fields of network analysis, game theory and information theory. It also
provides the basis for the construction of the research question.
This work follows a quantitative and experimental research methodology. More specifically,
findings are based on simulated results based on network and game theoretic models.
Qualitative analysis is used to interpret the results and also justify the models used.
Thus, broadly speaking, the research methodology used in this work is a combination of
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quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. We incorporate real-world network
data into these models to further validate the results, whenever applicable. Further,
we make extensive use of statistical methods as correlation analysis to determine the
possible strength of relationship among network properties such as scale-free correlation
and clustering coefficient, where applicable.
While this is the broad research methodology used in this work, each chapter elaborates on
specific research techniques used in the context of that work. The chapters from chapter
three to eight can be sub-divided into two segments. The chapters three to five study the
effect of networked game dynamics from different perspectives such as the effect on the
evolution of coordination and the evolutionary stability of strategies. The second segment,
which expands from chapter six to eight, is based on the modeling of bounded rationality
based on network topology and information diffusion.
Accordingly, the third chapter discusses the influence of network topology in the evolu-
tion of coordination in network-based games. This is further analysed with respect to the
information diffusion in networks. Quantitative analysis of results generated from experi-
mental simulations were used in this chapter. In order to simulate the coordination game
played on a population of nodes, an ensemble of scale-free networks, small-world networks,
hierarchical-modular networks, Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random networks, and lattices were used. Ex-
ploring the evolution of coordination on such varying set of topologies help to study the
affect of topology more broadly, instead of limiting the study primarily to the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi
random networks and Scale-free networks[225].
The fourth chapter discusses the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability
of strategies. In order to evaluate this, different strategies were evolved in well-mixed
and scale-free topologies. The strategies are then evolved over a number of timesteps to
observe which strategy dominates the population and which strategy dies out. Effectively,
this work extends on the work done by Adami and Hintze [4], by taking into account the
heterogeneity of networks as a factor of evolutionary stability. Based on the observations
gathered, the topological effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies is introduced as
the ‘topological stability’ of strategies.
The fifth chapter focuses on the optimisation of strategy placement in order to maximise
the common public good of a population. For this purpose, several well-known strate-
gies are considered and the question is posed that given a pair of strategies present in a
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network, which strategy should occupy the hubs in order to maximise the total pay off
or the common good of the society. Evolutionary optimisation is used as the method for
evaluating the effectiveness of strategy placement. This is a novel approach introduced to
optimise the placement of strategies in order to maximise their collective payoff.
The sixth chapter proposes a topological model of bounded rationality that suggests there
is a topological interpretation of bounded rationality in populations of players and thereby
proposes a topological model of bounded rationality. Based on the notion that there is a
correlation between network topology and node rationality, a topological model of bounded
rationality is proposed. In order to validate this model, a random network is evolved to
optimise the rationality to observe how the topology of the network evolves. In addition to
that, different network topologies, such as well-mixed, random and scale-free are compared
to observe which topology produces the interactions with highest level of rationality. The
methodology adopted here is a novel approach of modeling and quantifying rationality.
The seventh chapter discusses the potential applications of the topologically derived bounded
rationality. Three applications are considered: the peer-to-peer network formation, net-
work security and peer-to-peer routing applications. In all of these applications, the topo-
logically distributed bounded rationality model is shown to produce results that match
the real-world observations. Thus, these results are shown to be as validation of the ap-
plicability of the topologically distributed rationality model in populations of strategic
players.
Next in chapter eight, the rationality is modelled as based on the information transfer
among nodes, instead of the topology of the nodes. Using random boolean networks as
the underlying information transfer model, the transfer entropy is applied as a dynamic
bounded rationality measure in populations of strategic players. The implications of such
an interpretation of rationality are discussed, with respect to random boolean networks.
When the chaotic nature and the complexity of the random boolean networks are high,
it is shown that the information transfer based rationality is at its peak, suggesting that
the complexity of networks is a result of their tendency to optimise the rationality of
interactions. The methodology used to model rationality as an information theoretic
measure is a novel approach adopted in this work.
As previously mentioned, while the research methodology followed in each of the chapters
varies, they follow the broad methodology of a simulation-based quantitative methodology
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with qualitative interpretations. A more detailed elaboration of the research methods
followed to address each subquestion can be found within each chapter.
The chapter nine presents the summary of conclusions derived from each of the studies
performed in this work.
1.5 Major Research Contributions
Following is a list of major research contributions of this work. These contributions are
distributed over the research areas of network science, game theory and information theory.
• Both network topology and information diffusion are critical in determining the
prevalence of coordination in networked populations.
• Noise and time-lag of payoff information adversely affect the evolution of coordina-
tion in a networked population.
• It is the peripheral hubs and drive the coordination in a population of players.
• Systems that are small-world but not scale-free are likely to evolve into being dom-
inant in coordination and sustain it under difficult information-diffusion conditions.
• Three basic factors determine the topological stability of strategies in a non-homogeneous
network; network topology, the evolutionary process and the initial distribution of
the strategies.
• In order to maximise the collective utility of a networked population, the more
dominant strategies need to occupy the hubs.
• The function of socio-economic systems in terms of bounded rationality is affected
by the form or topology of socio-economic systems.
• When evolutionary pressure is applied on social systems to optimise their strategic
interactions, scale-free and small-world features emerge.
• The topology of a socio-economic structure affects the function of the network in
terms of its capacity to facilitate multiple equilibria.
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• The topology and the strategic interactions of socio-economic structures are cycli-
cally interdependent.
• The directed information transfer quantified using Transfer entropy may be effec-
tively used to quantify the bounded rationality of players in a networked population.
• Complexity that emerges in the real-world systems may be a result of their tendency
to optimise the strategic interactions.
Chapter 2
Background
This work is based on three fundamental fields of science; Complex systems/Complex net-
works, Game theory and Information theory. As the focus is on studying the influence
of topology and information transfer on the strategic games played among spatially dis-
tributed players, all these three fields of science are relevant in building up the background
for this thesis. Following sections discuss each of these fields of study within the scope of
this research.
2.1 Complex Systems and Complex Networks
Complex Systems is a field of science that is used to study how the components of a
system and their relationships give rise to the collective behaviour of the system[23]. In
other words, complex systems are systems where the collective has properties that cannot
be derived by aggregation of the constituents. Complex systems science has sprung out
of multiple fields of study such as non-linear dynamics, statistical mechanics, information
theory, computational theory, behavioural psychology and evolutionary biology[165]. Most
of the real-world complex systems, such as the networks formed on top of the relationships
that are formed among people, the neurons that are connected in the brain, the cells that
are connected in the body all can be modelled as complex networks. However, modeling
complex systems as complex networks may lead to a certain level of loss of information
as the nodes in a network are often modelled as abstract and homogeneous entities[194],
while actual components in a complex system are mostly heterogeneous.
13
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There are three main approaches used in the study of complex systems[23]. Namely, (1)
How interactions give rise to patterns of behaviour, as in homophily[156] (2) The space
of possibilities or the possible patterns that can occur, and (3) The formation or growth
of complex systems through evolution and pattern formation[25]. Currently, all three
approaches are being pursued extensively by the research community. In this work, all
these approaches have been taken as appropriate.
Even though complex systems do not necessarily have a formal definition, there are certain
key characteristics that can be used to identify a complex system. Following are three such
characteristics that are common to almost all complex systems.
1. Emergence
2. Interdependence
3. Self-organisation
2.1.1 Emergence
Emergence is the advent of the properties in a system in a large-scale or macro view that
may not be evident in the micro level. An example of a system where emergence is preva-
lent is the world wide web (WWW)[10]. The Internet may consist of computers, servers,
routers and other myriad components may have specific characteristics and behaviours of
their own. However, the WWW its own dynamics and features that may only be evident
in a large scale macro view. Also, the WWW would have its own growth trends and pat-
terns that are evident in the large scale view. Emergence is only applicable for details that
are important for the large scale view, as not all details that may be present in a system
may have a relationship with the large scale, macro perspective of the system. More for-
mally put, emergence refers to a system’s global behaviour that arises from the collective
actions of the simpler components[165]. It is this feature of complex systems that gives
rise to their non-linear characteristics. One example for this emergent behaviour is the
emergence of coordination in a social network even when the micro-level interactions may
be self-centered[5].
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2.1.2 Interdependence
What makes complex systems ‘complex’ is that its parts are interdependent. Because
of this interdependence of components, the traditional approaches of modelling such as
discrete event simulation and the modular approach may not be applicable in complex
systems. Different kinds of interdependence can be observed. There may be systems
where the individual components are not strongly coupled or connected with the rest of
the systems, such as with the case of circuit-breaker systems. In some complex systems,
such as biological systems, the removal or the failure of a single component may affect the
entire system. Thus, identifying the nature of interdependence is each system is critical
in modelling their behaviour accurately.
2.1.3 Self-organisation
Perhaps self organisation is the single most significant characteristic shared by all complex
systems. Self organisation can be described as the spontaneous appearance of large scale
organisation through limited interactions among simple components[160]. As denoted by
this definition, it is a feature that arise as a result of emergence and the interdependence
of components. The best examples for self-organisation can be observed in nature. Ex-
tremely large systems such as galaxies, solar systems to minute systems such as cells are
all display self-organisation behaviour. The antonym of self organised systems may be
designed systems, which are man made. Unlike designed systems, self-organising systems
do not have a central design and the components organise themselves through local inter-
actions. One of the key motivations for studying the self-organising behaviour of natural
systems is that it may pave way to designed systems that have the ability to self organise
and evolve over time, in other words building ‘designed self-organising systems’. While
this may be a distant goal, certain attributes and behaviours of self-organising systems
can be incorporated into designed systems. A good example is the usage of the particle
swarm optimisation[206] model where local interactions of autonomous rule-bound agents
give rise to collective and global solutions to computationally difficult problems.
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2.2 Complex Networks: Modeling Complex systems as net-
works
Though complex systems cover a broad range of real-world systems, there is no common
consensus on modelling and analysing them. However, complex systems invariably consist
of components and their interactions. Thus, a complex system can be approximated as a
network of components. One of the key issues that has to be resolved here is the loss of
heterogeneity of nodes, since networks encompass nodes that are essentially abstract and
homogeneous in nature[194].
It was the pivotal work of Leonard Eular published his article ‘Seven bridges of Konigsberg’
that gave birth to modern graph theory[35]. In this work, he demonstrated that ‘one
cannot come back to the starting point by traveling through all the bridges once and once
only’. Although the study of networks originally sprung out of graph theory, later on it
started to grow as a field of its own while borrowing concepts from other fields of science
such as statistical mechanics and Artificial Intelligence. A significant milestone in the field
of network science is when Erdo˝s and Re`nyi did their influential proposition of Random
graphs[81]. Recently, there has been a considerable interest in the study of networks in
many disciplines ranging from communication systems to political science. This has paved
way to the birth of a new science called ‘network science’, where the focus is on studying the
holistic and global properties of networks that are common across myriad disciplines. In a
way, this is a divergence from the standard reductionist approach used in modern physics
where a system is studied by analysing it’s components and constituents. In network
science however, more attention is given to the collective and synergistic properties of the
components that consist in the system. It has to be noted that sociologists have been
conducting significant amount of quantitative studies of social networks over decades[94,
258]. However, it is quite recently that mathematicians and physicists and computer
scientists have gained momentum in developing abstract models of networks.
With the advent of the world wide web, the interest of networks have gained surging
interest. Online social networks have made it possible for individuals from across the
world to form connections and build relationships that may not have been possible if it
wasn’t for the leaps in technological advances in the recent years. Studying the growth and
evolution of these systems need novel approaches that may help to utilise such networks in
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(a) The original map of the Konigsberg
bridges
(b) The graph constructed based on the
Konigsberg bridges
Figure 2.1: Eulers seven bridges of Konigsberg[2, 1]
the most productive manner. A good example for this is utilising the online social networks
for direct and indirect marketing of goods and services. On the other hand, it may also
help to avoid potential dangers and undesirable factors that could spread via networks.
For example, if the most influential members within the social network are identified, it
may help to crack down a terrorist network, preventing potential acts of terrorism. How
game theory and network science can be intertwined is discussed extensively in the book,
‘Networks, Crowds and Markets’ by Easley and Kleinberg[78].
Following are some of the key questions that networks scientists have been and are still
trying to address[165]:
• What topological measures can be used to characterise the properties of networks?
• What are the properties that are common across different kinds of real-world net-
works? What are the domain specific properties of real-world networks?
• How to design algorithms to study the properties of networks?
• How do these properties of networks affect the information diffusion, robustness and
failure tolerance of networks?
• Given a network with certain set of properties, what is the most optimum way to
search for a particular node in the network?
This work too tries to address some of these broad research questions within the adopted
context. In order to fully appreciate these questions and their implications, it is necessary
to have a more detailed view on networks and their properties and attributes.
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2.2.1 Networks
A network is a representation of a system where the components are represented as nodes
or vertices and their interconnections are represented as links or edges[72]. Though this a
fairly simple representation of a system, it is extremely powerful and flexible in capturing
the static and dynamic properties of the system in concern.
A network could consist of nodes and links of different types. On the other hand, there
could be networks with same abstract type but different attributes attached to them. A
example would be a social network where attributes such as age, sex and income would
be specific attributes attached to each node. Links could also have properties attached to
them. For instance, in a social network, the type of relationship could be a property of the
link. The properties of links could be of either scalar or discrete types. For instance, the
sex of an individual in a social network is a discrete attribute while the weight of a node
could be modelled as a scalar attribute. However, by nature a network representation is
an abstract representation where nodes and links are represented as abstract entities. This
abstraction may be beneficial in identifying the common properties over different types
of networks, as representing too much specifics could be detrimental in identifying the
abstract properties of a network. On the other hand, it could cause the loss of important
information that are specific to each node. It is up to the network scientist to compromise
on the level of abstraction and the provision of node-specific information in modelling
networks.
According to the system that needs to be represented, different types of networks can
be utilised. The links of a network may be directed, such as in road traffic networks, or
undirected such as the network of neurons in the brain. A network could have weighted or
unweighted links. For instance, the power line network would have load capacities attached
to each power line, which can be considered as a ‘weight’ attached to the network. One
of the most common network models is knows as ‘Bipartite networks’, which is used to
model the relationships between two types or classes of objects, such that the two types
of objects are fully connected with each other. For instance, a bipartite graph could be
used to map the graduate students with a faculty.
The ‘topology’ of a network is the spatial structure of the nodes and their interconnections.
Unlike the scalar or discrete attributes that may be attached to the nodes or the links,
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the network topology carries implicit information that could be node specific or globally
relevant to the entire network. Topology of a network can be analysed using graph the-
oretical and statistical methods to identify these properties of nodes and the network.
One of the key advantages of using network topology for network analysis is that it can
be done without having access to the concrete scalar or discrete properties of nodes and
links. Thus, a network scientist may derive useful information about the system that is
represented using the network through topological analysis, even if the nodes and links
represented are completely abstract. This makes topological analysis a powerful tool that
could be applied to networks across myriad domains. The Fig. 2.11 represents some of the
most common and trivial network topologies that could be used to model a system[246].
(a) Ring (b) Star (c) Lattice
Figure 2.2: Basic topologies
Though the graphical representation of a network may be useful to a human observer
to capture its global characteristics and patterns, simple representations of networks are
necessary in network analysis. One of the most common methods of representing a network
is by using an adjacency matrix. An adjacency matrix is a N × N matrix, where the
network would consist of N nodes. The matrix values could either consist of link weights
or a boolean flag to represent the presence or absence of a link. The other most common
representation is a link list where each item in the list would be the source node and
the destination node of each link, if the network is directed. In this work, both these
approaches are extensively used to perform the network analysis. Fig. 2.3 depicts a
simple undirected network with the corresponding adjacency matrix and the link list.
2.3 Real-world Complex Networks
While complex network properties have been observed in a plethora of networks under
heterogeneous domains, real-world complex networks can be divided into four broad cat-
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(a) Graphical representation (b) Adjacency matrix (c) Link list
Figure 2.3: Different representations of networks
egories. Namely, Social networks, information networks, technological networks and bi-
ological networks[177]. Even though the domains of these networks may vary, complex
network features and mathematical models are relevant across these domains.
2.3.1 Social Networks
A social network consists of a set of people or groups with certain patterns of interactions
or contacts among them[104]. The friendships among individuals, business relationships
among companies and collaborations among scientists are all examples of social networks.
Social networks are one of the most dynamically changing and evolving forms of complex
networks that can be observed in the real-world. Further, they can be modelled with
the mathematical models such as the scale-free model and the small-world model. One
of the key advantages of studying social networks from a complex networks perspective
is that it enables harnessing the decades of qualitative and quantitative studies done by
social scientists, studying social networks. The first examples of such studies include the
study on factory workers in late 1930s[218] and the mathematical models developed by
Rapoport[215], who was the first to stress the significance of degree distribution in studying
networks. One of the difficulties that existed in studying traditional social networks is that
the difficulty in measuring and quantifying the social interactions accurately. With the
advent of the Internet and the World wide web however, a branch of social networks have
gained prominence in the form of online social networks. While these networks are becom-
ing more and more relevant from applications ranging from online marketing to shaping
public political opinion[229, 244], they enable the network scientists to more objectively
quantify the social interactions and extract the network topological information. This has
made online social networks an invaluable tool in network analysis, which has resulted in
a new rigour in study of social networks from a complex networks perspective[164, 138].
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2.3.2 Information Networks
Information networks differ from social networks in that they are formed among informa-
tion based entities, not individuals or organisations. A classic example of an information
network is the citation network of academic papers[70]. These networks contain accurate
and objective information about the network topology and content, making them an at-
tractive choice in network analysis. Citation networks are acyclic, since paper citations
are bound by a chronological order.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous information network available is the world wide web, which
is essentially a network of web pages. It is a unique network of unparalleled size and
growth rate, posing challenging questions on searching and ranking for nodes. The infor-
mation network of WWW has facilitated creation of algorithms and techniques are have
later been adopted in the field of complex network analysis in general. A good example
of such an algorithm is the Page-rank algorithm, which was initially used to rank web
pages by Google[192], and subsequently has been applied in complex network analysis
in general[49, 87]. Some of the lesser known information networks include the citation
network of patents[114] and online peer-to-peer resource sharing networks[147]. While
Peer-to-Peer resource sharing networks have their own growth algorithms, at the macro
level they have been observed to demonstrate complex networks characteristics[118].
2.3.3 Technological Networks
Technological networks are man-made networks that are designed to distribute a com-
modity or a service. Interestingly, these networks are designed, though they evolve and
grow in to self-organising networks behaviour and other complex network characteristics.
A good example of such networks is the power-grid, which is used to distribute electrical
power. Numerous studies have been done on the network analysis of the power grid[7].
Wireless sensor networks, mobile device networks and the Internet are other well-known
technological networks[44]. These networks differ from information networks in that a
node would be represented by a physical entity, rather than an information based entity.
Another important characteristic specific to technological networks is that their topology
and structure is indirectly affected by the geography of their distribution. Further, the
technological networks such as the Internet have several layers of inter-operable networks
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such as the router network and the Internet service provider network.
2.3.4 Biological Networks
Biological networks are an important subset of complex networks that have opened several
multi-disciplinary research avenues. One of the most well-known biological networks is the
network of metabolic pathways. Substantial body of work exists in the network analysis
of metabolic pathways[205, 116]. Gene regulatory networks are another important sub-
class of biological networks. These networks try to capture the expression of a gene in a
network structure. Random boolean networks have been effective in modelling the gene
regulatory networks[11], using which important questions on the origin and nature of life
are addressed. Food webs and animal networks too fall into the category of biological
networks, which help biologists to extract information about animal behaviour using net-
work topological analysis[77]. Networks of the brain or physical neural networks help to
uncover the structure and functionality of the brain in a network perspective[79].
2.4 Network properties and measures
Graph theory and statistical mechanics have contributed with myriad network properties
and measures that are used to analyse networks. There are both local and global properties
that are used to analyse networks. Local measures are those that are bound to a particular
node or a link. On the other hand, global properties enable quantifying the network-wide
properties that a network may possess. Based on these measures it is possible to categorise
networks and even predict their behaviour. While network science literature consists of
numerous properties and measures defined to analyse networks, this section only discusses
those measures that are directly relevant to this work.
2.4.1 Centrality Measures
Perhaps the most common problem that arises with respect to networks is how to identify
the most influential or prominent nodes in them. This problem is relevant in numer-
ous scenarios ranging from preventing the spread of contagious diseases to protecting a
computer network from malicious attacks and viruses[56, 161]. Centrality measures are
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those measures that are used to quantify the prominence of a node within a network. Fol-
lowing are some of the most common centrality measures that are used in network analysis.
Degree Centrality
Perhaps the most common and intuitive centrality measure available in network analysis
is the Degree centrality. Degree refers to the number of connections or links that a node
may have. For instance, in Fig. 2.3[a], the degree of node 1 would be 1 while the degree of
node 4 would b 3. If the network is directed, the in-degree and out-degree of each node can
be considered, depending on whether the incoming links or outgoing links are measured.
Degree is a local measure that can be a topological property of a node.
Betweenness Centrality
While degree is a local measure that can be used to measure centrality, it fails to capture
the global influence in measuring a node’s prominence is a network. Betweenness centrality
of a node is defined as the number of shortest paths going through the node in concern,
considering the shortest paths that connect any two given nodes in the network. The
formal definition of betweenness centrality would be[222]:
BC(v) =
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)
∑
s 6=v 6=t
σs,t(v)
σs,t
(2.1)
Here, σs,t is the number of shortest paths between the source node s and the target node
t. σs,t(v) is the number of shortest paths between source node s and target node t that
lies through node v. Betweenness centrality is most relevant in situations where the infor-
mation flow within a network is taken into consideration, such as in traffic networks.
Closeness Centrality
Closeness measures the average distance to other nodes in the network, from the node in
concern. In essence, it’s a measure of the time that it takes to spread the information
from a particular node to the other nodes in the network. While it is closely related
to betweenness centrality, closeness more relevant in situations where a node acts as a
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generator of information rather than a mere mediator. The Eq. 2.2 denotes the formal
definition of the closeness centrality[222].
CC(v) =
1∑
i 6=v dg(v, i)
(2.2)
Here, dg(v, i) denotes the shortest path (geodesic) distance between nodes v and i. The
average is inverted so that the node that is closest to the other nodes will have the highest
closeness centrality.
Eigenvector Centrality
A recently proposed centrality measure, eigenvector centrality measures a node’s influence
in a network by taking into account the influence of its neighbours. Google’s page-rank
algorithm[191], that is used to rank web pages according to their relevance can be regarded
as a variant of the eigenvector centrality. The eigenvector centrality[38] assumes that
the centrality score of a node is proportional to the sum of the centrality scores of the
neighbours. As such, it is defined iteratively. If the centrality scores of nodes are given
by the matrix X and the adjacency matrix of the network is A, then x can be defined
iteratively as,
x ∝ Ax (2.3)
i.e
λx = Ax (2.4)
The centrality scores are obtained by solving this matrix equation. It can be shown that,
while there can be many values for λ, only the largest value will result in positive scores
for all nodes [182].
2.4.2 Degree Distribution
As mentioned earlier, the degree of a node in a network is the number of edges connected
to that node. Suppose pk is the fraction of nodes in the network that has the degree k.
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Thus, pk would be the probability that a node chosen randomly would have the degree k.
A plot of pk of a given network can be generated by making a histogram of the degrees
of the nodes. This histogram is called the degree distribution[177]. Degree distribution of
a network can be thought as an abstract representation of a network. However, it does
not provide a unique one-to-one mapping of a network as networks with varying mixing
patterns may have similar degree distributions[180]. In a directed network, the in-degree
and out-degree distributions may be considered depending on whether it’s the in-degree or
out-degree that is used to plot the histogram. In practice the degree distribution is plotted
in logarithmic scale to highlight its characteristics. Depending on the degree distribution
plot of a network, it may be characterised into different categories. These categories are
discussed further in section 2.5.
2.4.3 Clustering coefficient
Also referred to as the ‘transitivity’ of a network, clustering coefficient measures the ‘clus-
tering’ or group behaviour of the network. This is an important property that has been
observed in real-world networks and particularly in social networks[163]. This pattern
emerges when the neighbours of a node tend to make connections among themselves. In
social network terminology, this may occur when the two people make connections via
a mutual friend. In network topology terminology, clustering is the presence of height-
ened number of triangles in the network[177]. It can be quantified using the clustering
coefficient C as follows:
C =
3× number of triangles in the network
number of connected triples of nodes
(2.5)
Defined in this manner, clustering coefficient is a local measure, which is seldom referred
to as local clustering coefficient. Clustering coefficient can also be measured as a global
measure by averaging the local clustering coefficient values over the entire network. This
global measure is particularly relevant in signifying the Small-world network model[260,
9, 177], as described in section 2.5.3.
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2.4.4 Average Path length
Average path length is the average distance along the shortest paths that exists among
all possible pairs in a network. It can be regarded as a measure of efficiency in spreading
information over a network. The formal definition of the average path length would be,
lG =
2
n.(n− 1) .
∑
i 6=j
d(vi, vj) (2.6)
Here, d(vi, vj) denotes the shortest distance between the nodes vi and vj , and n is the
number of nodes in network G. Average path length is also an important measure that is
used to define the Small-world network model [177], which will be explained in detail in
section 2.5.3. If the network is disconnected, the average path length calculation would
be infinite, as certain nodes may not be reachable by other nodes. To avoid this issue, the
average path length can be calculated for all connected components and then the average
of those values can be considered as the average path length of the entire network.
2.4.5 Assortativity
One of the interesting questions that can be asked about networks is that which nodes
would tend to pair up with others. Social science and epidemiology has put forth homophily
[156] as a possible answer to this question, suggesting that nodes tend to connect with
similar nodes. Network scientists use the term ‘assortative mixing’ or ‘assortativity’ to de-
fine this mixing pattern. Even in technological networks such as in the network of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) within the Internet, assortative mixing has been observed[177],
suggesting that this property may be relevant in networks in general, and not just in social
networks.
Assortative mixing can occur based on any property of a node. A very common example
of assortative mixing in social networks is mixing by race. Further, such mixing can occur
based on sex, age and even income groups. However, when generic networks are anal-
ysed based on network topology, topological measures become more relevant in analysing
assortative mixing. One of the key advantages of using a topological measure to study as-
sortative mixing is that it enables it to be quantified and compared and contrasted among
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networks. Often, it is the degree of nodes that is used to quantify assortativity, as it is
the most intuitive and inherent property of a node.
Assortative mixing can be quantified using the Assortativity coefficient. It is calculated
by measuring the Pearson correlation coefficient of degrees between lined pairs of nodes.
The Eq. 2.7 is used to calculate the assortativity coefficient in a network[180, 247].
ρ =
1
σ2q
∑
jk
jk (ej,k − qjqk)
 (2.7)
Here, j and k denote the degrees of a given pair in the network, while qk and qj represent
the remaining degree distribution. The remaining degree distribution is a slight variant
of the degree distribution discussed in section 2.4.2, where the degree of each node is
considered excluding the link that connects the pair. The term ejk denotes the joint
probability distribution of the remaining degrees of the two nodes that are connected by
the link, which would specify the probabilities at which the given remaining degrees would
recur within the network. For an undirected network, this property would be symmetric,
and would follow the sum rules
∑
jk ejk = 1 and
∑
j ejk = qk. The assortativity coefficient
would have the range [-1:1]. A positive assortativity would mean that the nodes with
similar degrees would have a higher tendency to connect with each other, while negative
assortativity would indicate that it is the nodes with dissimilar degrees that tend to pair-
up in the given network. An assortativity coefficient value close to 0 would indicate that
there is no clear correlation of mixing patterns with the remaining degrees of nodes. It
has been observed that collaboration networks and social networks tend to demonstrate
positive assortative mixing while natural networks such as food webs and neuron networks
show negative assortativity[180]. Thus, mixing patterns quantified using assortativity is a
useful measure that can be used to analyse and classify networks.
There have been other variants of assortativity that have been proposed that defines assor-
tativity as local measure instead of a global measure and using alternative link properties
to define assortativity [199, 248]. However, these measures would not be explained in
detail in this section as it is beyond the scope of this work.
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2.4.6 Network Resilience
Network resilience is a network’s ability to maintain its functionality and connectivity
against node removal[128, 129]. This property has been subjected to a great deal of
scrutiny, particularly in the field of epidemiology[170]. Further, applications of this prop-
erty can be found in fields such as computer networks, technological networks and financial
networks[15, 120].
2.5 Network models
Three general models of networks can be found in network science literature: random,
small-world and scale-free [165]. These three models are identified by their degree distri-
butions, global properties such as the average path length and clustering coefficient, and
how they evolve over time. These models can either be used to model and approximate
real-world networks. Further, studying such abstract reference models may help network
scientists to predict the characteristics and even manipulate the real-world networks that
they are identified with. It has to be noted that the network models that are discussed
here are display properties that emerge due to self-organisation behaviour and not designed
network topologies such as the star or ring topology.
2.5.1 Random networks
Random networks were initially proposed by Erdo˝s and Re`nyi in their pivotal work ‘On
random graphs’[81]. Erdo˝s and Re`nyi proposed a model to generate random graphs, where
a graph is defined by n labelled nodes connected by e links, where links are chosen randomly
from n(n−1)2 possible edges[9]. Hence, the total number of graphs that could be generated
would be Ce[n(n−1)
2
]. While random networks display elegant mathematical properties,
most characteristics of they deviate significantly from those of real-world networks. Thus,
random networks are often used as an abstract reference model rather than an actual
approximation of the real-world networks. Within the scope of this work, random network
model is used as a reference model in comparison to the scale-free and small-world network
models.
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As mentioned before, the properties of the random network model show marked differ-
ences from real-world networks. For instance, random networks do not show clustering
or grouping behaviour. On the other hand, empirical results from real-world networks,
such as collaboration networks and social networks give relatively higher clustering coeffi-
cient values that are not comparable with the clustering coefficients[9, 183] obtained from
random networks with similar number of nodes.
The other key variation that random networks display from real-world networks is in its
degree distribution. While random networks display Poisson degree distributions, the
degree distributions of most real-world networks are of Power-law degree distributions.
The properties of the power-law degree distribution would be discussed further in section
2.5.2. The degree distribution of a random graph generated using the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi model
would be of the following form, where pk would be the probability of a node having degree
k, where n would be the size of the network. The Fig. 2.4[a] shows a typical Poisson
degree distribution of a random network.
pk = (
n
k) p
k(1− p)n−k ' z
ke−z
k!
(2.8)
Still, the random graph model proposed by Erdo˝s and Re`nyi is significant since it paved
way to the concepts of ‘growth’, ‘evolution’ and ‘emergence’ of network models. When
generating a random network, edges are accumulated in a successive and iterative fash-
ion. One important discovery of the random graph model is that most of the significant
properties of random graphs appear quite suddenly, making it the first ‘complex network
model’ where emergence of properties is prevalent.
2.5.2 Scale-free networks
Scale-free networks are those networks that consist of a power-law degree distribution with
a long tail. Thus, these networks would be deviating significantly from the Poisson degree
distribution of the random networks. The Fig. 2.4[b] shows a typical power-law degree
distribution in comparison to a Poisson degree distribution of a random network. Unlike
random networks, most real-world networks observed do have scale-free networks, making
this model much more relevant in studying real-world networks. In a random network, vast
majority of nodes would have the same number of links. However, in a scale-free networks
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Figure 2.4: The degree distributions of a random network generated using the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi model and a Scale-free
network generated using the preferential attachment growth model. The x-axis is the degree k and the y-axis
represents the number of nodes with degree k, Xk divided by the size of the network N . The degree distribution
of the random network shows a Poisson degree distribution while the scale-free network shows a power-law degree
distribution. Both networks contained 10,000 nodes. The scale-free exponent γ in the scale-free network was
measured to be 2.73.
there would be significant variations in the number of links that a node has. There would a
only a few number of heavily connected nodes or “hubs”, while a vast majority of the nodes
would be connected these hubs via a relatively smaller number of links. For instance, in
social networks, typically there would be highly connected individuals while most others
would be connected to them. As such, these networks would not display ‘scaling’ as the
grow, hence earning the name ‘scale-free networks’. Formally put, a scale-free network
would have the degree distribution pk could be expressed using the following power-law
relationship.
pk ∼ k−γ (2.9)
Here γ is called the ‘scale-free exponent’, which is a measure of the ‘scale-freeness’ of the
network. For most real-world networks, this value is observed to be falling within 2 and
3[9].
Baraba´si and Albert proposed the ‘Preferential-attachment growth model’ to generate
scale-free networks in 1999[25]. Apart from being a growth model, it has also been used
as an explanation on why real-world networks demonstrate scale-free behaviour. Prior to
them, Simon and Price [232, 211] had proposed the notion that power-law degree distri-
butions in networks arise due to the tendency that ”rich get richer”. Several variations
of the preferential attachment model has also been proposed[123]. Baraba´si and Albert
argued that the networks evolve under two main contributing factors. Namely, growth and
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preferential attachment.
1. Growth
The property of growth implies that networks have an inherent tendency to expand
and growth. Within the context of the Baraba´si and Albert model, growth is a
process that happens linearly such that in each timestep, a node is added with m
links where the links are made with the already existing nodes in the network.
2. Preferential attachment
Under preferential attachment, the probability
∏
that a new node will be connected
to node i would be dependent on the degree ki of node i, such that,
∏
(ki) =
ki∑
j kj
(2.10)
where j would be any existing node in the network.
Examples of real-world networks that demonstrate scale-free behaviour are WWW, collab-
oration networks, social networks, networks of the brain[27] and software networks[252].
Considering the heterogeneity of the domains, it is truly remarkable that scale-free model
could have such wide applicability.
2.5.3 Small-world networks
Stanley Milgram[158] was one of the first to demonstrate that social networks demon-
strate the Small-world effect, where most the nodes in a network appear to be connected
via a relatively short path through the network, irrespective of the network size. He de-
vised an experiment where letters were passed among the first-name acquaintances of the
participants and measuring the number of intermediate passers that was involved in the
successful delivery of the letters. It was observed that the letters that were delivered were
passed through at most six people. This experiment paved way to the concept of six
degrees of separation.
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Even before Milgram, the existence of the small-world effect had been speculated. One
of the most remarkable references to this can be found in the short story by the Hun-
garian writer Frigyes Karinthy[119], which was published in 1929. Pool and Kochen had
attempted to propose a mathematical basis for the small-world effect[66]. Subsequently,
it has been noted that the small-world effect is not just specific to social networks but can
be observed in networks in general[29, 167].
The small-world effect can be particularly important when considering the spread of infor-
mation in a network. It suggests that there could be rapid spread of information, may it
be a disease, or a gossip, through a network irrespective of the network size. In a computer
network, small-world effect could be utilised to reduce the number of hops or intermediate
computers that are required to transfer a packet of data from the source to destination.
Thus, it is a very important feature of networks that can be utilised when interacting with
networks.
More recently, mathematical interpretations of small-world effect have been proposed,
instead of the qualitative definitions suggested by the earlier work on this model. One
such definition is that in such networks the average path l, would scale proportional to
the logarithm of network size n. Further, small-world networks demonstrate high cluster-
ing coefficient suggesting that the grouping behaviour would actually useful in reducing
the average path length of the network. Hence, small-world effect is a relative measure
that is typically characterised by the higher clustering coefficient and the lower average
path length. Based on these properties Watts and Strogratz[260] proposed their model
of small-world networks. It is used throughout this work to generate small-world networks.
Watts-Strogatz model
The model proposed by Watts-Strogatz to generate small world networks consists of two
basic steps.
1. Start with order - Start with a ring lattice with N nodes, where every node is connected
to its first K neighbours (k2 on either side).
2. Randomly rewire the edges in the lattice with probability p. By varying p it is possible
to change the transition from an ordered lattice to a fully random network.
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For p = 0 the resulting network would be a regular lattice while for p = 1 the resulting
network would be a completely random network. For low but non-zero values of p, the re-
sulting network would have high clustering coefficient with few ‘long-distance’ connection,
making the average path length relatively low. Such networks would have the ‘small-world
effect’ with relatively high clustering coefficient and relatively low average path length.
Fig. 2.5 depicts a graphical representation of the topological transition that occurs in
the Watss-Strogatz model. While relatively easy to implement, the Watts-Strogatz model
has the shortcoming of producing degree distributions that are not comparable with most
real-world networks[165].
Figure 2.5: The variation from a regular lattice to a total random network in the Watts-Strogatz model[260], when
the rewiring probability p is increased. The networks that have relatively higher clustering coefficient and lower
average path length would have the small-world effect.
It has to be noted that the small-world and scale-free effects are mutually exclusive[14].
In other words, there could be real-world networks that demonstrate both the small-world
and scale-free behavior, such as most social and collaboration networks. However, there
could be networks that only demonstrate either of those effects.
A variation of the Small-world networks have been proposed by Newman et al.[178], where
instead of rewiring the links, shortcuts are added among the existing network structure.
Both the Preferential attachment model and the Watts-Strogatz model were extensivvely
used throughout this thesis to generate the theoretical scale-free and small-world networks,
respectively.
In this sub-section of the background, emphasis was given on providing an introduction on
the concepts of network science that are relevant in this study. However, without delving
into the foundations of strategic interactions among autonomous agents built upon game
theory, it is impossible to study the strategic interactions that occur on top of networks of
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players. Therefore, next, we will look at the science of strategic games, which is the next
pillar on which this work is based.
2.6 Game theory
Game theory is the science of strategic decision making among agents. Strategic decisions
are decisions that are interdependent, where actions of one affects the other. On the other
hand, game can be regarded as the formal study of cooperation and conflict[171]. For
game theory to be applied, multiple agents have to interact in a strategic decision making
environment. These agents may be individuals, firms, governments or combinations of
those. The models and concepts provided in game theory is used to formulate and analyse
strategic decision making scenarios. Following are the basic concepts and terminology that
are used in game theory to define strategic decision making scenarios.
• Game - The particular strategic decision making scenario that is being modelled.
This may range from a stock trading in the share market to placing a bid in an
online auction.
• Player - The agents that are involved in making the strategic decisions.
• Strategy - Actions that are available for each player.
• Payoff - The return or utility assigned to each action taken by each player.
2.6.1 History
Game theory originated as a branch of mathematics and micro-economics. The earliest
known game theoretic analysis was done by Antoine Cournet in his study of Duopoly
in 1938[141]. Mathematicians Emile Borel and Von Neumann[155] formulated a formal
theory of games in their respective works. However, the inception of the modern field of
game theory could be regarded as the monumental volume Theory of games and economic
behaviour, by Von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern. This work provides
much of the terminology and concepts that are in use in the field of game theory.
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Perhaps the most important concept that modern game theory is based on is the concept
of Nash equilibrium, which was proposed by John Nash in 1950[174]. He proposed that
finite non-cooperative games always have an equilibrium point at which all agents choose
actions that are best for them given their opponents’ choices. In this work, the concept of
Nash equilibrium and its variations are used extensively, as explained in the subsequent
sections. Even though game theory originated as a branch of micro-economics, later on it
has been applied to myriad fields such as political science, psychology, sociology and even
biology[61, 172]. This may be due to the fact that the prevalence of strategic decision
making scenarios in all these domains, where game theoretic concepts may be applied to
model and analyse such scenarios.
With the rise of computer and communications technology, game theory has found many
novel applications in areas such as online auctions, network routing and frequency band-
width allocation. For instance, Google cooperation’s ‘AdSense’ uses game theory to bid
on keywords that are intended to be used for targeted advertising[115]. In engineering,
there is growing interest in using non-cooperative game theory due to the possibility of
designing large-scale systems that globally regulate their performance and functionality
in a distributed and a decentralised manner. Modelling a system as a set of sub-systems
that compete for a limited resource is relevant in most engineered systems, where game
theory is an attractive tool of choice. Examples of such applications include congestion
control of network traffic, optimising network routing and power allocation in wireless
sensor networks[13, 241]
Following sub-sections explain some of the basic concepts and models identified in contem-
porary game theory. In particular, several well-known classifications of strategic games
are discussed.
2.6.2 Cooperative and Non-cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory[41] focuses on how coalitions could be formed among play-
ers to maximise the utility of each player in concern. As such, cooperative games can be
regarded as a situation where the cooperative behaviour is enforced on players by factors
external to the game or the environment itself. Cooperative game theory is more appro-
priate to legal and political situations where the relative amount of power held by each
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player has to be taken into account. Bargaining is an example where cooperative game
theory can be applied, where the relative strengths of two parties involved is critical in
arriving at a solution. Formally, a cooperative game consists of a finite set of N players,
called the grand coalition, and a characteristic function v: 2N → R from a set of all possible
coalitions of players to a set of utilities that satisfies v(θ) = 0.
Non-cooperative game theory is on the other hand is concerned about the strategic
decision making by individual players. These games are called non-cooperative since each
player tends to pursue its own interests which may conflict with the interests of others.
In the non-cooperative game paradigm, the details of the ordering and timing of players’
choices are critical in determining the outcome of the game. It is important to note that
cooperation can arise in non-cooperative games as well, however it is not so by design but
due to emergent behaviour. Non-cooperative game theory can be used to define most of
the decision making scenarios in the real-world, such as in evolution of biological species,
negotiations in the power distribution[82, 68] and forecasting in financial markets. In this
work, we would be mainly focusing on the non-cooperative games, where individual, self
interested and rational agents would interact with each other in strategic decision making
environments.
Non-cooperative games can be represented in two basic forms depending on the consider-
ation of the time dimension, known as Normal-form and Extensive-form game representa-
tions.
2.6.3 Normal form and extensive form games
Normal form game[109] descriptions define strategic decision making scenarios where
the players play their moves simultaneously. In other words, normal form games do not
take into account the temporal element in decision making. Even if there’s a temporal
difference in the moves taken by the players, if there isn’t a flow of information among
them, such scenarios may be represented as normal form games.
A normal form representation may consist of the following components.
1. A finite number of players.
2. A strategy set assigned to each player.
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3. A payoff function, which assigns a payoff to each player based on his strategy and
the strategies of the other players.
A Normal form or a simultaneous move games are used to define scenarios where the
players are not aware of each others actions when choosing their strategies. It could be
that the players play the moves simultaneously or that they don’t have access to the
information of the opponent’s strategies. Thus, even when there is a time difference in
the moves, if the players don’t have the knowledge of the opponent’s moves, it can be
considered as a normal form game. If the number of players engaged is two and if the
list of strategies are limited to a few elements, the outcome of the payoff function can be
represented in a matrix, which is referred to as the payoff matrix. Payoff matrix depicts
the two players, their strategies and payoffs. Following figure depicts a sample payoff
matrix.
1, 3 2, 4
1, 0 3, 3
L R
U
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P
la
y
e
r 
1
Figure 2.6: Sample payoff matrix
According the to payoff matrix given in Fig. 2.6, player 1 has two different strategies: Up
(U) and Down (D). Player 2 has two different strategies, left L and right R. According to
the given payoff matrix if player 1 chooses strategy U and player 2 chooses strategy R, the
outcome is (2,4), which suggests that the payoff of player 1 is 2 and player 2 is 4. Examples
of normal form games include classical games such as prisoner’s dilemma game[216] and
Coordination game, which will be discussed further in the subsequent sections.
Extensive form games[197] represent strategic decision making scenarios where the
players play their strategies consequently. In other words, the temporal sequence of events
are taken into consideration. Typically, an extensive form game is represented as a game
tree. Each level of the tree represents a temporal state of the game and each node rep-
resents a stage of the game. Examples of games that can be represented in the extensive
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form include board games such as Chess and Auction games, where the sequence of actions
are important. A game in extensive form may be analysed directly or could be converted
into a equivalent strategic form game and then analysed.
Fig. 2.7 depicts a sample game tree of an extensive form game. According to the given
game tree, the payoffs of player 1 would be 1 and the player 2 would be 2, given that the
player 1 players the strategy D and subsequently player 2 chooses the strategy U ′. It is
important to note that the flow of information is what is critical for the decision making
of the players in the extensive-form games, rather than the actual flow of time. If the
information flow is not intact, the game could effectively be regarded as a normal-form
game, even if the actions are taken at two different instances of time.
Figure 2.7: An extensive form representation of a game
Extensive form games can further be sub-divided into perfect and imperfect information
games. An extensive-form game has perfect information if each player is perfectly informed
of all the events that have previously occurred when making a decision. Board games such
as chess and tic-tac-toe are examples of perfect information games, where each player
is aware of the steps that are taken up to the point of making a decision. Further,
only one player makes a move at a given time, thus there are no simultaneous moves.
Backward induction[16] method is used to solve a game with perfect information, by
reasoning backwards in time.
However, in most real-world strategic decision making scenarios, players do not have full
access to the information that is relevant to their choices. Extensive form games with
imperfect information are used to model such scenarios. The information that is relevant
in such scenarios would be the type of the players, their strategies and their respective
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payoffs. Normal-form games can be regarded as a special case of imperfect information
extensive-form games where a player has absolutely no knowledge of the previous move of
the opponent.
While acknowledging the relevance and applicability in extensive form games in a wide-
range of domains and applications, this works focuses mainly on normal form games ap-
plied in a network context.
Complete and incomplete information games
Another important categorisation that can be made regarding games is with respect to
the information availability to players. In complete information games, all players are
completely informed of all other players’ payoffs and all possible strategy profiles they
may undertake. Both normal-form and extensive-form games may fall into this category.
For instance normal form games like prisoner’s dilemma and extensive-form games such
as chess can be regarded as complete information games.
In games with incomplete information[102], players may not have common knowledge of
the game being played. Following may be some of the aspects on which the players may
not have common knowledge.
• Payoffs
• Who the other players are
• What are the possible strategies available
• What are the utilities attached to each strategy
• The knowledge that the opponent has of the game and of the player in concern
Due to the complex and dynamic nature of the information flows, most real-world networks
fall into the category of the incomplete information games. Following are some of the
examples where incomplete information games may be used to model the strategic decision
making scenarios.
1. In price competition scenarios, firms may be aware of their own costs, but not the
costs of others.
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2. Firms involved in R&D might have knowledge about their own product, but may
not know whether there are similar products being developed by the other firms.
3. A government may decide on a tax policy without having the prior knowledge of the
ploys that people may develop to avoid paying taxes.
4. The climate change agreements among countries may vary based on their beliefs of
the effect of climate change.
The players in an incomplete information game may have private and public information
components that they utilise in making strategic decisions. This heterogeneous of infor-
mation about the opponents and the game may lead to non-optimal or bounded rationality
of the players. Capturing this heterogeneity of rationality of the players in a network is a
critical research question, that would help to predict the behaviour of agents accurately.
This is one of the key research questions that we try to address in Chapters 6,7 and 8.
2.6.4 Pure strategy and Mixed strategy games
In a pure strategy game, players would have a complete definition on how the players would
play the game. It provides a deterministic strategy for each player when the opponent plays
a move. The strategy set of a pure strategy game is the set of pure strategies available
to that particular player. In other words, the pure strategy game is a game where the
‘strategy space’, that is the set of strategies available for the player, coincides with the
‘action space’, which is the set of actions that could be taken by the player. Classical
prisoner’s dilemma game and the Coordination game are defined as pure strategy games.
In mixed strategy games[255], there’s an assignment of a probability to each strategy. As
such, the strategies are not chosen deterministically. The probability distribution of a
mixed strategy game is continuous, enabling a player to select from an infinite number of
mixed strategies. A pure strategy game can be regarded as a special case of the mixed
strategy game, where one strategy is selected, the probability of it being selected is always
1 and the probability of other strategies being selected would be 0.
The payoff matrix given in Fig. 2.8 demonstrates the matching pennies game, which
is an example of a mixed strategy game. In such a game, each player would choose its
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strategy simultaneously based on a coin toss. Thus the probability distribution of selecting
a strategy for each player would be [0.5, 0.5].
1, -1 -1,1
-1,1 1,-1
Head Tail
Head
Tail
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y
e
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1
Figure 2.8: Matching pennies game where mixed strategies are used.
In this work both pure and mixed strategy games are simulated among spatially distributed
players.
2.6.5 Nash Equilibrium
A dominant strategy is a strategy that would always provide the best possible payoff
irrespective of the strategy taken up by the opponent. However, most strategies do not
fall into this category and thus it is necessary to consider the equilibrium states to consider
the most appropriate strategy to adopt. In 1950, John Nash[174] suggested the concept
of Nash equilibrium, which has become the pivotal concept in game theory ever since.
Nash equilibrium suggests that there exists a profile of strategies such that each player’s
strategy is the best response against the equilibrium strategies of other players. Here,
the best response is the strategy that gives the highest payoff. In other words, at Nash
equilibrium, the players cannot improve their payoffs unilaterally.
A formal definition for Nash equilibrium can be given as follows. Let (S, f) be a game
with n players, where Si is the strategy set of a given player i. Thus, the strategy profile
S consisting of the strategy sets of all players would be, S = S1 × S2 × S3.... × Sn.
f = (f1(x), ....., fn(x)) would be the payoff function for xS. Suppose xi is th strategy
profile of player i and x−i be the strategy profile of all players except player i. Thus,
when each player i1, ....., n chooses strategy xi that would result in the strategy profile
x = (x1, ...., xn), giving a payoff of f(i) to that particular player. A strategy profile x
∗S
is in Nash equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player would
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return a higher utility for that particular player. Formally put,
∀i, xiSi : fi(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ fi(xi, x∗−i) (2.11)
A strategic game may have multiple equilibria. According to the above definition the game
represented by the payoff matrix in Fig. 2.9 would have equilibrium pairs where the two
players select the equilibria (U1,1, U2,1) and (U1,2, U2,2).
1, -1 -1,1
-1,1 1,-1
U2,1 U2,2
U1,1
U1,2
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Figure 2.9: Game with multiple Nash equilibria
While the equilibria in the above game are pure Nash equilibria, since the strategies in-
volved are pure strategies, Nash equilibria has been shown to exist in Mixed strategy games
as well[173]. In Mixed strategy games, it is the expected payoff under a given strategy
distribution that is considered in identifying the mixed strategy nash equilibrium. For
instance, in the matching pennies shown in Fig. 2.8, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
would be [0.5,0.5] for both players, where the expected payoff of each player would be 0.
Next, a brief explanation is given on the two games that are extensively used throughout
this work as network-based games; The prisoner’s dilemma game and the Coordination
game.
2.6.6 Prisoner’s dilemma game
Prisoner’s dilemma game[216] is a classical normal form game defined between two players.
The name is derived from a hypothetical decision making scenario between two prisoners.
There is no judicial evidence against either of them, except if one prisoner testifies against
the other. If one of them testifies, he will be awarded with immunity from prosecution,
whereas the other will serve a longer sentence. If both testify, the punishment will be
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less. However, if both of them do not testify, their mutual sentences will be substantially
reduced. Thus, the Nash would occur when both players testify against each other. How-
ever, the optimal strategy for them is not to testify. This is the ‘dilemma’ that they are
faced in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Fig. 2.10 depicts the canonical payoff matrix of a prisoner’s dilemma game. The ‘co-
operation’ is identified as the situation where the prisoner doesn’t testify and ‘defection’
is where the prisoner testifies against the other. In the given canonical form, the payoff
inequality T < R < P < S would hold in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
R, R S, T
T, S P, P
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation
Defection
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Figure 2.10: Payoff matrix of a prisoner’s dilemma game
Prisoner’s dilemma game is extensively used to model decision making scenarios where
the individual ‘defections’ at the expense of others lead to overall less desirable outcomes.
Examples of such situations include arms races, price wars among corporations, litigation
instead of settlement and environmental pollution[149, 43]. Prisoner’s dilemma game is
extensively used in modelling populations of players in social networks, particularly in the
form of an iterative game[17, 83].
Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
When the prisoner’s dilemma game is player over many iterations and when the previous
actions of the players affect the next selection of each player, it is called the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma game[17]. In pure strategy games, a player may adopt the strategy of an
opponent, based on the payoffs of previous interactions, while in mixed strategy games the
strategy probability distribution of a player may alter based on the previous interactions
with the opponents. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is widely applied in populations
of players. Even though the Nash equilibrium of a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma game
is mutual defection, it has been observed that cooperation may emerge as the dominant
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strategy in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game in a population of players[196]. This is
in apparent conflict with the Darwinian world-view of the prevalence of the fittest who
are continuously in conflict with each other. It has been suggested that this peculiar phe-
nomenon could be a result of the scale-free topology of most of the real-world populations
of players[223]. It is a perfect example of the critical nature that network topology players
in determining the outcome of strategic interactions in a population of players, which is
part of the motivation for this work. In the existing literature, the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game has been hardly used as a means of measuring public good. It is usu-
ally the Public goods game that is used for this purpose. But in a voluntary network of
self-interested agents, maximizing the public good under the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game may be more realistic. Thus, in Chapter 5, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
along with genetic optimisation is used to determine optimum placement of strategies in
a non-homogeneous network, in order to optimise public or common good.
n-Memory strategies
In iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, the players consider the history of interactions
between the opponent in choosing the next strategy. N memory strategies consider the
interactions occurred in the previous N steps, when making the next move. Memory-
one strategies are a special subclass of N memory strategies where only the immediate
previous interaction with the same opponent is considered in deciding the next move. The
resulting mixed strategy distribution is a probability distribution, that is conditional to
the previous set of interactions by the same players. Perhaps the most commonly known
memory-one strategy is the tit-for-tat strategy[184], where a player would always respond
with the same action that its opponent used in the previous iteration. In iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game, a memory-one strategy would consist of four probabilities depending on
the previous set of interactions of the two players. Those four probabilities would be [CC,
CD, DC, DD] where C and D would denote cooperation and defection in the previous
interaction by each player, respectively. By varying these 4 probabilities, it is possible to
come up with infinite number of memory-one strategies. There are well-known memory-
one strategies such as the Zero-determinant (ZD) strategy and the Pavlov strategy, which
have specific conditional probability functions attached to them. There has been a recent
interest in the evolutionary stability of the Zero Determinant strategy[4]. However, there
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hasn’t been a sufficient discussion on the effect of network topology on the evolutionary
stability of strategies. Thus, in Chapter 4, we adopt memory-one strategies such as the
ZD strategy, in an attempt to determine the topological effect of the evolutionary stability
of strategies.
2.6.7 Coordination game
In this work, Coordination game[157] is extensively used, particularly in Chapter 3 to
evaluate the effect of network topology on coordination behaviour. Coordination game
is a classical game defined in game theory literature that has two pure Nash equilibria.
Coordination game is used to model scenarios which the agents involved can mutually
gain higher utility by coordinating or making decisions that are mutually consistent. In
other words, what is beneficial for a single player would be beneficial for all. Thus, the
players engaged in a coordination game may not have the ‘dilemma’ that the players
in the prisoner’s dilemma game would have. However, it should be noted that the two
Nash equilibria in coordination game are mutual cooperation and mutual defection, where
cooperation and defection are the two strategies available. It is mutual cooperation that
gives the highest utility to the agents involved although mutual defection too is a Nash
equilibrium solution.
There are several variations of coordination games defined. Following are some of the
variations of the coordination game utilised in this work. These variations exist due to the
relationship among the payoffs given in the payoff matrix. Stag-hunt game, Battle of the
sexes game and the pure coordination games are the three variations of the coordination
game that are mainly adopted in this work. Following figures depict sample payoff matrices
that depict the payoff relationships in each of those games.
Each of these games are woven around an interesting premise that describe a particular
strategic decision making scenario. For instance, the stag-hunt game refers to a scenario
where two hunters hunt for a stag or a Hare. In order to hunt a stag, both of them need to
coordinate, thus coordination gives the highest payoff. If either of them chooses to hunt a
hare, the other hunter would get zero utility as it is impossible for a single hunter to hunt
a stag. If both hunters hunt a hare, then they would get an equal but lesser payoff. On
the other hand, the battle-of-the-sexes game describe a strategic decision making scenario
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(a) Pure coordination game
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(b) Stag-hunt game
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(c) Battle of the sexes
Figure 2.11: Variations of the coordination game
where a husband and a wife would decide on whether to go to a party or staying at home,
depending on their preferences. These payoff matrices can be effectively used to describe
a strategic decision making scenario where coordination would give a higher mutual payoff
compared to defection. A typical example where coordination game is applied is discussed
in Roger McCain’s book ”Game Theory: A non-technical Introduction to the analysis of
strategy”[152]. He describes a scenario where two are driving down the same road that
will soon meet each other. Supposing these is not centralised traffic direction is available,
the only way each car can avoid collision is by coordinating with each other. We noticed
that there was a lack of rigorous theoretical analysis on how the network topology and
information diffusion facilitates coordination in a population of networked players, in the
existing literature. Thus, in Chapter 3 we attempt to evaluate the cumulative effect of
network topology and information diffusion on a population of networked players who are
collectively playing the coordination game.
So far in this subsection, we discussed the history and background and game theory that
are relevant to this work. Next, we would look at some of the fundamental assumptions
made in game theory. These assumptions are central to this research, since providing a
network based interpretations to them is a key contributions of this work.
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2.7 Rationality of self-interested players
In strategic games, being rational is closely associated with being self-interested. In a
game theoretic context, self-interested behaviour is the tendency of a player to maximise
its own payoff. While this self-interested behaviour may not always be the case with
autonomous agents in a strategic game in the real-world, it is a fundamental assumption
in game theory. In particular, Nash equilibrium assumes that players make decisions with
perfect rationality. In literature on game theory and strategic decision making, rationality
is often discussed, although there isn’t a precise definition of it. One possible definition of
rationality is that a player is rational if[195];
1. the player consistently acts to improve its payoff without the possibility of making
errors,
2. the player has full knowledge of other players’ intentions and the actions available
to them.
3. the player has infinite capacity to calculate a priori all possible refinements to the
Nash equilibrium of the game in its attempt to find the best possible strategy avail-
able.
Thus, if a game involves only rational agents, each of whom assume that the other players
too are rational, then the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium would match with
the actual outcome of the strategic decision making scenario.
2.7.1 Bounded rationality
Even though perfect rationality is a fundamental assumption in game theory and the
theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium, in most real-world decision making scenarios
among real-world players, such perfect rationality is hardly observed. It was originally
Herbert A. Simon[231] as an alternative basis for mathematical modelling of decision
making. Decision making by real-world strategic players is almost always constrained by
three limiting factors; the cognitive capacity of the agent, the information available for
the agent to make a decision and the time available to compute the most appropriate
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decision[88]. These factors are due to the limitations of the factors that are essential for
a player to be perfectly rational, as discussed in the previous sub-section. These limiting
factors may be observed in human players and even non-human autonomous agents. This
non-optimal and limited rationality is known as the ‘bounded rationality’ of self interested
players.
The notion of bounded rationality does not mean that players make irrational decisions.
On the contrary, players do strive to make rational decisions, yet they may not always do
so. In other words, the players in a strategic decision making environment are inclined
to make ‘better’ decisions, even though they may not always make the ‘best’ decision.
As a result, there would be an error component attached to the decisions made by the
self-interested players in strategic environments. This error component may be due to the
lack of information available, limitations of the cognitive capacity and the time constrains
in making decisions. Within the context of this work, it is assumed that all players that
are spatially distributed have equal computational time and cognitive capacity in making
decisions and the only limitation would be the availability of information about the game
and the other players in the environment. This may enable modelling bounded rationality
from the perspective of network topological properties and information transfer, where
such externally observable characteristics may be used to deduce the bounded rationality
of players. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, we attempt to model the distribution of bounded
rationality of players in a networked population, using network topology and information
transfer among players.
Many different models of bounded rationality have been proposed. These models can be
thought of as generalisations of the Nash equilibrium, where errors in decision making due
to bounded rationality is considered in predicting agent behaviour and the outcomes of the
games. Most of these models have originated in the fields of political science or economics,
due to the inherent complexities of human interaction in those fields. Following are some
of the commonly known bounded rationality decision making models.
2.7.2 Generalisations of Nash equilibrium
For non-cooperative games, Nash equilibrium is the pivotal concepts which predicts an
equilibrium state in existence for all non cooperative strategic scenarios. However, this
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prediction is based on the notion of perfect or optimum rationality. According to the
argument of bounded rationality however, there exists non optimal rationality of players
in making decisions. Thus, it is necessary to come up with alternative equilibrium models
that facilitates for the bounded rationality. These models can be regarded as extensions
or generalizations of Nash equilibrium. There’s a noise element introduced in each of
the bounded rationality equilibrium models to account for the errors introduced by the
bounded rational players.
Several approximation models of Nash equilibrium are found in the literature. The most
prominent of them are the Bayes-Nash equilibrium model, noisy introspection model, the
-Equilibrium and the Quantal Response Equilibrium(QRE) modes. These equilibrium
models attempt to accommodate for the error or the noise component in decision making
by bounded rational players.
2.7.3 Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
The first extension to Nash equilibrium that we consider is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
[67, 113]. Though it is not directly related to bounded rationality, Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium is applicable in games where there is incomplete information. The incompleteness of
information may lead to bounded rationality of players making them choose non-optimal
decisions in a stochastic manner. In most game theoretic situations, the agent in con-
cern is unsure about the preferences or intentions of others. The existence of incomplete
information in a game introduces additional strategic interactions and also raises ques-
tions related to ‘learning’. Following are some of the common examples of games with
incomplete information;
• Bargaining - The amount that the other party is willing to pay is unknown to the
agent.
• Auctions - How much should an agent pay for an object that the agent wants,
knowing that the other agents too compete for the same object?
• Market competition - Firms that are unaware of the exact cost of their competitors.
• Signalling games - How to infer information about the others agents from the signals
they send, such as in a job interview process.
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• Social learning - How to leverage the decisions of others in order to make better
decisions.
Bayesian games are modelled by introducing Nature as a player of the game. Nature would
randomly assign a player with a type according to a probability distribution function of
the players’ type space. A Bayesian game would consist of,
• A set of players I
• A set of pure strategies for each player i: Si
• A set of types for each player i: θiΘ
• A payoff function for each player i : ui(s1, ..., sI , θ1, ...., θI)
• A probability distribution p(θ1, ......., θI) over types
The knowledge of all these components assumed to be the common knowledge in a
Baysian games, which is refereed to as the ‘common-prior assumption’. Based on this
assumption, at Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each type of player chooses a strategy that
maximises the expected utility given the actions of all types of other players and the
player’s ‘beliefs’ about the other players. Following is the formal definition of the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
The strategy profile s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all iI and for all θiΘi,
si(θi) arg max
s′iSi
∑
θ−i
p (θ−i| θi)ui
(
s
′
is−i(θ−i)θi, θ−i
)
(2.12)
The expected payoffs that are calculated using the Bayes rule are optimised to identify the
strategy distribution at the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. It has to be noted that while the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium tries to incorporate the incomplete information that a player
may have about the other players’ types, it does not directly differentiate the heterogeneity
of rationality among players.
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2.7.4  Equilibrium
-Equilibrium[214, 55], also called the near-rationality equilibrium is a generalization of
Nash equilibrium based on the deviations of the payoffs from the Nash equilibrium pre-
dictions. Given  is a non-negative parameter, a game is considered to be in  Equilibrium
if for any player it is not possible to gain more than  in expected payoff by unilaterally
deviating from his strategy. Nash equilibrium could be regarded as a specific instance of 
equilibrium where the value of  would b 0. Following is the formal definition of  equilib-
rium. In the near rational equilibria a player who is not perfectly maximising her utility
cannot improve her payoff by a substantial amount by playing her Nash equilibria more
accurately. Though the payoff losses for a player is quite small, the equilibria derived
often represent substantial departures from the respective Nash equilibrium prediction.
Models of near rationality equilibria may be appropriate for the description of empirical
phenomena.
 equilibrium concept relaxes conception of a perfectly rational player to a model where
each player is satisfied to get closer to, but not necessarily arrive, at its best response to
the other players’ strategies. In a  Equilibrium, no player can increase its utility by more
than  by choosing another strategy. Thus, an  equilibrium is identified by identifying
a strategy for each player so that her payoff is within  of the maximum possible payoff
given the other players’ strategies. The formal definition of the  equilibrium is as follows;
Definition 2.7.1.  - Equilibrium σ = (σ1, ....., σ

n)
∑
comprises a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium of a game G if, for all iN , for all σ
′
i
∑
i , and a fixed  > 0, ui(σ
′
i, σ

−i) −
ui(σ

−i) ≤ .
A pure strategy -Equilibrium is a vector of pure strategies, sS, that satisfies the equiv-
alent condition. According to the given definition,  = 0 would reduce the -Equilibrium
to Nash equilibrium. Therefore, -Equilibrium can be regarded as a generalised form of
Nash equilibrium.
Even though -equilibrium provides a convenient model of providing for the errors in deci-
sion making, it does not provide a mechanism for quantifying the rationality of players in
a rationality parameter. Hence, we adopt the Quantal Response Equilibrium model which
consists of a rationality parameter that could be used to model the bounded rationality
of each player.
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2.7.5 Quantal response equilibrium
Probabilistic choice models are often used to incorporate stochastic elements in to the
analysis of individual decision, which was proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey[153, 91]
These models are based on Quantal response functions such as the logit and probit func-
tions. Quantal response functions provide an analogous approach to model noisy players.
The Quantal response functions, on which the Quantal response equilibrium is based on,
have the unique feature where the deviations from optimal decisions are negatively cor-
related with the associated costs. In other words, in a when players behave according to
a quantal response function, they are more likely to adopt a better choice compared to a
worse choice, though they may not always adopt the best choice. Formally put, quantal
response function maps the vector of expected payoffs from available choices into a vector
of choice probabilities that is monotone in the expected payoffs.
In a strategic decision making environment, a player’s beliefs from adopting different
strategies are indirectly determined by its beliefs about the opponents’ actions. Thus,
beliefs determine the expected payoffs, which in turn would generate choice probabilities
according to a quantal response function. In equilibrium, the Quantal response functions
imposes the requirement that the beliefs should map the equilibrium choice probabilities.
Quantal response equilibrium can be regarded as a more generalised form of Nash equi-
librium. QRE converges to the Nash equilibrium when the quantal response functions
become very steep and approximate best response functions.
Compared to the bounded rationality and imperfect information based equilibrium models
discussed so far, the QRE model has three distinct advantages when it is used as a tool
for quantifying bounded rationality. Firstly, the probability of mistakes depends on the
payoff differences between actions, so mistakes are less likely when there is a lot at stake
for players. Secondly, it is a consistent equilibrium theory in the sense that th subjects’
responses take into account the mistakes of other players as well. Thirdly, it provides a
rationality parameter, particularly when the logit and probit functions are used, that is
useful in quantifying the individual or collective rationality of each players.
QRE model has been defined for both Normal-form and extensive form games. Since this
work makes extensive use of the Normal-form QRE model, it will be explained in more
detail compared to the other equilibrium models. Following is the formal definition of the
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normal-form QRE model.
Let G = (N,S1, ....., Sn, pi1, ...., pin) be a normal form game, where N = 1, ...., n is the set
of players, Si = si1, ...., siJ(i) is player i’s set of strategies and S = S1 × .....× SN is a set
of strategy profiles, and pii:Si → R is player i’s payoff function. Further, let
∑
i = δ
J(i) be
the set of probability distributions over Si. An element σ
∑
i is a mixed-strategy, which is
mapping from Si to
∑
i, where σi(si) is the probability that player i chooses pure-strategy
si. Let
∑
=
∑
1×....×
∑
N be the set of mixed-strategy profiles. Given a mixed-strategy
profile σ
∑
, player i’s expected payoff is pii(σ) =
∑
sS p(s)pii(s), where p(s) = piiNσi(si)
is the probability distribution over the pure-strategy profiles induced by σ.
Let Pij denote the probability that player i selects strategy j. The main argument behind
QRE is that the strategies with higher expected payoffs are more likely to be chosen,
although the best strategy is not necessarily chosen with probability 1. Thus, a quantal
response function can be defined as follows;
Definition 2.7.2. Quantal response function:
Pi:R
J(i) → ∆J(i) is a regular quantal response function if it satisfies the following
four axioms.
• Interiority: Pij(pii) > 0 for all j = 1, ....., J(i) and for all piiRJ(i).
• Continuity: Pij(pii) is a continuously differentiable function for all piiRJ(i).
• Responsiveness: δPij(pii)/δpiij > 0 for all j = 1, ......, J(i) and for all piiRJ(i).
• Monotonicity: piij > piik implies that Pij(pii) > Pik(pii) for all j, k = 1, ...., J(i).
These four features are critical for the validity and applicability of the model. Interiority
ensures that the model is consistent with all possible data sets, which is important for
empirical applications of the model. Continuity suggests that the arbitrary and small
changes in the payoffs do not cause jumps in the choice probabilities. Responsiveness
suggests that if the expected payoff of an action increases, the choice probability must
also increase. Monotonicity implies that an action with a higher expected payoff is chosen
more frequently than an action with a lower expected payoff.
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Suppose P (pi) = (P1(pi1), ....., Pn(pin)) to be regular if each Pi satisfies the above regularity
axioms. Since P (pi)
∑
and pi = pi(σ) is defined for any σ
∑
, Poσ defines a mapping
from
∑
to itself. Thus, a regular Quantal Response Equilibrium can be defined as follows;
Definition 2.7.3. Quantal response equilibrium Let P be regular. A Regular Quantal
Response Equilibrium of a normal-form game G is a mixed-strategy profile σ∗ such
that σ∗ = P (σ∗).
Logit QRE
The most commonly applied quantal response functions are logit functions, producing a
logit-Quantal response equilibrium (LQRE). In a logit-QRE, the players’ strategy strate-
gies are chosen according to the probability distribution;
Pij =
exp(λiEUij(P−i))∑
k exp(λiEUik(P−i))
(2.13)
where Pij is the probability of player i choosing the strategy j. EUij(P−i) is the expected
utility of player i choosing strategy j given other players are playing according to the
probability distribution P−i. The parameter λi is known as the rationality parameter,
which would be discussed further in the subsequent chapters, where it is interpreted based
on network topology and the information transfer among players in a network. As λi → 0,
the player would be ‘completely irrational’, behaving randomly, and as λi → ∞, the
strategic interaction approaches Nash equilibrium. The rationality parameter is often set
arbitrarily to match the empirical observations. However, in this work, an attempt is made
to quantify it using network topological measures and information transfer measures.
Following is an example where the Logit-QRE is applied in a generalised matching pennies
game. Suppose there are two players engaged in a generalised matching pennies game
where the row player has to choose from top (T) or bottom (B) and the column player has
to has to choose from left(L) or right(R). Row wins a penny while column loses a penny if
the outcome is (top,right) or (bottom, left) and Column wins a penny otherwise. Thus, the
row player’s expected payoff for Top (UT ) is a function of the column player’s probability of
choosing Right (pR). The expected payoff would thus be, UT (pR) = pR−(1−pR) = 2pR−1.
Similarly, UB(pR) = 1− 2pR.
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The Fig. 2.12 depicts the step functions associated with the choice probabilities of the
two players. The smoothed curves represent the appropriate quantal response functions.
If the Top-Right outcomes is changed such that the Row player gets 9 and the Column
player gives -1, it would shift the Row player’s best response line as given in the dotted
line. The dotted curved line shows the respective quantal response function. The new
Nash equilibrium, which is at the intersection of the step functions gives pT as 0.5, while
the respective QRE based pT is higher than that, as shown in the figure. This kind of shift
in choice probabilities due to the variations of a player’s own-payoffs do coincide with the
empirical observations and laboratory experiments[97, 90, 219], which demonstrates the
applicability of the QRE model.
Figure 2.12: Step and quantal response functions of a generalised matching pennies game.[91]
The QRE choice probabilities of the generalised matching pennies game can be derived
using the logit function based calculations given in Eq. 2.14 and 2.15. Similar choice
probability calculations based on the logit-QRE functions are used throughout this work.
pT =
exp(λR[X + 1]pR − 1)
exp(λR[X + 1]pR − 1) + exp(λR[1− 2pR]) (2.14)
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pR =
exp(λC [1− 2pT ])
exp(λC [1− 2pT ]) + exp(λC(2pT − 1)) (2.15)
Here, pT and pR would provide the probabilities at which the Row player would select
the Top option and the column player would select the Right option. λR and λC are the
rationality parameters of the Row player and the column player, respectively. As these
parameters are increased, the response functions become more responsive to the payoff
differences. As the rationality parameters reach infinity, the logit functions converge to
the step functions shown in Fig. 2.12.
Quantal response equilibrium has been proposed for extensive form games as well[154].
In the extensive form QRE, players follow the Bayesian rule and calculate the expected
payoffs based on the QRE strategies of the other players involved. While QRE in extensive
form would have numerous applications ranging from auctions to bargaining problems, in
this work we would only focus on QRE and its rationality parameter in its normal form.
2.8 Evolutionary game theory
The game theoretic concepts discussed so far have mainly been on classical game theory,
where the games are ‘static’ and they are played among two players. However, in most
real-life decision making scenarios, the games are played among populations of players
that interact with each other. Examples of such games are auctions, stock trading options
and political campaigns. Evolutionary game theory originated from the adoption of game
theory into the field of evolutionary biology. Evolutionary game theory[235, 261] improves
on traditional game theory by providing dynamics describing how a game would evolve
over time in populations of players. John Maynard Smith in his book Evolution and
the Theory of Games, 1982 [236] introduced the mathematical basis of Evolutionary game
theory (EGT). Even though the inception of the field is bound with evolutionary biology,
EGT can also be applied in studying the evolution of a population of players over time,
such as in sociology and political science.
Evolutionary biology is based on the idea that an organism’s genes largely contribute to
its observable characteristics. Thus, genes determine the fitness of an organism in a given
environment. Evolutionary game theory argues that the success of an organism depends on
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its interaction with other organisms within a population. Thus, the fitness of an organism
would be dependent on its interaction with other organisms in that population. In game
theoretic terminology, the interactions of players would be the strategies and the fitness of
each strategy would be the payoff. As the population evolves over time, certain strategies
would be dominant while some other strategies would be extinct. Thus, evolutionary game
theory provides a mathematical basis to model the evolutionary process using concepts of
game theory. On the other hand, it opens a new dimension for game theorists to observe
how the evolution of strategies in games would happen over time in populations of players.
Some of the critical questions asked in EGT include; which populations/strategies are
stable? When to individuals adopt other strategies? and would it be possible for mutants
to invade a given population?
2.8.1 Evolutionary stability
Evolutionary stability of strategies or Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS)[245, 107] is
an important concept in evolutionary game theory. If a strategy is evolutionarily stable
if, when the entire population is following that strategy, a small invading group with
a different strategy would eventually die-out over multiple generations. These invaders
could either be migrants from a different population or mutants from within the same
population. More formally put, evolutionary stability of a strategy can be defined as,
• The fitness of an organism in a population is the expected payoff it receives from
interacting with a random number of opponents within the population.
• Strategy T would be invading strategy S at the evolutionary step x, for some small
positive number x, if an x fraction of the underlying population adopts the strategy
T and a 1-x fraction of the underlying population uses S.
• Strategy S is considered to be evolutionary stable if there is a relatively small positive
number y such that when any other strategy T invades S at any level x ¡ y, the fitness
of the organism playing S is strictly greater than the fitness of the organism playing
T.
While Nash equilibrium is a static equilibrium, Evolutionary stability of strategies signify a
dynamic equilibrium that takes in to account the space and time dimensions of population
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of players. In the context of this research, the effect on the evolutionary stability of
strategies by the topological aspects of a population of players is studied. Following
example demonstrates the applicability of evolutionary stability of strategies.
To explain the concept of ESS further, let us consider a following hypothetical game
among populations of players, called the Hawk-Dove game. In this game, two groups of
players called Hawks and Doves compete for a resource of a fixed value V . The Hawk
strategy demonstrates aggressive behaviour, not stopping until injured or the opponent
backs down, while the Dove strategy is retreating immediately if one’s opponent initiates
aggressive behaviour. The game can be defined by making the following assumptions of
the two strategies.
1. When two players with the Hawk strategy meet, conflict would result and the two
players are equally likely to get injured.
2. The cost of conflict reduces the individual fitness by some constant value C.
3. When a hawk confronts a dove, the dove would retreat and the hawk would obtain
the resource.
4. When two doves meet, the resource would be shared equally among them.
The payoff matrix given in Fig. 2.13 summarises these assumptions.
E(D,D), which is the expected payoff when two doves meet each other is V/2, is less than
the expected payoff when a Hawk meets a Dove, E(H,D) = V . This would mean that
Dove is not a evolutionarily stable strategy. On the other hand, E(H,H) = 1/2(V − C)
and E(D,H) = 0. Thus, H would be an ESS if V > C. However, if V < C, neither H nor
D would be regarded as an ESS. ESS has been defined for mixed strategies as well.
The effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability has hardly been studied. In
Chapter 4 of this thesis, we study the topological effect on the evolutionarily stability of
strategies, focusing on pure strategy networked games.
2.8.2 Replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics model[109] provides a convenient mathematical framework for
evaluating the evolution of a particular strategy in a population of players. Consider
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Figure 2.13: Payoff matrix of the Hawk-Dove game
a population of n types where xi(t) denotes the frequency of type i. The state of the
population at time t would be given by the vector x(t) = x1(t), ...., xn(t).
Suppose the individuals in a population meet randomly and then engage in a symmetric
game with payoff matrix A. Then (Ax)i is the expected payoff for an individual of type i
and xTAx is the average payoff in the population of state x.
Thus, the evolution of x over time would be described by the replicator equation;
x˙i = xi[(Ax)i + x
TAx] (2.16)
The replicator equation describes a selection process where more successful strategies
would tend to spread in the population. We utilise replicator dynamics as a theoretical
benchmark to test for the evolutionarily stability of strategies simulated on networked
players.
2.8.3 Networked Games
Social networks are important in many facets of strategic decision making. The social
networks affect most decisions that people make, such as whom to vote for and which
products to buy, as such decisions are influenced by the choices of their friends and ac-
quaintances. Games on networks, where an agent chooses an action and then the payoffs
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of each player is determined by those of his or her neighbours is a special perspective that
may be used to model such collective decision making scenarios. There may be also other
applications that involve strategic decision making and networks of relationships, such as
exchange or trade on networks (networked markets). These sorts of analyses tend to be
much more particular in their structure. This structure may be represented by a specific
bargaining protocol or timing on interactions.
While most of the network game interactions are modelled as the repetitions of two-player
interactions, there have been numerous attempts to model the games in a more integrated
manner with the underlying network. For instance, numerous attempts have been made
to define the payoffs of a network as a function of the network topology. For instance,
Galeotti et al.[85] modelled the public goods game in such a manner where the game
parameters and roles were derived from the network topology.
Initial work done on games on populations were done among well-mixed populations where
all players are connected to each other in a fully connected network. However, in the real-
world populations, the players are not connected in a well-mixed network. Instead, they
tend to arrange themselves in spatially distributed topologies. These spatial topologies
may adhere to different spatial structures such as the scale-free or small-world structures.
The spatial restrictions of networks are often instrumental in determining the evolutionary
stability of a strategy. For instance, it has been shown that coordination is evolutionarily
unstable in a well mixed population though it may be evolutionarily stable in a scale-free
population[224].
There are mainly two approaches taken in studying games on networks. One is to look take
a top down approach and try to calculate the nash equilibrium of a game on a network.
For instance, Bramoulle` and Kraton have attempted calculating the Nash equilibria of
the Public Goods game in networked players[40]. This is not a trivial task as the advent
of network structure would mean that there could be multiple equilibria present, even
in the simplest form of the games and network structures. Moreover, the complexity of
equilibria would continue to grow as the network grows in size. However, this is still a
major avenue of research taken up by the game theory community who are interested in
networked populations of players.
The other approach is to take a bottom-up approach and observe how the micro level
interactions among players would facilitate the emergence of topological or game theo-
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retic features in the population. This is the approach mainly undertaken in the field of
evolutionary game theory and that is the approach that is used in this work. Further,
studies have been conducted on modelling the Public goods game in a topologically dis-
tributed environment where network topological features affect the contribution of each
players[80, 96]. Public goods game[103] studies scenarios where individuals contribute an
individual resource, such as money or network bandwidth, for a collective benefit. Mod-
elling the individual contributions using network topological features would be beneficial
in identifying the free riders and the variations of contributions in the Public goods game,
in applications such as collective file sharing in the Internet. Since major part of this work
is woven around the evolutionary stability and the bounded rationality of individual nodes,
adopting a bottom-up approach in modelling and simulating networked games would be
more appropriate in this work.
The primary reason for networks and social networks to be prominent in strategic decision
making of humans is that their behaviour is sometimes emotional. Also, their decisions
can sometimes be based on concepts of fairness and reciprocity. Humans are also bound by
their reasoning capabilities. In order to study how agents behave in social and economic
situations, numerous empirical studies have been conducted. This results in the sub-field
of study known as Behavioural game theory. Behavioural game theory examines how
humans behave in numerous game theoritic settings. However, most of these empirical
studies are confined to relatively small number of persons, which makes the credibility of
the outcomes of such research questionable. On the other hand, the usage of online social
networks to gather the human behaviour data in game theoretic settings can be useful as
they overcome this particular limitation posed by the logistics [136].
This concludes the background on game theoretic concepts used in this work. The next
sub-section would explore some key concepts of information theory that are relevant in
this study. The theoretical interpretation of information theory and information transfer
is an integral part of this work, as it is suggested as a means of quantifying the distribution
of bounded rationality of a network of players.
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2.9 Information theory
Concepts of information theory[64] are used in this work to quantify to bounded rationality
of agents in a game, from the perspective of information transfer. Information theory is the
science of quantification of information. It is widely used in several applied fields of science
and technology such electrical engineering, telecommunications engineering and computer
science. Claude Shannon[228] was instrumental in developing information theory as a field
of science, particularly relating to his work on signal processing. While the concept of
information is too broad to be captured by a single definition, for probability distributions
the concept of entropy has been proposed and been used as a measure of information.
Entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable. In the information theoretic
context, this quantification of uncertainty is the measure of level of information contained
in a random variable.
2.9.1 Entropy
The formal definition of entropy is as follows. Let X be a discrete random variable with
alphabet A and the probability mass function p(x) = Pr(X = x), xA. Then the entropy
H(X) of a discrete random variable X would be[63],
H(X) = −
∑
xX
p(x)log p(x) (2.17)
If the log value of the above equation is 2, then the resulting entropy would be expressed
in bits. Note that entropy is a function of the distribution of X. Thus, it does not depend
on the actual values taken up by X, but only on the probabilities. Following are several
extensions of entropy that are used to measure information in different dimensions.
2.9.2 Joint entropy and conditional entropy
Joint entropy is the definition of entropy extended to a pair of random variables. Thus,
the joint entropy H(X,Y ) of a pair of discrete random variables (X,Y ) with a joint
distribution p(x, y) can be defined as,
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H(X) = −
∑
xX
∑
p(x)yY p(x, y)logp(x, y) (2.18)
This can also be expressed as,
H(X,Y ) = −Elogp(X,Y ) (2.19)
Conditional entropy, on the other hand is defined as the expected value of the entropies
of the conditional distributions, averaged over the conditioning random variable. That is,
if (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y), then the conditional entropy H(Y |X) is defined as,
H(Y |X) =
∑
xX
p(x)H(Y |X = x) = −Ep(x,y)logp(Y |X) (2.20)
Based on these definitions, it can be shown that the entropy of a pair of random variables
is the entropy of one plus the conditional entropy of the other.
Relative Entropy and Mutual Information
Relative entropy is a measure of the distance between two probability distributions of
two random variables. The relative entropy D(p ‖ q) is a measure of the inefficiency of
assuming that the distribution is q when the true distribution is p. The relative entropy
is also known as the Kullback-Leibler Divergence. Formally put, the Relative entropy
between two probability mass functions p(x) and q(x) is defined as,
D(p ‖ q) =
∑
xX
p(x)log
p(x)
q(x)
= Eplog
p(X)
q(X)
(2.21)
Relative entropy is always non-negative and it is zero only if p = q. However, it does
not give the true distance between probability distributions since it does not satisfy the
triangle inequality. In this study, a variation of the KL-divergence is used as a metric that
satisfies the triangle inequality.
Based on relative entropy, it is possible to measure the amount of information that one
random variable contains about another random variable. This measure is called the
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mutual information, which is the reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable due
to the knowledge of the other. Consider two random variables X and Y with a joint
probability mass function p(x, y) and marginal probability mass functions p(x) and p(y).
Thus, the mutual information I(X;Y ) would be the relative entropy between the joint
distribution and the product distribution p(x)p(y);
I(X;Y ) =
∑
xX
∑
yY p(x, y)log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(2.22)
= Ep(x, y)log
p(X,Y )
p(X)p(Y )
(2.23)
It should be noted that mutual information is not a directed measure meaning that it does
not quantify the directed information flow from one random process to another.
Network entropy
While Entropy is a measure of the information content of a system, Sole` and Valverde[239]
have proposed a measure of information content of complex network, utilising the topo-
logical information and the node states of the network. This measure can be conveniently
mapped to measure the information content of a network based game where the node
states would be the states of the game or the strategies of the game. For instance, the ‘co-
ordinator’ and ‘defector’ strategies can be considered to be states of a prisoner’s dilemma
game played over a network of players. This measure can be used to observe the evolution
of information in a network at a given point in time. The information content I(qt) of a
complex network at time t can be defined as,
I(qt) =
∑
y
∑
z
ety,zlog
ety,z
qty, q
t
z
(2.24)
Here, ety,z is the proportion of links connecting the nodes with states y and z at time t.
qty is the proportion of links with a node of state y at one end and q
t
z is the proportion of
links with a node in state z.
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2.9.3 Local information dynamics
Information dynamics are typically used to characterise universal computational systems
such as the Cellular automata (CA) model[143, 145]. These information dynamics can be
further sub-divided into three main components, information storage, information trans-
fer and information modification. In order to quantify these local information dynamics,
measures such as the Active information and Transfer entropy have been suggested in the
literature[212, 144]. In a distributed network, local information dynamics help to capture
the temporal and spatial variations of information flow and storage. In this work, such
local information measures are used to quantify the bounded rationality of spatially dis-
tributed players distributed in a network.
Information storage
Excess entropy encompasses all types of structure and memory by capturing correlations
among all time lengths. In studying local information dynamics, the focus is on the amount
of information that is actually in use at every local point in time and space. Informa-
tion storage or memory of an autonomous component in the system tries to quantify the
amount of information that it has accumulated over the past, that would be relevant to
predicting its future. Active information storage is the information in storage that is actu-
ally relevant in predicting its next state. Hence, active information is directly comparable
with information transfer in each computation. The formal definition of the active infor-
mation storage of an agent X is the average mutual information between its semi-infinite
past and its next state xn+1 at the timestep n+ 1.
Ax = lim
k→∞
〈
log2
p(x
(k)
n , xn+1)
p(x
(k)
n )pxn+1)
〉
(2.25)
Here, k would be the finite history length. From a computational perspective, an agent
can store information regardless of whether it is causally connected with itself. This is be-
cause information storage can be facilitated in a distributed fashion via one’s neighbours.
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Information transfer
The information transfer between a source and a destination is defined as the information
provided by the source about the destination’s next state this was not contained in the
destination’s own past. This measure is particularly important in modelling the bounded
rationality of players as it can be used to quantify the directed information flow. It ad-
dresses the deficiencies of the mutual information measure, which is a static and directional
measure. The information transfer is measured by transfer entropy[257]. By definition,
transfer entropy is a directed measure that takes into account the directed information
flow from a source to a destination. The transfer entropy from a source Y to destination
X is defined has the average mutual information between the previous state of the source
yn and the next state of the destination xn+1, conditioned on the semi-infinite past of the
destination xn.
TY→X = lim
k→∞
〈
log2
p(xn+1|xkn, yn)
p(xn+1|xkn)
〉
(2.26)
This formulation is also known as the apparent transfer entropy. Apparent transfer entropy
measures the effect of information transfer from a single source only. If the information
transfer is affected by the interaction of multiple sources, it does not account for that
cumulative effect, which is addressed by a more refined version of transfer entropy known
as the complete transfer entropy. For this work, we mainly focus on the apparent trans-
fer entropy as an approximation of the information transfer between a single source and
a destination. In Chapter 8, we utilise the directed and incoming information transfer
measured as transfer entropy as an implicit measure of the bounded rationality of a sub-
optimal player in a network.
Information modification
Information modification refers to the processing of information into a new form. More
formally, it has been interpreted to mean interactions between transmitted and/or stored
information which result in a modification of one or the other. While there isn’t a widely
accepted measure to quantify information modification, Separable information has been
proposed as a potential measure of it. While information modification is crucial in dis-
tributed computation, this work doesn’t consider the information modification aspect of
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players in a networked game, particularly with respect to modelling their bounded ratio-
nality.
This concludes the background section where the three theoretical cornerstones used in
this work, game theory, network theory and information theory were discussed. These
three components of theoretical basis are essential for the subsequent chapters where the
research questions introduced in the Introduction are addressed in detail. The next chapter
discusses the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked games,
using the coordination game as a basis for strategic interactions.
Chapter 3
The influence of topology on the
evolution of coordination in
complex networks under
information diffusion constraints
3.1 Introduction
The Darwinian world view [30] suggests that it is the competition between others that
drives the individuals in a population. However, there exists a dilemma in that coordi-
nation is abundant in real-world social structures. This work evaluates the heuristic that
the structure or the topology of a population may be critical in determining the coordi-
nating behaviour among strategic players. It is the first research question that we address
under the broader question of how the network topology and information diffusion influ-
ence the network-based games. This chapter studies the effect of network topology under
information diffusion constraints on the evolution of coordination in a population of play-
ers. We simulate the coordination game on four well-known classes of complex networks
commonly used to model social systems: scale-free, small-world, random, hierarchical-
modular, and the well-mixed model. In particular, focus is given on understanding the
impact of information diffusion on coordination, and how this impact varies according to
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the topology of the social system. The simulation results demonstrate that while timelags
and noise in the information about relative payoffs affect the emergence of coordination
in all social systems, some topologies are markedly more resilient to these effects than
others. The findings also show that, while non-coordination may be a better strategy in
a society where people do not have information about the payoffs of others, coordination
will quickly emerge as the better strategy when people get this information about others,
even with noise and time lags. Societies with a small-world structure are most conducive
to the emergence of coordination, despite limitations in information propagation, while
societies with scale-free topologies are most sensitive to noise and time-lags in information
diffusion. Surprisingly, in all topologies, it is not the highest connected people (hubs),
but the slightly less connected people (provincial hubs) who first adopt coordination. Our
findings confirm that the evolution of coordination in social systems depends heavily on
the underlying social network structure[126, 127].
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section discusses the back-
ground for this work. Next section presents the justification of choosing particular classes
of networks for simulating the coordination game. The following sections describes the
methodology that was employed for the simulations. The results are presented with a
discussion on their implications.
3.2 Background
Studying the behavioural or evolutionary dynamics of a population has played a central
role in our understanding of emergent phenomena. Such studies have shed light on bio-
logical systems from cells [18] to species [237], on international politics [217] and even on
the firing of populations of neurons as we try to understand the internal states of another
person’s mind [267]. Modern approaches in this field began with the work of Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern [253] in 1944 and were taken up by John Nash who developed one
of the most influential ideas in game theory, that of the Nash equilibrium [174]. The Nash
equilibrium states that in an incentivised situation between two or more strategic players
of a ‘game’, at least one choice of strategy can be found whereby no other player can
achieve a better outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy. This particular notion of
equilibrium and its subsequent extensions have profoundly influenced our understanding
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of game theory as well as strategic interactions more broadly.
However, it quickly became apparent that the notion of a Nash equilibrium had a sig-
nificant flaw: the cooperation that had been observed between players in behavioural
experiments and we observe in everyday life was not an ‘Evolutionary Stable Strategy’
(ESS) [151], i.e. the theoretical results from applying Nash equilibrium did not reflect em-
pirical observations. While successful methods to address this shortcoming have recently
been explored using both finite and infinite population sizes [190], the disconnect between
theory and observation was first addressed when the study of spatially extended games was
introduced [186, 185, 52, 220]. In these games, interactions between agents were based on
their spatial relationship rather than a well-mixed population. Further, interacting strate-
gic agents played games in a two-dimensional space, typically on a lattice, and only the
nearest neighbours on the lattice interacted with one another. This is a more physically
realistic model than that of a well-mixed population where every agent can potentially
interact with every other agent. In this scenario, it was shown that cooperation was a
stable strategy and a portion of cooperating agents were able to persist indefinitely in the
system, thereby lining up theory with observation.
These results were then extended to other topological spaces by using different network
topologies, generalising the idea of a rigid lattice to that of stochastic connections between
agents. In these models the relationships between individuals are not described by spatial
connectedness but by more abstract connections such as the role of a species in a food
web [193] or people connected via a social network [234]. Such generalisations have signifi-
cantly broadened and deepened the phenomena that game theory has been able to explore.
Networked game theory has progressed significantly since the introduction of the so-called
small-world and scale-free topologies into the more general field of network theory more
than a decade ago [9, 194, 73, 135]. One of the more significant results to come from this
work was a result by Ohtsuki et al. [187] where a general rule for when cooperation is
favoured over non-cooperation for different network topologies was developed. Labelling
benefits of cooperation as b and the costs of cooperation as c, and given the average k¯ num-
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ber of connections an agent has to other agents, cooperators are favoured when b/c > k¯.
This very general result holds for a number of broad classes of networks and works as a
very good rule of thumb. However, as pointed out in Ohtsuki et al.’s original paper, this
analysis is a poor estimate in the case of scale-free networks and further study is needed
in order to understand what role is played by scale-free networks (and other well known
network topologies) that leads to such special circumstances.
With this background in mind, this research compares the evolutionary game dynamics
over four different network topologies commonly used to model social systems: the scale-
free, small-world, hierarchical-modular, and Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random topologies [81]. We also
consider regular lattices with homogeneous topology where relevant, since the well-mixed
scenario is a special case of lattice structure, where average degree is network size mi-
nus one. The coordination game was adopted for the study (sometimes referred to as a
stag-hunt game), with the aim of understanding the evolution of coordination in these
topologies. A parameter α is introduced, which is used to vary the strength of strategy
selection/introduces noise of a stochastic model that has also been used in other studies
of strategic interaction [250].
Parameter variation has been utilised to emulate non-linear responses in evolutionary
games [100, 265]. It has been suggested that global optimisation plays a vital role in
comparison to local optimisation, especially in crises [99]. Interestingly, changing a pa-
rameter in an evolutionary game has been compared to selecting a personality type, and
this in turn could lead to new equilibrium concepts [263]. These findings in evolutionary
game theory and adaptive systems were employed to study the evolution of coordination
in networked evolutionary games.
3.3 Studying games on networks
To analyse the evolution of coordination on realistic network topologies, the well known
‘stag-hunt’ game was used. It is variation of the coordination game([265, 233, 39]). Since
it is a two-player game, it can be simulated pair-wise on neighbours sharing a link on a
social network model. In this game, if two players coordinate, they both get the highest
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reward S (half a Stag), and if one-player does not coordinate while the other does, the non
coordinator gets higher reward R (Rabbit), while the coordinator gets a lower reward T
(Nothing). If both players do not coordinate, they both get reward R (Rabbit). The game
is modelled such that S >R >T . The analogy is that half a stag would typically have
more meat than a rabbit, and hunting a rabbit is better than going home empty handed.
In the classical stag-hunt game, coordination is needed only to hunt a stag, whereas rabbits
can be hunted independently by each person or agent. As such, a coordinator (someone
who uses a ‘coordinating’ strategy) is somebody who intends to hunt a stag, and a non-
coordinator (sometimes called a defector, though this term is more appropriate to the
prisoner’s dilemma game) is someone who intends to hunt a rabbit, in a particular round.
This game can be applied in strategic decision making situations where two players can
gain higher payoff by coordinating rather than by defecting. The pure strategy Nash
equilibria of this game occur when both players coordinate and both players defect. The
mixed strategy scenario was not considered in this study.
Following is a brief description within the context of this analysis, on the five types of
network models applied.
Scale-free networks: It has been recently shown that many real-world networks are
scale-free networks, including technical, biological and social networks [194, 73, 24, 26, 27,
47, 166, 202, 203]. Particularly, many social networks are scale-free and heterogeneous,
because there are always people who are more ‘famous’ and well-connected, while there
are many who are relatively isolated. Scale-free networks display power-law degree distri-
butions, described by pk = Ak
−γU(k/kmax) where U is a step function specifying a cut off
at k = kmax. There are a number of growth models which generate scale-free networks,
and prominent among them is the Baraba`si-Albert model [9], which utilises preferential
attachment. Due to the prevalence of scale-free features in many online and oﬄine social
networks, scale-free networks are good models to study games on social systems, and of-
ten used for this purpose in recent literature [225]. Thus, scale-free networks make ideal
candidates to study the evolution of coordination of populations of players.
Small-world networks: An equally justifiable model to study the evolution of coordi-
nation is the small-world network model. Small-world networks have low characteristic
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path lengths (compared to network diameter) and high clustering ([260, 139, 179]). The
small-world effect on social systems was first and famously demonstrated by Milgram
with a network of acquaintances [159] in United States, where he showed that the av-
erage number of hops required before a letter addressed to a random addressee within
the country reached them was only six: thus the ‘six-degrees of separation’ [259]. It has
since been shown that a range of real-world networks, including social networks, biological
networks such as gene regulatory networks, metabolic networks, Protein-Protein Interac-
tion networks, and signalling networks, as well as Internet show the small-world property
[73, 221, 12]. Of course, many small-world networks can be scale-free to a certain degree,
and vice-versa, but the scale-free and small-world characteristics need not (and often, do
not) overlap.
Hierarchical-modular networks: Another category of networks coming into recent
prominence is modular and hierarchical-modular networks. It has been recently observed
that the hierarchical-modular structure of brain networks enhances the brain’s robust-
ness [256]. Similarly, many designed and evolved engineered systems are highly modular
[108, 120]. More importantly, hierarchical-modular structure has been observed in hu-
man/social networks as well. For example, Ahn et al. [6] studied hierarchical organisation
in several social networks. It is also evident that networks of people in the military/defense
domain naturally exhibit hierarchical structure[254]. In the end, hierarchy is inherent in
the social structure of human beings, coupled with modularity; therefore it makes sense
to study how coordination games can be played in hierarchical-modular networks. Hence,
this topology was selected as the third topology of interest.
Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random networks: Finally, the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random topology was adopted
to study the evolution of coordination [73]. Even though such random networks were once
used extensively to model distributed systems, researchers have since realised that most
real-world networks do not display degree distributions similar to random networks [9].
Yet, random networks are often used as null models to compare against other network
models, and they are used for the same purpose in this work.
Well-mixed networks: Traditionally, game theory experiments were simulated on ‘well-
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mixed’ populations [225], where every agent was assumed to be connected to every other
agent, since then the importance of topology was realised, spawning the research area of
networked game theory. We therefore also test some of our results on well-mixed popu-
lations for comparison. A network which simulates a well-mixed population is a regular
lattice, with average degree of N − 1 where N is the number of nodes. We found how-
ever, that this average degree has no bearing on the results, and any regular lattice yields
qualitatively similar results in the experiments described in this chapter. For simplicity,
therefore, we present the results obtained from a regular lattice of average degrees four,
eight or twelve, so that it matches with the average degrees of other topologies.
The above mentioned scale-free, small-world, hierarchical-modular, random and lattice
topologies were adopted to study the evolution of coordination in social systems.
3.4 Methodology
The study uses quantitative analysis of results generated from experimental simulations
were used in this study. In order to simulate the coordination game played on a population
of nodes, an ensemble of scale-free networks, small-world networks, hierarchical-modular
networks, E-R random networks, and lattices were used. The scale-free networks were
generated using a version of preferential attachment [8], varying the average degree of
the networks, using the algorithm 1. The small-world networks were generated using the
algorithm proposed in Watts and Strogatz [260] using a rewiring probability of p = 0.5
(unless otherwise specified), again varying the average degree of the networks. This al-
gorithm was discussed in detailed in Chapter 2. The method described by Sarkar and
Dong [226] was followed to produce hierarchical-modular networks, as described in algo-
rithm 2. This method involves ‘rewiring’ each edge in a perfectly modular network to take
away intra-community edges in each module with a rewiring probability p. By varying p, it
is possible to obtain networks that have varying levels of hierarchy. The Erdo˝s-Re`nyi ran-
dom networks were generated simply by randomly choosing M pairs among N nodes and
connecting them. Generating lattices is trivial. Networks of size N = 103 were averaged
over 100 networks for each parameter configuration. In evolution scenarios, we typically
considered Te = 1500 time-steps to be sufficient for the network to achieve steady state.
This number was chosen based on the preliminary results.
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The payoff matrix of the game was constructed in such a manner that the reward for
both parties coordinating S would be a variable β, such that β >1. When one node is
coordinating and the other is not coordinating, the coordinator would not get any return
(T = 0) while the non-coordinator would get a return of unity (R = 1). Thus, it was
possible to manipulate the game environment by varying the single parameter β. Each
pair of nodes connected by a link would engage in a single round of coordination game,
after which the collective returns for each node pi would be stored and used to adjust
the accumulated payoff, Pi. The algorithm 3 describes the steps followed to simulate the
evolution of strategies in a population of players.
At the beginning, players were randomly assigned as coordinators or non-coordinators.
After each iteration, the players would adopt the role of the neighbours based on a certain
probability. This probability was affected by the current accumulated payoff of each node.
In the case of complete information diffusion suppose that two nodes x and y are connected
and their current accumulated payoff values are Px and Py. These are the payoffs that are
accumulated within each node after a certain number of time-steps. If x and y are different
in their respective roles (that is, one is a coordinator and the other is a non-coordinator),
the probability p that x would adopt the role of y is given by:
p = max
{
0,
(Py − Px)
kmax(R− T )β
}
(3.1)
where kmax is the larger of the degree of x, kx and the degree of y, ky. This is a model
commonly used in recent literature [225] to simulate evolutionary adaptation in a game
scenario1.
This model was modified to quantify information diffusion, by introducing a parameter α
that signifies the level of information a node can gather about its neighbours. Therefore, a
node may change strategies either (i) randomly (ii) based on information of its neighbours’
payoffs. Therefore, the adaptation probability could be calculated by;
p = (1− α)ρ+ αmax
{
0,
(Py − Px)
kmax(R− T )β
}
(3.2)
1However, note that [225] uses different symbolism, with a payoff ordering where T >R >S , and their
application is to a prisoner’s dilemma game, thus the update rule that has been proposed may seem slightly
different at first glance. However, simple analysis will reveal that the rules are essentially very similar.
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where ρ is a uniformly distributed random number between zero and one, and represents
white noise. Therefore, the higher the α, the more the ability of the system to distinguish
real cumulative payoff information from noise.
Later in the chapter, analysis is done on the influence of time-lags on the information
diffusion and the emergence of coordination. In order to do that, a time-lag parameter was
introduced λ. The payoffs considered are those payoffs which each node had accumulated
λ time-steps before the current time, P λx and P
λ
y . As such, the diffusion equation becomes
p = (1− α)ρ+ αmax
{
0,
(P λy − P λx )
kmax(R− T )β
}
(3.3)
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Algorithm 1: Generating a scale-free network based on the Baraba´si-Albert
Model[9].
1 Create the first node;
2 while Network size is less than the expected size do
3 Create a new node n;
4 forall the node n2 in the network do
5 Calculate the probability p of node n joining the node n2 in a way
proportional to the degree of n2 ;
6 Connect node n with n2 according to the probability p;
7 Add node n to the network;
Algorithm 2: Generating a Hierarchical Modular network.
1 Start with a perfectly modular network;
2 Randomly rewire the links according to probability p to generate a hierarchical
modular network;
Algorithm 3: Simulating the iterated coordination game in a network.
1 Randomly assign coordinators and defectors among the population;
2 Play the coordination game among the players of the population;
3 while Number of iterations is less than the expected number of iterations do
4 Add the payoffs of the game to the cumulative payoff;
5 Randomly select a node n;
6 Randomly select a neighbour node n2 of node n;
7 Based on the degrees and cumulative payoffs of nodes n and n2, calculate the
probability p of adopting a neighbour’s strategy;
8 Generate a random floating point number num;
9 if num < p then
10 Adopt the neighbour’s strategy;
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Pre-evolutionary balance
Initially, experiments were carried out to understand the balance between the payoffs of the
coordinators and non-coordinators on average, when nodes do not adapt. In order to do
that, single shot coordination game were simulated on scale-free, small-world, hierarchical-
modular, random and lattice networks, without any evolution. In the case of scale-free
networks, one-hundred networks (with a size N = 1000 and an average degree k¯ = 4 in
all cases) were used, and the average payoffs for coordinators and non-coordinators were
calculated for a range of β values. The results are shown in Figure 3.1. When the same
process was undertaken for Te = 1500 rounds, the results were identical: understandably,
since, in the absence of evolution, number of rounds would not make any difference, and
the results were averaged across networks.
From the results, it is possible to observe that, predictably, the relative payoff for coordi-
nators steadily increases with β. Only when β >2, is the average payoff for coordinators
higher than that of non-coordinators. Therefore, the total payoff for a pair of coordinators
must be four times higher than the individual return of a non-coordinator (the stag must
have four times more meat than the rabbit) for people in a scale-free network to decide to
adopt the coordination strategy, in the absence of information about strategies adopted by
others and their payoffs. If β = 1.5 for example, (the stag has three times more meat than
the rabbit), it may intuitively seem better to coordinate, since half a stag still has more
meat than a rabbit, yet due to the chance of the other node (person) not coordinating,
this is not the case. Similar results were observed for the small-world, E-R random and
hierarchical-modular networks (not shown), therefore it is also obvious that this result
does not depend on the network topology. We also analysed regular lattices of various
average degrees (starting from four up to N − 1 where N is network size), and found that
this result ( β >2 for coordinators to have higher relative payoff) holds also for well-mixed
populations: which is not surprising, since this simply is a consequence of the relative
proportion of coordinators and non-coordinators in the population (50 % each). As such,
it is clear that in the absence of evolutionary adaptation, topology does not determine
the relative payoffs of coordinators and non-coordinators (when the network concerned is
sufficiently large to negate finite-scale effects).
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Figure 3.1: The average score of coordinators and non-coordinators in 100 scale-free networks after a single round
of coordination game. Note that results for Te = 1500 time-steps were identical (results do not vary with time).
The nodes do not have a-priori knowledge about the strategy used by their neighbours. It can be seen that for
coordination rewards β ≤ 2.0, the average reward for non-coordinators is higher. Similar results were obtained for
small-world, hierarchical-modular, random network, and regular lattice classes.
3.5.2 Evolution of coordination
Next, simulations were done to study the evolution of coordination with the assumption of
complete information diffusion among players. Eq. 3.1 was used to simulate the evolution
of strategies in all five classes of networks. Three different average degree values (k¯ =
4, 8, 12 respectively) were used, and utilised the average over 100 networks in each case.
The populations were evolved for Te = 1500 time-steps in each network, and the proportion
of coordinators during and after the evolution was measured.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the proportion of coordinators for networks of k¯ = 4,
with β = 1.8 was used. It is observed that in all classes of networks, coordinators begin to
dominate after a certain stage. Earlier it was observed that in pre-evolutionary balance,
for a β less than two, it is advantageous to be a non-coordinator. However, it appears
that in evolved systems where players are aware of the payoffs of their neighbours, it is
advantageous to be a coordinator after a certain time frame. This is confirmed by Figure
3.3, which shows the average payoff of coordinators against time-step, for β = 1.8, and for
all five classes of networks. In all cases, this average payoff initially increases with time,
though it decreases in some cases once coordinators become a majority. For β ≥ 2.0, it is
advantageous from the beginning to be a coordinator, and these results confirm that this
is not changed by the evolution of the system.
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of coordinators against the time-step for the five different types of networks considered. The
network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 1500 time-steps are considered (though only up to 500 are
shown in figure, since the trend is clear after this point). β = 1.8, k¯ = 4.
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Figure 3.3: Average payoff of coordinators against the time-step for the five different types of networks considered.
The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 1500 time-steps are considered. β = 1.8, k¯ = 4.
Interestingly, from Figure 3.3 it is evident that while for scale-free and hierarchical-modular
networks (as well as the well-mixed population), the average payoff of coordinators in-
creases and stabilises with evolution, this is not the case with small-world and E-R ran-
dom networks. With these networks, the average payoff for coordinators increases, then
decreases and stabilises. Considered with Figure 3.2, it is clear that in these two classes
of networks, the non-coordinators become extinct after a certain number of time-steps.
Thus, in these networks, the lower average payoffs are derived at larger time-steps when
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Figure 3.4: Information content in the network against the time-step for the five types of networks considered. The
network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 500 time-steps are considered. β = 1.8, k¯ = 4.
all players within the network are coordinating.
It is important to note that there is not much difference in the time taken for the co-
ordinators to dominate between the classes of networks that were studied. However, in
the case of hierarchical-modular networks, non-coordinators are able to survive and hold
a proportion of the network. In all other topologies, non-coordinators are ‘wiped out’ by
evolution.
To complement this analysis, the information content of the node states is observed in
each class of networks, and how they evolved as the simulation progressed over time.
Shannon information is a generic measure of ‘information content’ in a system. In [240] an
information content measure I(q) was defined based on Shannon information for complex
networks and on the remaining degree distribution of the network qk, and [200] extended
this definition so that node states are considered. The mutual information measure defined
in [200] is,
I
(
qt
)
=
∑
y
∑
z
ety,z log
ety,z
qtyq
t
z
(3.4)
where ety,z is the proportion of links connecting, at time t, the nodes with states y, z
respectively; qty is the proportion of links, at time t, with a node (at one end) in the
state y; and similarly, qtz is the proportion of links, at time t, with a node (at one end)
in the state z. This measure was used to analyse how the mutual information in terms
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of node states (coordinator/non-coordinator) changes during simulation. The results are
presented in Figure 3.4. Interestingly, the information content increases rapidly during
the initial stages of evolution, and peaks at a point much earlier than when coordinators
saturate the networks in the respective class. It appears that the time-step when the
mutual information peaks is the time-step when the coordinators break - through, when
they attain a critical number after which their eventual complete domination becomes
inevitable. However, when coordinators completely dominate, the mutual information
content is close to zero. This is not surprising since there is no ‘information’ left to be
gained regarding the node status with respect to topology. Subsequently, it is evident that
the steady state information content for hierarchical networks is greater than the other
classes, since it was observed earlier that the domination of coordinators is not complete
in this class and some non-coordinators manage not to convert.
Next, it is observed how the payoff parameter, β, influences the domination of coordina-
tors. For this, let us consider each class of networks separately. In the case of scale-free
networks, three different average degree values (k¯ = 4, 8, 12 respectively) were used. The
populations were evolved over Te = 1500 time-steps for each network, and the propor-
tion of coordinators after the evolution was measured in each case. The obtained results
against various β values are shown in Figure 3.5 a.
As evident from this figure, even though non-coordination is initially the better strategy,
coordination emerges as the better strategy and is adopted by a majority of nodes after
a period of time, for a range of β values less than 2.0. Moreover, there is a transition
in terms of β, which occurs when β ≤ 2.0 in most cases. For example, when k¯ = 4.0,
it appears that coordination is a better strategy and is adopted by more nodes eventu-
ally, if β ≥ 1.6. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a range of β values (e.g.
2.0 ≥ β ≥ 1.6 for networks with average degree 4.0), for which it is beneficial to adopt the
non-coordination strategy if there is no information diffusion, however coordination is the
evolutionarily winning strategy (and the evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS) if there is in-
formation diffusion about the cumulative payoff of the neighbours. However, if the relative
payoff of coordination is sufficiently low (but higher than payoffs for non-coordination, e.g.
1.6 ≥ β ≥ 1.0 for networks with average degree 4.0), it is evolutionarily better strategy
to adopt non-coordination. It is also observed that for higher network density, it takes
higher rewards of coordination for coordinators to become dominant.
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for five classes of networks with different average
degrees, after evolution. It can be seen that for each class of network there is a value β above which coordination
dominates non-coordination. For low β values, non-coordinators dominate in all networks. The network size was
N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 1500 time-steps were used for evolution.
Similar analysis can be done in the case of small-world networks in order to ascertain the
influence of payoff parameter β on the evolution of coordination. Small-world networks
with size N = 1000 nodes and varying average degrees (k¯ = 4, 8, 12) were generated for this
purpose. One hundred networks of populations were simulated in each case, for Te = 1500
number of time-steps. Results that are similar to scale-free networks were found with
small-world networks, as shown in Figure 3.5 b. That is, coordination emerges as the
better strategy through evolution for higher values of β. However, there is one important
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difference. The phase transitions that were observed in terms of β are much sharper than
scale-free networks. Therefore, a slight increase in the actual amount of payoff can very
quickly change the evolutionary dynamics of coordination in small-world networks. The
phase transition, for this particular set of parameters, seems to occur around 1.9 ≥ β ≥ 1.7.
By comparing the results between various k¯ values for both scale-free and small-world
networks. It was also observed that the transition begins ‘later’ for higher average degrees,
and coordinators begin to dominate only for higher values of β. For example, in the case
of scale-free networks, when the average degree is 4.0, β is approximately 1.6 when the
coordinators begin to dominate, while for average degree of 8.0, coordinators begin to
dominate for β = 1.8 approximately. Even though the difference is small, it is possible to
come to the important conclusion that when more links (relationships) are added to an
existing network, increasing the link density and average degree, it takes higher relative
rewards for coordination, for it to become the evolutionary dominant strategy. In a more
densely connected society, the stag has to have relatively more meat for hunters to adopt
coordination.
Let us now consider hierarchical-modular networks. As Figure 3.5 c shows, there is also a
sharp transition. Does hierarchy in social systems favour the evolution of coordination? To
answer this, further analysis was done using the hierarchical-modular networks generated
by the method described in Sarkar and Dong [226]. Ensembles of 100 networks each were
generated for various values of wiring parameter p, from 0.3 to 0.9. Sarkar and Dong
explain that the higher this parameter, the higher the hierarchical nature of the networks.
For each set of networks, the evolution of coordination was simulated as described before
and measured the proportion of coordinators at the end of simulation (after Te = 1500
time-steps) against the payoff parameter, β. Figure 3.6 shows our results. As the figure
shows, hierarchy indeed aids the dominance of coordinators in a certain way. While
coordinators do not dominate below a certain payoff parameter (β = 1.6), and the value
of this cut-off is not influenced by the parameter p, the evolutionary behaviour for values
higher than this β is influenced by the amount of hierarchy represented by p. For lower
values of p, the coordinators do not dominate at all for any β. However, for higher values of
p, the coordinators dominate and a phase transition is vaguely observable around β = 1.6.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that other topological features being similar, the
presence of hierarchy encourages the emergence of coordinators (given sufficient relative
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payoff) in a social system.
Similarly, it may be possible to ask if small-worldness of small-world networks encourages
or discourages the evolution of coordination. The small-world nature of a network is
quantified by (i) relatively high clustering coefficient (ii) relatively low characteristic path
lengths of a network [9, 73]. Therefore, it is possible to analyse how these two parameters
influenced the evolution of coordination in small-world networks. Some typical results are
shown in Figure 3.7. As shown in the figure, when clustering coefficient increases and
network diameter decreases in a set of similar sized (N = 1000,M = 2000) small-world
networks, again generated using the Watts- Strogatz algorithm, the phase transition in
terms of relative coordinator payoff (β) becomes more pronounced. Thus, it can be argued
that small-world nature encourages the rapid evolution of coordination, when the relative
payoffs for coordinators increase.
Backing and intuitive explanations for these observations may be found in other recent
studies, which looked at other games on graphs. For example, Masuda et al. [150] found
that cooperative behaviour in spatial prisoner’s dilemma (similar to coordination in stag-
hunting) is optimised when the network is small-world. They arrived at this conclusion by
comparing a range of graphs from regular lattices to random graphs, and the small-world
characteristic was determined by the amount of randomness introduced into the lattice (as
explained by Watts and Strogatz [260]). The topology was shown to be most conducive to
cooperative behaviour when the randomness parameter was intermediate in value, which
also maximises small-worldness. However, in a hawks and dove game, where coordination
does not result in the highest payoff for an individual (the best scenario for an individual
is to be the hawk themselves while the other player plays dove, whereas when both players
playing hawk both players get a negative payoff), no such optimisation for coordination
was observed in small-world networks [5]. The reason for these observations may be that,
in games where mutual cooperation/coordination is not detrimental (in stag-hunting it
results in best possible payoff, whereas in prisoner’s dilemma it results in the second best
possible payoff for an individual), the high clustering introduced by small-worldness helps
sustain a group of coordinators /cooperators while the short-cuts available in topology
help it spread. If the network is lattice-like, there are no short-cuts to further parts of the
graph, hindering the spread of coordinators, while if it is totally random, the clustering is
lost, making it harder for coordinators to sustain each other.
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Similarly, in terms of modularity and hierarchy, it can be noted that in networks which
are highly modular, most nodes belong to certain groups (modules), while there are other
links which maintain the hierarchical structure. Recent work has shown that there is an
optimal proportion of inter-group links, for which the spreading of cooperative behaviour
for Prisoner’s Dilemma is optimised [117]. Assuming a similar phenomena occurs in the
case of the coordination game, it is possible that the increase in hierarchy as proposed
by Sarkar and Dong [226] moves the fraction of intermodule links towards this optimal
proportion, thus facilitating the spread of coordination. However, a detailed examination
of this particular relationship is beyond the scope of this work.
Finally, the case with Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random networks is shown in Figure 3.5 d, and well-
mixed populations in Figure 3.5 e. Here, too, it is possible to observe a sharp transition,
around 1.9 ≥ β ≥ 1.7. The average degree of network does not seem to influence much
where this transition occurs. Therefore, we may argue that while all classes of networks
display some degree of phase transition in terms of β, it is sharpest in small-world networks.
This would imply that in a small-world network, with a scenario of increasing relative
payoffs for coordinators, the decision to become coordinator has to be made quite swiftly in
order not to lose out. However, in a society where social links are scale-free, it is possible to
decide more slowly about becoming a coordinator(given that coordinator payoffs increase
at a fixed temporal rate).
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for hierarchical-modular networks with different
rewiring p probabilities, after evolution. The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 1500 time-steps
were used for evolution.
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of coordinators against the game parameter β for small-world networks with different (a)
network diameters (b) clustering coefficients after evolution. The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and
Te = 1500 time-steps were used for evolution.
3.5.3 Drivers of coordination and node degree
In order to gain an insight of how coordination ends up being the winning strategy, the
degree distribution of coordinating and non-coordinating nodes during the process of evo-
lution was observed. An example is shown in Figure 3.8 where the average of 100 networks
with k¯ = 4.0, for a β of 2.1 are considered. Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.5, these are
networks on which coordination dominates after Te time-steps. An intermediate time-step
was chosen deliberately, Ti = 100, with the view of understanding which degree range is
first dominated by the coordinators. In case of scale-free networks, we observed that it is
the provincial hubs, that first start to show a higher proportion of coordinators. It ap-
pears that main hubs resist the adaptation longer, and once they become predominantly
coordinators, the evolution of coordination is almost complete. Some of the peripheral
nodes also can remain non-coordinators for a long time. It is the provincial hubs that are
the quickest to adapt.
In the case of small-world networks, the degree distribution of the network in terms of
strategy at an intermediate time step (Ti = 100) was observed. The results, averaged
over 100 networks of 1000 nodes each, are shown in Figure 3.8 b. Note that the small-
world networks, by nature, have much smaller hubs than scale-free networks. Again, it is
the provincial hubs that seem to be first adopting the coordination strategy completely.
Similar results for hierarchical-modular and random networks were obtained, as shown
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in Figure 3.8 c and d. The regular lattices were not considered since node degrees are
homogeneous in them and the analysis is unnecessary: that is, in all cases, it is the
provincial hubs which are first fully converted into becoming coordinators.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of coordinators by degree for four classes of networks (regular lattices are not considered
since there is no variation of degree in them). The figure shows the fraction of coordinators for a number of
degree intervals, averaged over 100 networks, at the beginning and at an intermediate time Ti evolution. Since
strategies were initially randomly assigned, the proportion of coordinators is about half for each degree interval at
the beginning. At the intermediate time however, the proportion of coordinators is much higher overall but highest
among the provincial hubs. The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Ti = 100 time-steps were used
for evolution, k¯ = 4 and β = 2.1.
Now let us consider the question of which types of nodes convert first to coordination. To
do this, the average degree of coordinators and non-coordinators throughout evolution for
each class of networks (again averaged over 100 networks of N = 1000 each) were plotted
in Figure 3.9. As seen in the figure, while the average degree for coordinators remain
more or less the same, the average degree of non-coordinators declines steadily. This is
not inconsistent with provincial hubs first adopting coordination, because it means that
once provincial hubs (which have degrees higher than the network average) start becoming
coordinators, the average degree of non-coordinators begins to decrease. However, there
exists a special feature in terms of small-world networks. In this class, the average degree
of non-coordinators briefly becomes higher than the average degree of coordinators before
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Figure 3.9: Average degrees of coordinators/non-coordinators against time-step. Four different network types are
considered.
the average degree of non-coordinators decrease rapidly. This can only mean that in
small-world networks, non-coordinators find refuge in main hubs (while provincial hubs
are ‘invaded’ by coordinators) and resist the spread of coordinators for a while, before
giving up and retreating to a few peripheral nodes. It is intriguing that players who play
a larger number of games tend to adapt slower in small-world networks than in other
topologies.
3.5.4 Influence of information diffusion
It is often unrealistic to expect that members of a community would know or can correctly
predict, the strategies adopted by their neighbours or the payoffs they are receiving. In-
deed, as observed earlier, a non-coordination strategy is transiently competitive and pays
better dividends in the short term, so many members of the community may believe that
it is not in their interests to share correct information about their strategies or their pay-
offs. If nodes only have partial information about payoffs of their neighbours, which is the
evolutionarily competitive strategy in each of the network classes mentioned before? This
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is the primary question that is addressed in this section.
Eq. 3.2 could be used to introduce stochasticity in the adaptation. Nodes have ‘noise’ in
the information which they have about the payoffs of their neighbours, and therefore have
a level of randomness in changing decisions. The lower the parameter α, the higher the
randomness. If α = 0, no correct information diffuses about neighbours’ payoffs and all
decisions to change strategy are made randomly.
The evolution of the population under these conditions on the five classes of networks were
simulated. Sale-free networks of size N = 1000 were used, and the evolution was done for
Te = 1500 time-steps, for various α values. A typical set of results (for β = 2.3) are shown
in Figure 3.10 a. As shown previously, for this β, under complete information diffusion
the coordinators will dominate after some time. Therefore, the proportion of coordinators
were compared for a range of α values.
As expected, the proportion of coordinators increases with α. Further, there is a very
small, but non-zero alpha value below which the non-coordinators dominate. Therefore,
we can surmise that if the levels of information diffusion are sufficiently low then it is
an evolutionarily winning strategy to be a non-coordinator. Similar experiments were
conducted with other β values. While the starting points of plots vary with these β
values (for smaller β, non-coordinators dominate for larger ranges of α), the results were
qualitatively similar.
In the case of the small-world networks, it was found that the proportion of coordinators
increased with information diffusion proportion α. However small-world networks were
able to adopt coordination with smaller amounts of neighbour payoff information (smaller
α), and the transition was sharper. Figure 3.10 b shows some of our results, again for
β = 2.3, for hundred networks of size N = 1000 each after Te = 1500 time-steps. It is
found that for α ≥ 0.2, coordinators completely dominate. Therefore small-world networks
seem even more resilient to noise in neighbour payoff information than scale-free networks.
The experiments with E-R random networks, hierarchical-modular networks, and well-
mixed lattices produce similar results, as shown in Figures 3.10 c, d and e.
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Figure 3.10: Influence of the information diffusion parameter, α, on the proportion of coordinators during evolution.
The figure shows that the more information available about neighbour strategies, the higher the likelihood of
coordinators dominating. If the levels of information available is relatively very low, non coordinators dominate
even after evolution. The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases and Te = 1500 time-steps were used for
evolution, k¯ = 4, 8, 12 and β = 2.3.
3.5.5 Influence of timelag in information diffusion
In many real-world scenarios, information about the strategies adopted by other player, or
the payoff received by them is not immediately available, since players tend to think that
it is advantageous to hold such personal information secret. However, with the passage
of time, the strategies adopted by players in the past and the payoffs received by them
may become available, and this outdated information may partially help players to decide
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their current strategies. Even if players do not deliberately withhold information, it takes
time for information to be transmitted and received. In other words, information about
payoffs received by other players tends to have a time lag. In this section, the focus is on
analysing how such a time lag influences the evolutionary patterns.
Eq. 3.2 was modified so that there is a lag in the payoffs known, giving us Eq. 3.3. For
ease of reference, it is repeated here:
p = (1− α)ρ+ αmax
{
0,
(P λy − P λx )
kmax(R− T )β
}
(3.5)
where P λy , P
λ
x are the cumulative payoff values of players x and y, λ time-steps before the
present time. Even though a particular player may know their current cumulative payoff,
it might make more sense for cumulative payoffs from the same time-step to be compared,
since the lag λ is used for both nodes. For α = 1.0, our results for scale-free networks,
small-world networks, hierarchical-modular networks, random networks and lattices are
shown in Figure 3.11 a,b,c,d and e respectively. All these figures are for β = 2.1 and k¯ = 4.
The results were obtained after 1500 time-steps.
As discussed previously, if there is no time lag, then coordinators dominate the network
after a certain number of time-steps for this particular β. However, it is evident from the
figures that if there is time lag, the dominance of coordinators is less pronounced. Beyond
a certain amount of time lag, non coordinators become the dominant players. Importantly,
the effect of time lag depends on the topology of the network. The evolutionary dynamics
of scale-free networks change quickly, so that if the time lag is higher than 100 time-steps,
then non-coordinators become the dominant players even after evolution. Whereas in the
case of E-R random networks, hierarchical-modular networks and small-world networks,
and indeed well-mixed populations, the time lag has to be much larger before the non-
coordinators dominate evolved networks. The scale-free networks are the least resilient in
coping with time lags in payoff information.
Since most real world networks are scale-free [9, 73, 198, 204, 201], it is a very important
observation that scale-free networks are more sensitive to time-lags in payoff information
than almost any other conceivable topology. The inherent heterogeneity of the degree
distribution of scale-free networks could be a reason for this. This question could be
further analysed by varying the amount of heterogeneity of synthesised scale-free networks
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Figure 3.11: Proportion of coordinators against the time delay parameter λ for five classes of networks after evolution.
The network size was N = 1000 nodes in all cases, and Te = 1500 time-steps were used for evolution. β = 2.1, k¯ = 4.
by, for example, changing the scale-free exponent γ, and analysing the value of threshold λ
after which each network fails to evolve coordination. The λthreshold against γ plot would
then give an indication about the relationship between time-lag sensitivity and scale-free
nature. Such a detailed analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this preliminary study
and subject to future research.
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3.6 Discussion
In this chapter, the evolution of coordination in social systems was studied by simulating
a coordination(stag-hunt) game on an ensemble of complex networks. A comparative
study of topologies that are commonly found in social systems was conducted, by focusing
on scale-free networks, small-world networks, hierarchical-modular networks and Erdo˝s-
Re`nyi random networks. Well-mixed populations or lattices which approximate them were
considered as a reference model. In all classes, it was observed that if nodes are unaware of
the payoffs of their neighbours and cannot adapt, the relative payoff for coordination has
to be quite high, for the average payoff of coordinators to be higher than the average payoff
of non-coordinators. However, when nodes are aware of the payoffs of their neighbours
are receiving and can evolutionarily adapt, coordination quickly emerges as the winning
strategy, even for relatively lower levels of coordination payoff.
A number of general and topology-specific findings were observed. These can be sum-
marised as follows:
General findings: (i) When there is no evolution, the relative coordinator payoff, β,
has to be above two for coordinating nodes to have higher average payoff than non-
coordinators. This result is independent of the topology of the system. However, after
payoff information based evolution and adaptation, there emerges a range of β less than
two for which coordinators are still a majority. (ii) In most topologies, the proportion
of coordinators after sufficient evolution and adaptation goes through a phase transition
when the relative coordinator payoff, β, is increased. (iii) It is the peripheral hubs, which
first completely adopt coordination and drive the evolution of coordination. (iv) Noise
and time-lags in payoff information adversely affect the evolution of coordination, though
the level of this effect depends on topology.
Topology-specific findings: (i) The evolution of coordination is most pronounced, and
the phase transition in terms of relative coordinator payoff, β, is sharpest, in small-world
networks. However, the emergence of coordination after evolution is least rapid in scale-
free networks. (ii) Scale-free networks are most sensitive to noise in payoff information, and
the evolution of coordinators is most affected by such noise in them. Small-world networks
are not so sensitive. (iii) Similarly, scale-free networks are most sensitive to time-lags in
information about payoff. (iv) After the evolution of coordination, the average payoff of
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coordinators is higher than the initial stage in scale-free and hierarchical networks. On
the other hand, it is lower than the payoff at initial stage for small-world and E-R random
networks. Note however that the proportion of coordinators is higher than initial stage
in all classes. (v) The ‘amount’ of hierarchy in hierarchical-modular networks, and the
degree of ‘small-worldness’ in small-world networks, measured by appropriate parameters,
both seem to aid the emergence of coordination.
In general, scale-free networks and small-world networks display contrasting characteris-
tics in terms of the evolution of coordination. The hierarchical-modular class tends to
display features similar to scale-free networks, while the E-R random networks display
features similar to small-world networks. However, the overarching conclusion is that
topological features, qualified here by the four classes of networks, influence the evolution
of coordination in social systems in non-trivial ways.
There are several key implications from the results presented here. Both small-world
and scale-free features are observed in real-world social systems up to various degrees.
it was shown that while the emergence of coordination can be aided equally readily by
both features, scale-freeness increases the sensitivity of the system to noise and time lags
in information diffusion, while networks which are exclusively small-world are relatively
unaffected by it. This would imply that systems that are small-world but not scale-free
are likely to evolve into being dominant in coordination and sustain it under difficult
information diffusion conditions. This contention is further validated by the fact that
the ‘small-worldness’ itself, measured by the clustering coefficient and network diameter
of the network, seems to aid the phase transition in terms of relative coordinator payoff.
This has been corroborated by other studies in different game contexts. Experiments were
conducted with several network densities (average degrees) in all classes of networks, and
showed that the sparser the network is, the easier the emergence of coordination, other
parameters being unchanged. Therefore, the smaller the number of games played within
a network, the easier it seems for coordination to evolve as the winning strategy. These
results are significant for understanding the behaviour of the spatially connected social
system.
Finally, it would be useful to contextualise these results against some other recent ad-
vances made in networked game theory. A number of studies have looked at the evolution
of cooperation (exemplified by cooperation in Prisoners Dilemma game), and how it is
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influenced by graph topology. For example, [225] considered a range of essentially scale-
free networks and showed that the heterogeneity introduced by them helps in the spread
of co-operation. The relationship between payoff aspirations and cooperation was high-
lighted by [52]. Other studies have looked at the role of assortativity in the emergence of
coordination (for e.g., see [220]). The study by Jiang and Perc [117] highlighted, again
within the context of Prisoners Dilemma, that there exists an optimal number of inter-
modular links which aids the spread of cooperation between groups. Other studies have
looked at the influence of topology in hawks and doves games [5]. However, most of these
studies chose one or two arbitrary classes of network topologies, and did not consider the
affects of information diffusion. Our contribution in this work lies in (a) comparing all
well known classes of networks, as well as the well-mixed case, in a principled manner,
and (b) explicitly studying the effects of information diffusion, in terms of noise as well as
time-lags, in the evolution of coordination. This analysis focused on coordination rather
than cooperation (i.e stag hunt rather than prisoner’s dilemma), which is, while similar,
less analysed in literature.
This study could be enhanced by looking at a broader set of parameters and network
topologies. For example, only a limited range of average degrees were used, and mostly
studied topological differences based on broad classifications rather than based on indi-
vidual topological characteristics such as assortativity. The number of networks and ini-
tialisations used also could be increased. Despite these limitations, the results presented
here are indicative of some general patterns with respect to different topologies and how
coordination evolves in each of them.
While the simulations discussed in this chapter was done on relatively smaller networks,
the results were consistent even when relatively large networks were used. In this chapter,
we focused mainly on sparse networks and not dense networks, as social networks generally
tend to be sparse in nature[162].
In this chapter, it was observed how the evolution of coordination is influenced by the
topology of networks. While coordination is an important strategy in an evolving system
of strategic players, studying the effect of network topology on the evolution of generic
strategics is far more applicable in networked games. As such, the next chapter discusses
how the evolutionary stability of strategies is influenced by the topology of complex net-
works.
Chapter 4
The influence of network topology
on the evolutionary stability of
strategies
Previous chapter focused on the effect of network topology on the evolution of coordination
in network based games. While coordination is a significant strategy in evolving popula-
tions of strategic players, this chapter discusses the effect of topology on the evolution of
generic strategies in evolutionary games.
4.1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the branch of study that has resulted from the adoption of
game theory into evolutionary biology [238]. It is used to study how a particular strategy
or a group of strategies would evolve over time in a population of players. If a strategy
is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), once it is adopted by a population of players,
any mutated strategy would not be able to invade it [237]. Evolutionary stability of a
strategy could further be divided into two sub categories. strong ESS and weak ESS
(also called asymptotic stable strategy and stable strategy [33]). If a strategy is in a
weak evolutionarily stable state, the invading strategy does not completely die out but its
population does not increase [33].
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This chapter discusses how network topology affects the evolutionary stability of strate-
gies. In order to do that, a class of strategies known as ‘memory-one strategies’ is used
in prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game to evaluate the effect of network topology on evolu-
tionary stability. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game has widely been used to model the
strategic decision making of self-interested opponents [224, 83, 4]. In memory-one strate-
gies, each player would base his action on a probability derived based on the previous
interaction with the same opponent. In this work, particular significance is placed on a
sub-class of memory-one strategies known as zero-determinant(ZD) strategies, along with
other well-known memory-one strategies. Zero-determinant strategies have been demon-
strated to be extortionate strategies, meaning that they have the ability to unilaterally set
the payoff of the opponent [210]. Intuitively, this would suggest that Zero-Determinant
strategies have the potential to be evolutionarily stable against any competing strategy.
However, Zero-determinant strategies have been shown to be evolutionarily unstable in
a well-mixed population of players [4]. Extending from that basis, this chapter studies
whether network topology affects the evolutionary stability of Zero-determinant strategies
in a non-homogeneous network of players.
To test the effect of network topology, two well known network classes were used: scale-free
networks [9] and well-mixed networks. Additionally, two different evolutionary processes
were used to evolve the populations. First, the effect of topology on the evolutionary
stability was tested using the death-birth Moran process [169], which is an evolutionary
process used to model the evolution of players over time, particularly in biological systems.
Then, a stochastic strategy adoption process that would update the strategy of a randomly
selected node, by comparing it with a selected neighbour’s strategy. The same process has
been used as an evolutionary process by Santos et al. [223], with the pure-strategy PD
game. For the rest of the chapter, this evolutionary process would be referred to as
the ‘strategy adoption process’. The evolutionary outcomes of these two processes when
players are placed in both well-mixed networks and scale-free networks are compared.
Based on the results of these observations, it is argued that the evolutionarily unstable
strategies in a well-mixed population may survive and even dominate in a heterogeneous
network of players. Further, it is shown that the topology of the interactions of the players,
the evolutionary update process and the initial topological distribution of players are
significant in determining the overall evolutionary stability of a strategy. When the players
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are distributed in a homogeneous network however, the evolutionary process used would
not have a significant effect the evolutionary stability of a strategy. The effect of topology
on the evolutionary stability is evaluated by varying network assortativity [181], which is
a measure of the similarity of mixing of nodes in a network. Thus, it is possible to suggest
that when the network becomes more heterogeneous, network topology would have a more
significant effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies. We call this topologically
influenced evolutionary stability of strategies as ‘topological stability’[124, 130].
Understanding the topological effect on the evolutionary stability of a strategy would
help us to make better predictions about the evolutionary stability of a strategy in a
real-world environment. Even though a strategy may be theoretically stable or not, its
actual evolutionary behaviour may depend on the topology of the interconnections in
the population and the evolutionary update mechanism used. By studying these effects
extensively, the modelling of evolutionary games may be improved, by increasing the
accuracy of the predictions of the evolutionary stability of strategies.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a background
on the theoretical aspects of evolutionary game theory and complex network science,
within the scope of this work. Therein, the zero-determinant strategies in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game is introduced. Further, the death-birth Moran process and
its significance in determining the evolutionary stability of a strategy is compared with the
strategy adoption process suggested by Santos et al. [223]. The following section describes
the methodology applied in evaluating the evolutionary stability of strategies, under the
two evolutionary update processes used. Next, the results obtained by simulating both the
death-birth Moran process and the strategy adoption process in well-mixed and scale-free
networks of players are presented. Further, the results obtained on how the variation of
network heterogeneity, measured using the network assortativity, affects the evolutionary
stability of strategies are outlined. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the results,
presenting the conclusions.
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4.2 Background
4.2.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory is an outcome of the adaptation of game theory into the field
of evolutionary biology [238, 237]. It studies how contending strategies evolve over time
in a population of players. The equivalent concept to Nash Equilibrium in evolutionary
game theory, is evolutionary stability [151]. If Nash Equilibrium can be considered as a
static equilibrium, evolutionary stability represents a dynamic equilibrium of a strategy,
over time. A strategy is called evolutionarily stable if it has the potential to dominate
over any mutant strategy [238]. Evolutionary games are often modelled as iterative games
where a population of players play the same game iteratively in a well-mixed or a spatially
distributed environment. [140].
In iterated prisoner’s dilemma(IPD), the prisoner’s dilemma game is iterated over many
time-steps, over a population of players [83]. Each player would play a single iteration
of the game with its neighbours in each time-step. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is
widely used to model the autonomous decision making behaviour of self-interested players.
It has been demonstrated that the topology of the network is significant in the evolution of
cooperation of strategies in the IPD game [223]. For example, when the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game is played among pure cooperation and pure defection strategies, cooperation
evolves to be the dominant strategy in a population of players that are distributed in a
scale-free topology.
4.2.2 Zero-determinant strategies
As opposed to pure strategies of cooperation and defection, mixed strategies of prisoner’s
dilemma game are based on the assumption that each player chooses a strategy based on
a probability distribution. In fact, pure strategies can be regarded as a special case of
mixed strategies where each strategy is chosen with the probability of one. Memory-one
strategies [4, 137] are a special sub-class of mixed strategies, where the current mixed
strategy of a game would depend on the immediate previous interaction between the two
players in concern. Memory-one strategies are a specialisation of a more general class of
strategies called finite-memory strategies [4, 137], where the current mixed strategy would
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be dependent on n number of historical states between the two players.
When considering the previous state between two players in a PD game, there could be
four possible states. Namely CC, CD, DC and DD, where C represents cooperation and D
represents defection, respectively. Memory-one strategies are represented by calculating
the probabilities of cooperation by a player in the next move, given the type of the previous
interaction of the player with the same opponent. For example, the strategy (1,1,1,1)
would imply that the Player A would cooperate with player B, irrespective of the previous
encounter between Player A and B. Thus, the pure strategy cooperation and defection can
be thought of as a special case of memory-one or finite memory strategies. By varying
the probabilities of cooperation under each of the previous encounters, it is possible to
define any number of mixed strategies. Some of the well-known memory-one strategies
include the Pavlov strategy (1,0,0,1) and the general cooperator (0.935, 0.229, 0.266, 0.42)
strategy. General cooperator is the evolutionarily dominating strategy that evolved at low
mutation rates as demonstrated by Iliopoulos et al. [112].
Zero-determinant strategies [210, 242] are a special sub-class of memory-one strategies that
have recently gained much attention in the literature and media. ZD strategies denote
a class of memory-one strategies that enable a player to unilaterally set the opponent’s
payoff. Due to this inherent property, ZD strategies have the ability to gain a higher
expected payoff against an opposing strategy. However, for a strategy to be evolutionarily
stable, it has to be stable against itself as well as the opponent strategies. It has been
shown that ZD strategies do not perform well against itself. Due to this reason, ZD
strategies have been demonstrated to be evolutionarily unstable [4], particularly against
the Pavlov strategy.
ZD strategies are defined using a set of conditional probability equations [210]. Suppose
p1, p2, p3 and p4 denote the set of probabilities that a player would cooperate given that
the player’s last interaction with the same opponent resulted in the outcomes CC (p1), CD
(p2), DC (p3) or DD (p4). ZD strategies are defined by fixing p2 and p3 to be functions
of p1 and p4, denoted by Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2.
p2 =
p1(T − P )− (1 + p4)(T −R)
R− P (4.1)
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p3 =
(1− p1)(P − S) + p4(R− S)
R− P (4.2)
It was shown by Press and Dyson [210] that when playing against the ZD strategy, the
expected utility of an opponent O can be defined using the probabilities p1 and p4, while
p2 and p3 are defined as functions of p1 and p4. Eq. 4.3 gives the expected payoff of the
opponent against the ZD strategy.
E(O,ZD) =
(1− p1)P + p4R)
(1− p1 + p4) (4.3)
Here, P and R represent the payoffs earned when both players defect and corporate,
respectively.
Hence, ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally set the opponent’s payoff, effectively
making them extortionate strategies. In the simulations performed here, the probabilities
are set at p1 and p4 as 0.99 and 0.01 respectively, as in the study done by Adami and
Hintze [4]. p2 and p3 are derived to be 0.97 and 0.02, using the ZD conditional probability
equations Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2.
4.3 Evolutionary processes
Two evolutionary processes are used in the evolution of populations. The first one is a
well-known evolutionary process known as the death-birth Moran process. The second
one is the stochastic strategy adoption process that was adopted from the work of Santos
et al. [223].
4.3.1 The Death-birth Moran process [169]
As the name suggests, in the death-birth Moran process, a node is randomly selected for
removal at each time-step. Its replacement node is then selected from its neighbours based
on a probability proportional to the fitness of the neighbours. In the case of the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma game, the fitness is equivalent to the accumulated payoff of each node,
averaged over its number of neighbours. Then, the selected neighbour is replicated to
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replace the node that is being removed. The new node would have zero payoff yet it will still
have the same neighbours as the previous node that existed in the same topological space.
This process is continued over n number of time-steps to evolve the entire population
over time. The death-birth Moran process is commonly used to emulate the evolution of
biological species where the strategies are hard-wired into the players. If the lifetime of a
player is significantly less than the time-span of evolution, as with the case of biological
evolution, the death-birth Moran process may effectively be used to simulate the evolution
of strategies(players) over time.
4.3.2 Stochastic strategy adoption process
Since Moran process maybe be more applicable in the biological context where the players
with hard-wired strategies get replaced, it does not take into account the individual payoff
differences of the node being replaced and the replicating node. Thus, it maybe possible
that the node being replaced would actually have a higher cumulative payoff (fitness) than
the replicating node. On the other hand, in the social context, the time-span of evolution
of strategies could be considerably less than the lifetime of a player. Hence, players
would be more inclined to adopt the apparently successful strategy and survive without
getting replaced from the population. In order to model this kind of social evolution,
a stochastic strategy adoption process can be applied. Such a process has been used in
Santos et al. [223] to demonstrate the evolution of cooperation in IPD games with pure
strategies. This method is extended for mixed strategies in this work. When employing
this particular strategy adoption process, a node going through evolution is not directly
replaced. Instead, its strategy could be updated by comparing its cumulative payoff with
that of a stochastically selected neighbour. As with the Moran process, in each time-step,
a node is marked for update. A potential node to compare it with is selected from its
neighbours, based on a probability proportional to the fitness (accumulated payoff) of the
neighbours, then the probability of the marked node adopting the strategy of its selected
neighbour is calculated using the following equation.
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p = max{0, (Py − Px)/[k> (E (ZD,Pav)− E (Pav, ZD)]} (4.4)
Where:
p - Probability that node X would adopt Y ’s strategy
Px - Cumulative pay off of node X
Py - Cumulative pay off of node Y
k> - Maximum degree of X ’s degree (kx) and Y ’s degree (ky)
E (ZD,Pav)− The expected payoff of a ZD node against a Pavlov node
E (Pav, ZD)– The expected payoff of a Pavlov node against a ZD node
As shown above, the population update probability depends on the payoff difference be-
tween the marked node and the selected neighbour node. The degree of those two nodes
is also used to normalise the effect of degree differences. However, the cumulative payoff
of the node with the higher degree would still be higher due to the fact that it will have
more interactions with other players. Thus, this equation implicitly captures the network
topology in calculating the adoption probability. Due to this, this particular strategy
adoption process can be used to study the topological effect on the evolutionary stability
of strategies.
4.4 Network analysis
Complex networks are self-organising networks that show non-trivial topological features
[9]. Complex network analysis provides a network perspective in analysing complex sys-
tems. Different classes of complex networks have been defined to model real-world complex
systems such as social and biological systems. This chapter mainly focuses on two such
network classes: well-mixed networks and scale-free networks. These are widely discussed
in the network analysis literature when evaluating the topological stability of strategies.
Out of the network metrics discussed in the Background, Assortativity is used as a means
of observing how the heterogeneity of mixing patterns affects the evolutionary stability of
strategies.
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4.5 Methodology
Initially, the experimental results obtained in the work by Adami and Hintze [4] were re-
created, by mixing the Zero-determinant strategy with the Pavlov strategy in a well-mixed
population. This further enabled the confirmation of the theoretical results presented in
the same work using the replicator dynamics model, suggesting that the ZD strategy would
be evolutionarily unstable against the Pavlov strategy. To do this, a population of 1000
nodes that are connected via a lattice where each node is connected to eight other random
nodes were initialised. Initially, the two strategies were distributed in a random manner
so that the ZD strategy would occupy different fractions of the population (0.6 and 0.4)
in each simulation run. Then, using the death-birth Moran process, the population was
updated over 150,000 time-steps to observe the evolution of the strategies.
Afterwards, the evolutionary process was changed to the stochastic strategy adoption
process used by Santos et al. [223]. This tested whether it is the population update
process or the network topology that affects the evolutionary stability of the strategies
concerned.
Then, the well-mixed population was replaced with a non-homogeneous scale-free network
with 1000 nodes. As with the case of the previous experiment, the ZD strategy and the
Pavlov strategy were randomly assigned among the nodes. With the players spatially
distributed in a scale-free network, both the death-birth Moran process and the strategy
adoption process were applied separately to observe the effect that they have on the
evolution of strategies.
Next, the initial distribution of the strategies were changed in such a manner that the ZD
strategy occupied the majority of hubs. This was done by sorting the nodes according
to their degree and assigning the top 60% of the nodes with the ZD strategy. In this
configuration, the initial average degree of ZD nodes was measured to be 3.4 while the
average degree of Pavlov nodes was 1.8. The evolution of strategies was observed under
the death-birth Moran process as well as the strategy adoption process. The experiment
was repeated with the Pavlov strategy occupying the majority of hubs.
As the next step, the Pavlov strategy was mixed with the general cooperator strategy
and the cooperator strategy in separate scale-free networks of players. The evolution
of strategies was tested with a random initial distribution of strategies and a strategy
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distribution where the opponent strategy (GC or cooperator) was initially assigned mostly
on hubs. This enabled us to determine whether any observed topological stability of ZD
strategy is a unique and inherent property of the strategy itself or whether it is a more
general behaviour that could occur with other strategies as well.
Finally, the evolution of the Pavlov and ZD strategies were observed in non-homogeneous
networks while the network heterogeneity was gradually varied. To perform this test, a set
of scale-free networks were generated with varying assortativity values by rewiring a scale-
free network in a probabilistic manner. Then, both strategies were distributed randomly
in each scale-free population in such a manner that the ZD strategy would occupy 60%
of the nodes. Afterwards, the populations were allowed to evolve over 150,000 time-steps
under the strategy adoption process and the remaining population fractions of ZD players
were recorded. The results were averaged over 40 independent runs.
4.6 Results
In certain figures in this section, the number of time-steps shown is limited, when the
strategy in concern becomes extinct reasonably quickly. Fig.4.1 shows the evolution of the
fraction of ZD nodes when the ZD strategy is mixed with the Pavlov strategy in well-mixed
and scale-free populations. The evolutionary process used is the death-birth Moran pro-
cess. As expected, ZD strategy gradually becomes extinct in a well-mixed population. This
confirms that in a homogeneous network, ZD strategy is evolutionarily unstable against
the Pavlov strategy that operates as a strong evolutionarily stable strategy, as suggested
by Adami and Hintze [4]. Moreover, ZD does not survive even in a non-homogeneous
population distributed in a scale-free network, when the same evolutionary process is
applied.
Next, Fig.4.2 depicts the evolution of the ZD and Pavlov strategies in a scale-free non-
homogeneous network of players, under different initial configurations. The figure shows
the evolution of the ZD fraction when the strategies are initially distributed randomly as
well as when more hubs are assigned with the ZD strategy initially. As the figure depicts,
Pavlov clearly dominates and eradicates the ZD strategy, suggesting that regardless of
the initial distribution of strategies, ZD cannot survive when the population is allowed to
evolve under the death-birth Moran process.
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Figure 4.1: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in well-mixed and scale-free
populations. The population is allowed to evolve under the death-birth Moran process with 0.1% replacement rate.
The strategies are initially distributed randomly, with the fraction of ZD nodes being 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
Fig.4.3 depicts the scenario where a well-mixed population of ZD and Pavlov strategies are
allowed to interact with each other over time, according to the strategy adoption process
instead of the Moran process. Here too, ZD is gradually eradicated from the popula-
tion. However, when the same evolutionary process is applied in a scale-free population
of players, ZD strategy manages to survive, as shown in Fig4.4[a]. As shown in the figure,
Pavlov strategy shows weak evolutionary stability, failing to eradicate the ZD strategy
completely, when the two strategies are initially assigned randomly. On the other hand,
when the ZD is initially assigned to the majority of hubs as depicted in Fig.4.4[b], ZD
manages to become the weak evolutionarily stable strategy over the Pavlov strategy, be-
coming the dominant strategy in the network. However, as the same figure shows, when
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Figure 4.2: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations of varying
initial configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the death-birth Moran process with 0.1% replace-
ment rate. In the two initial configurations, ZD strategy is either assigned randomly or assigned more on hubs (in
hubs initialisation, the initial average degrees of ZD and Pavlov nodes are 3.4 and 1.8, respectively).
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Figure 4.3: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in a well-mixed population. The
population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. The strategies are initially distributed randomly,
with the fraction of ZD nodes being 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
the Pavlov strategy is initially assigned to the majority of hubs, it behaves as a strong
evolutionarily stable strategy, wiping out the ZD population. This suggests that under the
strategy adoption evolutionary process, the evolutionarily unstable ZD strategy may not
only survive, but may even become the more prominent strategy in a non-homogeneous
population of players.
The Pavlov strategy was then mixed with the GC and the cooperator strategies in a scale-
free population. Fig.4.5 shows the evolution of the GC and cooperator strategy fractions
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Figure 4.4: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations of varying
initial configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. (a) ZD and Pavlov
strategies initially distributed randomly (b) Majority of hubs are either assigned with ZD or Pavlov (the initial
average degrees of hub and non-hub strategies are 3.4 and 1.8, respectively).
over time, when those strategies are initially placed randomly or mostly on hubs. As
the figures depict, GC and cooperator too may survive or dominate the population based
on the initial distribution of the strategies, when the population is updated using the
strategy adoption evolutionary process. This suggests that topological influence on the
evolutionary stability is not limited to the ZD strategy, but may apply to other strategies
as well.
Finally, the evolution of the ZD population against the Pavlov strategy was tested while
the heterogeneity of the networks are gradually changed. Fig.4.6 shows the variation of
the remaining ZD fraction after 150,000 time-steps under the strategy adoption process.
CHAPTER 4. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF STRATEGIES 110
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  50000  100000  150000
G
C
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
fra
ct
io
n
Time-step
Random
Hubs
(a) GC-vs-Pavlov
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  50000  100000  150000C
oo
rp
er
at
or
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
fra
ct
io
n
Time-step
Random
Hubs
(b) Cooperator-vs-Pavlov
Figure 4.5: The evolution of GC and cooperator strategies competing against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free
populations of varying initial configurations. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption
process. In the two initial configurations, the competing strategy is either assigned randomly or assigned more
on hubs (in hubs initialisation, the initial average degrees of competing nodes and Pavlov nodes are 3.4 and 1.8,
respectively).
As the figure shows, there exits a negative correlation between the network assortativity
and the remaining ZD fraction. The actual Pearson correlation value of the two series is
-0.85, suggesting a strong negative correlation. Network assortativity is a measure of the
similarity or the homogeneity of the mixing patterns of the nodes. Therefore, this result
suggests that the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of a strategy
increases as the network becomes more heterogeneous.
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Figure 4.6: The evolution of ZD population fraction against the Pavlov strategy, in scale-free populations with
varying network assortativity values. The population is allowed to evolve under the strategy adoption process. The
results are averaged over 40 independent runs.
4.7 Discussion
This chapter attempted to evaluate how the network topology of a population of players
affects the evolutionary stability of a strategy. In particular, focus in this work was given to
a class of strategies known as zero-determinant strategies, which have been demonstrated
to be evolutionarily unstable against the Pavlov strategy.
Based on the results gathered from the experiments conducted in this chapter, it is pos-
sible to argue that network topology has an effect on whether a particular strategy is
evolutionarily stable or not. However, the topologically influenced evolutionary stability
is a weak evolutionary stability and not a strong evolutionary stability. In other words,
the stable strategy would not be able to completely eradicate the competing strategy and
the competing strategy would be able to survive within the confines of the network.
Further, it was identified that the topological effect of evolutionary stability is determined
by the evolutionary process used. When using the death-birth Moran process to evolve the
population, topology does not seem have a significant effect on the evolutionary stability of
strategies. However, when the strategy adoption process suggested by Santos et al. [223]
is applied, topology does have significant effect on evolutionary stability of a strategy
within a population. Strategy adoption process takes into account the cumulative payoff
of each node in determining whether a strategy should be replaced or not. Therefore, this
result suggests that an evolutionarily unstable strategy could survive when they occupy
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the hubs surrounded by leaf nodes assigned with the evolutionarily stable strategy. In
a heterogeneous network of players, hubs tend to have more strategic interactions with
their opponents compared to leaf nodes. Thus, a hub with an evolutionarily unstable
strategy would continue to be irreplaceable by the neighbouring nodes’ strategies, as it
would continue to have a higher payoff than its immediate neighbours.
The significance of the evolutionary process may have implications in the real-world net-
works of strategic players. Moran process would be more appropriate in the biological
context where the lifetime of a player is significantly less than the evolutionary time-span.
It could be effectively used to model the evolution of species where the strategies are
hard-wired to the players and the evolution happens through the replacement of players
with the replicas of better performing players. However, in the social context, the evolu-
tion of strategies may be driven by the adoption of strategies by the players based on the
performance of their neighbouring players. In other words, a stochastic strategy adoption
process could be used to model the evolution of strategies when the lifetime of a player
maybe considerably larger than the time-span of evolution. Examples of such situations
involve the interactions that happen in corporate sector and financial markets. There, it
is often observable that the players continually adopt the strategies of other players, in
their struggle to survive. Thus, the strategy adoption evolutionary update process may
be more relevant when the evolution of strategies is applied in the social context. Accord-
ingly, topological effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies may be more prevalent
in the social context, than the biological context.
Further, it is important to note that it is not only the topology, but also the initial
distribution of the strategies within the network too plays a significant role in shaping the
evolution of the strategies. For instance, when an evolutionarily unstable strategy occupies
hubs as opposed to the leaf nodes at the initiation of the evolution, it even manages to
become the more prominent strategy within the network over time, resembling a weak
evolutionarily stable strategy.
Even though the main focus was on the ZD and Pavlov strategies in this work, it was
possible to replicate similar observations with other well-known strategies such as the
general cooperator and cooperator strategies, competing against the Pavlov strategy. This
could mean that the variation of evolutionary stability due to topological stability of
strategies is a more general phenomena that may be applicable to most strategies that are
CHAPTER 4. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF STRATEGIES 113
competing with each other.
The simulations discussed in this chapter was done on relatively smaller networks. How-
ever, the results were consistent even when relatively large networks were used. Further,
we mainly focused on sparse networks and not dense networks in this work, as social
networks generally tend to be sparse in nature[162].
In conclusion, it is possible to identify three key factors that determine the topological
stability of strategies in a non-homogeneous network: network topology, evolutionary
process and the initial distribution of the strategies. By varying these three factors, an
evolutionarily unstable strategy may be able to survive and may even operate as a weak
evolutionarily stable strategy, in a population of players connected in a non-homogeneous
topology. Based on these observations, the topological stability of strategies may be more
prevalent in the social context of the evolution of strategies in comparison to the biological
context.
In this chapter, we studied the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of
strategies was examined. While the evolution that is discussed here is based on the clas-
sic notion of individual fitness, the optimisation of the global value of an socio-economic
system too is of particular importance, especially in a social context. Thus, in the next
chapter, the placement of contending strategies is evolved in order to maximise the col-
lective utility of a population of strategic players.
Chapter 5
The influence of network topology
on the optimisation of public good
in complex networks
In the previous chapter, we discussed the effect of network topology on the evolution of
strategies. Accordingly, it is observed that the initial strategy placement is critical in the
evolution of strategies. While the work on evolutionary stability focuses on individual fit-
ness, in real-world socio-economic systems, improving the collective utility of a population
is also of vital importance. Thus, this chapter focuses on the evolution of the placement of
contending strategies in order to maximise the collective utility of a population of players.
5.1 Introduction
As the next step in observing how the network topology affects strategic interactions, this
work examines how to optimise strategy placement in populations of players based on
network topology. Game theory has long been used to model cognitive decision-making
in societies. While traditional game theoretic modelling has focused on well-mixed pop-
ulations, recent research has suggested that the topological structure of social networks
plays an important part in the dynamic behaviour of social systems. Any agent or person
playing a game employs a strategy (pure or mixed) to optimise pay-off. So far, we focused
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on how selfish agents can optimise their payoffs by choosing particular strategies within a
social network model. In this chapter we pose the question that, if agents were to work
towards the common goal of increasing the public good (that is, the total network utility),
what strategies they should adapt within the context of a heterogeneous network. We con-
sider a number of classical and recently demonstrated game theoretic strategies, including
cooperation, defection, general cooperation, Pavlov, and zero-determinant strategies, and
compare them pairwise. The iterative prisoner’s dilemma game is simulated on scale-free
networks, and use a genetic-algorithmic approach to investigate what optimal placement
patterns evolve in terms of strategy. In particular, we ask the question that, given a pair of
strategies are present in a network, which strategy should be adopted by the hubs (highly
connected people), for the overall betterment of society (high network utility).
The social structures of people have often been modelled as complex networks. While the
well-mixed or random models have been used earlier in this research to characterise social
interactions, the heterogeneous nature of some interactions, whereby some individuals
have more links than others, is nowadays taken into account. It has been found that
most social networks are, in fact, the so-called scale-free networks, with power law degree
distributions. As such, networked game theory has come into prominence, to analyse the
payoff of individuals in such scenario. At the same time, public goods games have begun to
be studied as a branch of games where the individual pay-offs for agents are less important
than the overall payoff (utility) for the community. Not many studies have been done on
networked public good games.
The evolutionary stability of a game refers to the ability of a particular strategy to domi-
nate over any mutant strategy [151, 33]. There may be situations, however, where weaker
strategies are allowed to sustain within a network due to the factors external to the game
itself. A good real-world example of this is the welfare systems that are in place in many
financial environments to safeguard the financially weaker individuals or organisations.
Normally, evolution within the context of game theory or networked game theory is taken
to mean that individual agents adopt or evolve strategies with the view of maximising their
individual payoff. This is indeed often the case; for example each deer in the forest adapts
strategies to maximize its lifetime and food intake, and such strategies are passed on to
the next generation, either by observation or as some kind of genetic memory. However,
environmental pressures may also dictate collective evolution, whereby each individual
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tries to adapt the best strategy for the collective gain of the society, as opposed to its
individual gain. For example, a herd of deers may be forced to evolve collective strategies
to better survive against a pride of lions. The strategy adapted by each deer, then, is
dictated not so much by its individual gain but the collective gain of the society. It is easy
to find similar examples in the human society as well.
In this work, we observe how the evolutionarily stable and evolutionarily unstable strate-
gies should be distributed within a network in order to maximize the cumulative payoff of
the entire network. That is, how best to assign the strategies over the nodes of a network
to maximize the cumulative payoff of all players. In order to do that, first we try to deter-
mine whether the spatial distribution of players have an effect on the cumulative payoff
of the network. Next, we observe the variation of average degree of players with each
strategy is observed to see which strategies tend to occupy the hubs and which occupy the
peripheral nodes when the cumulative payoff increases. Since the ratios of different strate-
gies and their distributions need to be kept fixed, we assume that there is no evolution of
strategies among the players when a game is played iteratively. Instead, merely the initial
configurations of players are varied to observe which configuration would provide the best
overall utility of the network over time.
A genetic algorithm-based approach is used where a population of networks that are
structurally identical but employ different placement of strategies, evolve to maximise
the network utility. The evolving networks answer the question of how best to distribute
strategies in order to maximise payoff for the society. The iterative prisoner’s dilemma
game is used as the game of choice. A number of well known strategies, including coopera-
tion, defection, general cooperation, Pavlov, and the recently introduced zero-determinant
strategies are employed. We compare strategies pairwise, and our particular goal is to iden-
tify which strategy must occupy the hubs (highly connected nodes) against the other for
maximum network utility.
Potential applications of such optimisation may be found in organisational structures.
Quite often, even the weaker strategies are allowed to survive due to the external environ-
mental conditions (for example, welfare, legal or political pressures). Thus, the optimi-
sation technique suggested in this work may help to determine the optimum distribution
of strategies to maximise the overall utility of the network, while the strategies are not
allowed to freely evolve and the ratios of players with each strategy remains fixed.
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This chapter is organised as follows. The next section elaborates on the game theoretical
and genetic algorithm based background used in this work. Then, we describe how genetic
optimisation was used to optimise for the cumulative network payoff. Next, we present
the results obtained, followed by the discussion and conclusion.
5.2 Background
Memory-one strategies [4, 137] are a special sub class of strategies in prisoner’s dilemma
games, where the current mixed strategy of a game would depend on the previous in-
teraction between the two players in concern. In a mixed strategy scenario, there is a
probability distribution that defines the potential strategies that could be adopted by
a particular player against an opponent strategy. In memory-one strategies, this distri-
bution is conditional to the immediate previous state of the two players in concern. In
fact, Memory-one strategies are a specialisation of a more general class of strategies called
finite-memory strategies[4, 137], where the current strategy is dependent on n number of
historical states between the two players.
When considering the previous state between two players, in a prisoner’s dilemma game,
there could be four possible states: CC, CD, DC and DD, where C represents coopera-
tion and D represents defection, respectively. Memory-one strategies are represented by
stipulating the probabilities of cooperation by a player in the next move, given each type
of interaction of the player with the same opponent. For example, a strategy (1,1,1,1)
would imply that the Player A would cooperate with player B, regardless of the previous
encounter between players A and B. Thus, the pure strategy cooperation and defection
can be thought of as a special case of memory-one or finite memory strategies. By varying
the probabilities of cooperation under each of the previous encounters, it is possible to
define an infinite amount of mixed strategies. Well-known memory-one strategies include
the Pavlov (1,0,0,1) and general cooperator (0.935, 0.229, 0.266, 0.42) strategies. Both
these strategies are considered in this study.
Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [210, 242] are a special sub class of memory-one strategies
that has recently gained much attention in the literature. As the name suggests, ZD
strategies denote a class of memory-one strategies that enable a player to unilaterally set
the opponent’s payoff. Due to this inherent property, ZD strategies have the ability to
CHAPTER 5. THE EFFECT OF TOPOLOGY ON OPTIMISATION 118
gain higher expected payoff against an opposing strategy. However, it has been shown that
ZD strategies do not perform well against themselves. Due to this reason, ZD strategies
have been demonstrated to be evolutionary unstable [4], particularly against the Pavlov
strategy. In order to observe how the distribution of evolutionary stable and unstable
strategies affect the overall utility optimisation in a network of players, the scenarios
where ZD strategy is mixed with Pavlov and GC strategies were simulated.
5.2.1 Genetic algorithms
Genetic algorithms [92] are widely used as an optimisation technique. Genetic algorithms
adopt the established concepts in biology to optimize a population of candidate solutions
based on a particular fitness function. Each potential solution is identified as a genome.
Recombination and mutation are the genetic operators that are used to evolve a popula-
tion, until a certain boundary condition is met. In recombination, two most fit solutions
in the population are selected for reproduction and they are randomly recombined to
produce a new offspring solution. When each offspring is born, it would go through a
mutation process with a relatively small probability of adding new genetic information to
the population. When generating each population set, the weaker solutions are allowed
to die out, keeping the overall population size fixed. In this context, genetic optimisation
may be a suitable candidate for optimising the payoff of a network game as there isn’t a
deterministic and computationally efficient algorithm to perform that task.
5.3 Research Method
The genetic optimisation technique was used to test the hypothesis that the strategy
distribution in a heterogeneous network affects the cumulative payoff of all nodes. Here,
the assignment the strategies to players was evolved within the network to maximise the
overall payoff. The algorithm 4 describes the steps followed to apply genetic optimisation
to evolve the network to optimise for the cumulative payoff.
In a heterogeneous network of players, the players at hubs may play a larger number
of games than the players at the peripheral nodes. Therefore, depending on the spatial
distribution of strategies, the cumulative payoffs of a particular game would be different.
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Thus, given a particular set of strategies and a spatial distribution, finding the optimum
distribution of strategies over the network in order to maximise the total cumulative payoff
could be regarded as an optimisation problem. Such optimisation may have applications
where the overall benefit of a particular strategic decision making environment has to be
maximised instead of maximising a particular player’s payoff.
Initially, we wanted to test whether there’s a correlation between the cumulative payoff
and the initial distribution of strategies. To do that, we distributed the cooperator and
the defector strategies were distributed in 100 different initial configurations, with the
underlying network topology being a scale-free topology. The configurations were made to
remain static without any evolution. For each configuration, we repeated the game over
1000 iterations and compared the accumulated payoff compared with the average degrees
of nodes with each strategy.
When using the genetic optimisation, a scale-free network was chosen for observation.
Scale-free networks make good candidates as heterogeneous networks as they are com-
monly observed in social networks. A genome is represented as a binary string to represent
the collection of nodes, with 1 and 0s being used to denote the two strategies assigned
to the nodes. Initially, n number of different initial distributions of players were placed
randomly, ensuring that exactly 50% of the players follow each strategy. Afterwards, the
game is played iteratively for t number of time-steps among the players within the network.
In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the parameter b was set to 1.8 while for the memory-one
strategies, the variables were assigned to constants as T = 5, R = 3, P = 1 and S =
0. Note that the strategies of the nodes remain fixed during these iterations, thus the
game is not simulated as an evolutionary game in the strict sense of the word. This is
necessary as this work is interested in observing the effect of topological arrangement of
strategies of players on the cumulative payoff of the network, for which the topological
distribution of strategies should remain unchanged. The fitness function of the network
game is the total cumulative payoff of all the players after the iterative game is played.
In each generation of candidate player distributions, the fittest 10% of networks are cho-
sen for recombination. Upon recombining, the positions of players are randomly mutated
with a very small probability. Following each recombination and mutation, the strategies
of players are adjusted to keep the ratio of two strategies the same. This is done to ensure
that the changing ratios of players’ strategies do not affect the cumulative payoffs and it
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is just the arrangement of the strategies that affect the cumulative payoff of the network.
Following this process, it was observed that genetic optimisation of player positions does
improve the overall payoff of the network. Hence, the cumulative payoff of a network of
a players are affected by the spatial distribution of players with heterogeneous strategies.
This also suggests that GA could be effectively used to identify the optimum distribution
of players/strategies within a network.
Algorithm 4: Genetic optimisation to optimise for the cumulative payoff of the
network
1 Start with an initial N number of networks of players with coordinators and
defectors;
2 forall the Network net in the Network collection N do
3 forall the node n in Network net do
4 Randomly assign a strategy
5 while The termination condition is not met do
6 Play an iteration of the prisoner’s dilemma game over the network;
7 Assign payoffs to each node;
8 Calculate the collective payoff of the network;
9 Select the 10% of networks that have the highest collective payoffs;
10 Randomly recombine the selected networks;
11 After recombining, 0.05% of the networks are mutated% Replace the networks
with least collective payoff with the new population;
5.4 Results
First, we simulated the classical prisoner’s dilemma game for the optimisation of strategy
placement. It has been shown that the cooperation strategy is the evolutionary stable
strategy in a scale-free network. Fig. 5.1 depicts the variation of the cumulative payoff
of players in a collection of randomly distributed strategy distributions in a scale-free
topology. The strategy distributions are sorted based on their resulting cumulative payoff.
Fig. 5.2 shows the variation of the average degrees of cooperators and defectors in the
same set of networks. As shown in the figures, there exists a clear correlation between the
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cumulative payoffs of strategy distributions and the average degrees of each strategy. Fig.
5.3 shows the average cumulative payoffs of network populations do increase over time
when the initial configuration of the strategies is optimised using a genetic algorithm,
suggesting that it is the networks with cooperators occupying the hubs that generate
higher cumulative payoffs. While the cumulative payoff of the network is increasing, we
can observe that the average degree of the cooperators of network populations do increase
over time, while the average defector degree decreases, as shown in Fig. 5.4. This suggests
that in order to maximise the cumulative payoff of a network, the cooperators should be
placed as hubs.
 7850
 7900
 7950
 8000
 8050
 8100
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
ay
of
f
Configuration number
Figure 5.1: The variation of cumulative network payoff of a collection of random strategy distributions on a set of
players playing the prisoner’s dilemma game. The variable b was set to 1.8. The underlying network has a scale-free
topology, consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 10,000 time-steps. The strategy distributions are
sorted based on the cumulative payoff.
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Figure 5.2: The variation of the average degrees of the cooperators and defectors of a collection of random strategy
distributions on a set of players playing the prisoner’s dilemma game. The variable b was set to 1.8. The underlying
network has a scale-free topology, consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 10,000 time-steps. The
strategy distributions are sorted based on the cumulative payoff.
Next we performed a similar optimisation was performed on memory-one strategies of the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Memory-one strategies are a branch of strategies in prisoner’s
dilemma games where each the cooperation of each node depends on the previous move
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Figure 5.3: The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network of players playing the prisoner’s dilemma
game. The variable b was set to 1.8. The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was
iterated for 10,000 time-steps.
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Figure 5.4: The variation of the average degrees of the cooperators and defectors of a network of players playing
the prisoner’s dilemma game. The variable b was set to 1.8. The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000
nodes. The game was iterated for 10,000 time-steps.
of each node. By varying the probabilities of cooperation based on each of the previ-
ous combinations (CC, CD, DC, DD), it is possible to derive different strategies. Some
of the well-known strategies include General Cooperator, Pavlov and zero-determinant
strategies. ZD strategies have been recently shown to be evolutionary unstable against
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Figure 5.5: The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network of players consisting of ZD-Pavlov and ZD-GC
strategies. The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 200 time-steps.
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(a) ZD − Pavlov
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Figure 5.6: The variation of the average degrees of the network of players consisting of ZD-Pavlov and ZD-GC
strategies. The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 200 time-steps.
Pavlov strategy. Thus, we use the Genetic optimisation technique is used to identify the
optimum positioning of the ZD and Pavlov strategies. Fig. 5.5[a] depicts the increase of
the cumulative payoff of the players when the networks are being evolved, suggesting that
in memory-one strategies too, strategy placement does contribute to the optimisation of
cumulative network payoff. Fig. 5.6[a] shows the evolution of player configuration using
genetic optimisation. As the figure shows, there is an apparent increase in the average
degree of the Pavlov strategy compared to the ZD strategy within the network population
as the average cumulative payoffs of the networks are optimised. Even though the payoff
of a ZD node would be higher against a Pavlov node, Pavlov performs well against itself
compared to ZD strategy, making it evolutionary stable against ZD. This suggests that
when Pavlov and ZD strategies are mixed in a population of players, the cumulative payoff
of the entire network could be maximised by assigning the hubs with the Pavlov strategy.
Similarly, when the ZD strategy mixed with the general cooperator strategy, the GC
strategy tended to occupy the hubs as the networks are evolved over time. As with the
ZD versus Pavlov strategies, the cumulative payoffs of the networks continued to increase
when the initial configuration of the strategies are changed, as shown in Fig. 5.5[b]. Fig.
5.6[b] shows the evolution of the average degree of the nodes occupying the two strategies
over time.
Next, we mixed the Pavlov and general cooperator strategies were mixed in order to ob-
serve which strategy tends to occupy the hubs as the cumulative payoff of networks evolve
as in Fig. 5.7. Again, it is when the Pavlov strategy is placed on the hubs that the
cumulative payoff of the network tends to increase, as shown in Fig. 5.8.
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Figure 5.7: The variation of cumulative network payoff of the network of players consisting of GC and Pavlov
strategies. The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 200 time steps.
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Figure 5.8: The variation of the average degrees of the network of players consisting of GC and Pavlov strategies.
The network is a scale-free network consisting of 1000 nodes. The game was iterated for 200 time steps.
The observations made above can be summarised as follows:
Given a society which can be modelled as a scale-free network (bearing in mind the fact
that most social networks have been proven to be scale-free) and considering a scenario
where nodes in that social network can choose from one of two strategies and the over-
all balance of strategies across the network should be maintained such that at any given
time, the number of agents playing either strategy must be the same, certain strategies
evolutionarily win the competition against certain other strategies in occupying the hubs
(highest connected nodes) in the network.
• Cooperation occupies the hubs against defection
• Pavlov occupies the hubs against general cooperation
• Pavlov occupies the hubs against zero-determinant strategies
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• General cooperation occupies the hubs against zero-determinant strategies
These results are arrived at by comparing the average degrees of nodes implementing
each strategy after evolution. Noting here that nodes evolve (switch strategies) not to
maximise their own pay-off, but to maximise the cumulative network payoff. Thus, the
environmental pressure is for maximisation of the public good.
These results are significant for the following reasons. The constraint of the network having
to have an equal number of nodes implementing a pair of strategies might seem artificial
at first. However, if we consider a scenario where nodes are merely place-holders for
individuals who roam in the network, while the strategies for these individuals is actually
fixed, it is conceivable that such a scenario may indeed occur in real world. Therefore,
nodes do not actually change strategies, but swap individuals who themselves always use
a certain strategy. Thus, all individuals ‘coordinate’ by swapping positions for the ‘public
good’. For example, consider a soccer team, which has 11 fixed positions (left extreme,
right extreme, centre back, goal keeper etc). The positions can be thought of as a complex
network (the goal keeper position is connected to the three backs, and so forth). There
would be certain players who are better at offence and others who are better at defence.
The coach could rotate players around the positions in order to maximize the ‘public
good’, which, in this case, is to increase the net number of goals (goals scored by the
side minus goals scored by the opposition). Similar scenarios can be described in the case
of an army comprised of many strategic units advancing, or a business magnate placing
his subordinates in various parts of his business empire to derive maximum benefit to his
business. Therefore, understanding which classical strategies must be used by the hubs as
opposed to peripheral nodes for maximum overall utility is of vital importance.
5.5 Discussion
Game theory can be successfully applied to understand the dynamics of a society. The
concept of public goods games has recently gained prominence where the emphasis is not
on the individual gains of agents but the overall payoff for the society. In this paper, a
novel approach is taken by utilising the classical iterative prisoner’s dilemma game as a
public goods game. That is, agents play prisoner’s dilemma repeatedly and adapt their
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strategies with the goal of increasing the total network utility. Evolution was simulated
by implementing a version of genetic algorithm optimisation, where each member of the
population is a network with a particular distribution of strategies. Thus, the evolution
of networks (social structures), rather than evolution of individuals is considered.
It was found that for high network utility, networks evolve which prefer a certain type
of strategy to be at their hub over another type[122]. As such, the evolved networks
preferred cooperation over defection, general cooperation over zero-determinant, Pavlov
over general cooperation, and Pavlov over zero determinant at their hubs. This indicates
that when societies compete, societies that can efficiently order individuals within those
societies according to their strategies to have a better chance of gaining a high overall
payoff. This is a significant result in understanding cooperation for public good.
The genetic algorithm is only one form of optimisation. Similar experiments can be
performed with another optimisation techniques, including simulated annealing and ant-
colony optimisation. Also, genetic optimisation does not guarantee a global optimum and
it could be the optimum that is arrived at is a local optimum. To avoid this limitation,
a more formal optimisation technique on networks, such as the convex function may be
used, as potential future work. Broader range of memory-one and other strategies can
be considered (tit-for-tat, for example). Furthermore, experiments could be performed
on particular application domains, such as defence and project management, to better
demonstrate the utility of our results. The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate
that the network topology or form is key in determining the optimum global wealth of a
population based on the placement of strategies.
While the results presented in this chapter were mainly for relatively smaller networks, the
results were consistent even when relatively large networks were used. Further, we focused
mainly on sparse networks and not dense networks in this chapter, as social networks
generally tend to be sparse[162].
It has to be acknowledged that genetic optimisation doesn’t always guarantee a globally
optimum solution. For the optimisation conducted in this chapter, many experiments
were performed to select the GA parameters such that a global optimum is reached.
It has to be noted that there is a limitation in applying formal optimization methods
to find the optimum solution evolutionary game theory as the global search space (all
possible networks and individual/collective payoffs) is extremely large and heterogeneous
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and demonstrates non-linear behavior.
One crucial detail that has to be noted here is that the collective payoff that we consider
is based on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, which is a pairwise-interaction, while
the traditional public goods game is a multi-point game. It is to be seen whether the
traditional public goods game would produced the same results as the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game.
This chapter concludes the first segment of the thesis which studied the influence of topol-
ogy on networked games from numerous aspects such as the evolution of coordination,
evolutionary stability of strategies and the optimisation of collective utility of a popula-
tion. The next segment of the thesis focuses on the concept of non-optimal or bounded
rationality and how it may be defined by the network topology and information diffu-
sion constraints. Since the bounded rationality of players implicitly affects the outcome
of strategic interactions, it allows network topology and information diffusion to be an
integral part of networked game dynamics.
Chapter 6
Topological distribution of
bounded rationality in
network-based games
The previous three chapters primarily focused on the direct impact of network topology
on different aspects of network based games, such as the evolution of coordination and the
evolutionary stability. Chapters 6,7 and 8 of this thesis investigate the concept of non-
optimal or bounded rationality, which provides an implicit mechanism for capturing the
influence of network topology and information diffusion constraints on networked game
dynamics.
6.1 Introduction
Socio ecological systems are increasingly being modelled by games played on complex
networks. While the concept of Nash equilibrium assumes perfect rationality, in reality
players in such systems display heterogeneous bounded rationality. This chapter presents
a topological model of bounded rationality in socio-ecological systems, using the rational-
ity parameter of the quantal response equilibrium. It is argued that system rationality
could be measured by the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash and quantal
response equilibria, and that the convergence towards Nash equilibria on average corre-
sponds to increased system rationality. Using this model, it is shown that when a randomly
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connected socio-ecological system is topologically optimised in order to converge towards
Nash equilibria, scale-free and small world features emerge. Therefore, optimising system
rationality is an evolutionary reason for the emergence of scale-free and small-world fea-
tures in socio-ecological systems. Further, it is demonstrated that in games where multiple
equilibria are possible, the correlation between the scale-freeness of the system and the
fraction of links with multiple equilibria goes through a phase transition when the average
system rationality increases. The results presented explain the influence of the topological
structure of socio ecological systems in shaping their collective cognitive behaviour and
provide an explanation for the prevalence of scale-free and small-world characteristics in
such systems[125].
Game theory is widely used to study and model strategic decision making scenarios, rang-
ing from politics and market economics to ecosystems and information routing [217, 28,
237, 270]. Network based games are increasingly used to understand critical phenomena
in socio-ecological systems [186, 185, 52, 220]. The concept of Nash equilibrium has been
an important cornerstone in understanding the dynamics of such systems [174]. While
Nash equilibrium assumes that all players in a system are fully rational, most real-world
strategic decision making scenarios involve players with non-optimal or bounded rational-
ity, resulting in their strategies and behaviour deviating from those predicted by the Nash
equilibrium [91]. The possible limitations, such as the amount of information at hand,
cognitive capacity and the computational time available, may force a self-interested au-
tonomous player or agent to have bounded rationality and therefore to make non-optimal
decisions [88].
Numerous theories have been presented to model the non-optimal rationality of players in
strategic games, including the concepts of the near-rationality equilibrium and the quan-
tal response equilibrium [55, 90, 264, 219]. However, these models do not attempt to
quantify and predict the levels of rationality prevalent in individual players based on their
observable characteristics. Meanwhile, studies in psychology and cognitive science have
conjectured that the rationality of individuals is correlated to the level of their social inter-
actions [21, 75, 46]. In this chapter, therefore, a topological model of bounded rationality
in socio ecological systems is proposed, based on this conjecture. Using this model, it is
investigated how such systems could topologically evolve to have higher system rational-
ity, given a heterogeneous bounded rationality distribution. Since the calculation of Nash
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equilibrium assumes the perfect rationality of all players, the average Jensen-Shannon di-
vergence between the Nash and quantal response equilibria of each game played within the
system is applied as an indicator of overall system rationality. It is important to note that
distinguish this system rationality from the average rationality, which is simply the aver-
age of the heterogeneous rationality distribution of a system and therefore not influenced
by its topology.
This work shows that among different topological classes of complex networks modelling
socio ecological systems, the scale-free class minimises this divergence and maximises the
system rationality. Further, it is shown that when a network is grown under the Baraba`si-
Albert model [25], its system rationality increases, suggesting that it is this drive towards
increasing the system rationality that makes the networks grow under the Baraba`si-Albert
model. Based on this assumption, a rationality based interpretation of the preferential
attachment model is provided, observing the evolution of the topological features while
comparing and contrasting them with the standard, degree-based Baraba`si-Albert model.
Conversely, when a socio ecological system with a random topology is optimised towards
higher system rationality (the system on average is driven towards Nash equilibrium),
scale-free and small world features emerge. This result is true for games with single or
multiple equilibria. In the case of games with multiple equilibria, the fraction of links in
a network where multiple equilibria are actually prevalent is topologically dependent. It
is shown that when average rationality is lower, the scale-freeness of the socio-ecological
network aids in increasing the fraction of links with multiple equilibria. However, when
the average rationality is higher, the scale-freeness actually aids in decreasing this frac-
tion. In fact, with this topological interpretation of bounded rationality, it is possible
to demonstrate that the correlation between the ‘scale-freeness’ and the fraction of links
with multiple equilibria goes through a phase-transition when average network rationality
is increased. The results presented here provide a possible explanation for the prevalence
of scale-free features in the topologies of real world socio-ecological systems [9], and ex-
plore how the scale-freeness in turn affects the cognitive decision making behaviour of such
systems.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The section 6.2 discusses the background
relevant to this work, including the quantal response equilibrium model for players with
bounded rationality. Section 6.3 introduces the topological model of bounded rationality,
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on which this work is based. Section 6.4 discusses the methodology followed in measuring
the divergence of Nash equilibrium from quantal response equilibrium and devising the
methods applied in performing the other experiments. The next section presents the anal-
ysis conducted based on the assumption of topologically distributed bounded rationality
(TDBR), and the results obtained. Within that, each sub-section elaborates on the sim-
ulation method used in each experiment. Finally, an overall discussion of the topological
rationality model is presented.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Games among players with bounded rationality
Game theory [28, 172, 230, 45] is an effective tool for prisoner’s complex socio ecological
systems that involve multiple self-interested entities and decision making scenarios [62, 32,
83, 140]. The concept of Nash Equilibrium [174, 101] states that in a strategic decision
making environment there exists an equilibrium which no player would benefit deviating
from. However, it has been observed that in experimental settings, the equilibrium states
of players deviate substantially from those predicted by the Nash equilibrium [97]. One
key reason for this deviation is the non-perfect, or bounded rationality of players.
Nash equilibrium assumes that players always adopt the strategy that maximises their
utility, with rationality defined as the tendency to maximise one’s own utility under un-
certainty [91]. However, in the real world, the players may not be perfectly rational due to
the limitations mentioned before [88]. Since these limitations vary from player to player,
it is to be expected that the players would have heterogeneous bounded rationality, and
would make some sub-optimal or apparently random decisions. The qusantal response
equilibrium (QRE) [91, 153, 154] presents an analogous way to model games with ‘noisy’
strategies, by using probabilistic choice model functions such as logit and probit [91].
These functions map the vector of expected payoffs from available choices into a vector of
choice probabilities that is monotone with the expected payoffs.
Let us consider the payoff matrix of a generic normal form game (an example is given in
Fig.6.1 for two-player games). The quantal response logit function, shown in Eq.6.1, can
be used to derive the Quantal Response Equilibrium of a player with a particular level of
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non-perfect rationality, as shown in Methods.
Figure 6.1: The payoff matrix of a generic normal-form game which involves two players. Sij denotes strategy j
adapted by player i, while uijk denotes the payoff to player i, when the first player adopts the strategy j and the
second player adapts strategy k.
P ij =
eλiE
i(sij ,P)
κ∑
k=1
eλiE
i(sik,P)
(6.1)
Here, P ij is the probability of player i selecting the strategy j. E
i(sij ,P) is the expected
utility to player i in choosing strategy j, given that other players play according to the
probability distribution P. The total number of strategies that player i can choose from
is given by κ. The parameter λi is known as the rationality parameter of player i, and
denotes the level of relative rationality the player i possesses, and can vary from zero
to infinity. The average of λi over all players, λ¯, can therefore be an indicator of the
average levels of rationality prevalent in the system. It can be shown that as λi → ∞,
the equilibrium probabilities tend towards those given by the Nash equilibrium, and as
λi → 0, the player would operate in a totally random (irrational) fashion [91]. Thus, the
rationality parameter λi provides a convenient way to quantify the bounded rationality of
a particular player and the resulting probability distribution denotes the quantal response
equilibrium for that player at that particular bounded rationality level.
6.2.2 Relationship between rationality and social interaction
In this section, we present an argument that there exists an implicit relationship between
the amount of social interaction of a particular player and their bounded rationality. This
argument is critical in topologically quantifying the bounded rationality of players. In-
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deed, a number of theories and models have already articulated this view.
Social cognitive theory
Social cognitive theory[21] is a theory used in psychology. It is also applied in areas
such as education and mass media. The core argument in social cognitive theory is that
‘learning’ or cognitive capacity is a social function. In other words, the cognitive capacity
of an individual may depend on his ability to observe others within the context of social
interactions.
Social learning theory[22] identifies four key factors in learning new behaviour. Those
are identified as drives, cues, responses and rewards. These four factors are abundant in
strategic decision making environments, making them relevant in determining the cognitive
capacities of the players involved.
Developing on the ideas formulated in social learning theory, social cognitive theory[21]
identifies five core concepts in modelling the social perspective of cognition. Those are
observational learning/modelling, outcome expectations, self-efficacy, goal setting and self
regulation. The first aspect, which is observational learning suggests that knowledge
acquisition is directly correlated to the observation of models. All these aspects can be
related to strategic decision making environments, where the players may learn from each
other. One example where social cognitive theory is applied in a strategic decision making
environment is organisational modelling, where individuals with conflicting interests may
interact with each other.
The key assumption that is made based on social cognitive theory is that in a game theo-
retic setting, a player’s cognitive capacity is proportional to the observational capacity of
that player. Thus, a player with a relatively high amount of social interactions may have
higher cognitive capacity than a player with a relatively low amount of social interactions.
Social brain hypothesis
Social brain hypothesis [75, 76] provides another interesting avenue to theorise how the
social influence, or the social group size, of an individual may reflect upon the cognitive
capacity of that individual. Conventionally, it was assumed that the relatively large brain
size of humans was due to the evolutionary advantage that it provided in collecting and
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processing information. However, the social brain hypothesis suggests that the larger brain
sizes of primates and humans in general are correlated to the complex and large social
groups that they form.
Extending on this evolutionary brain hypothesis, brain studies have been conducted to
study the correlation between the human brain cortex size and the social cognitive capac-
ity of humans. Indeed, it has been observed that there exists such a correlation. Recent
studies, however suggest that there is a neuro-anatomical correlation with that of cogni-
tive competencies, where the increased brain volumes observed in more intelligent human
beings may be accounted for by selectively enlarged brain volumes especially relevant for
higher cognitive function [209]. Therefore, these findings suggest that there may be a
strong correlation between the social group size and complexity and the cognitive capac-
ity of individuals.
Cognitive hierarchical model
Modelling the heterogeneity of the rationality of players has been previously attempted
in game theory. One of the key models that captures this heterogeneity is known as the
cognitive hierarchical model[46]. Cognitive hierarchical model was developed to account
for the variation of empirical results from the predictions of the Nash equilibrium. The
basic assumption in the cognitive hierarchical (CH) model is that each player ‘believes’
that he or she is the most sophisticated player in the population. It also makes use of
iterated decision rules that reflect the iterated process of strategic thinking. The CH
models predicts that the players in a population are distributed in k levels of rationality
or cognitive capacity. A step k player would assume that all other players are distributed
in cognitive levels 0 to k− 1. The frequency distribution f(k) of other players is assumed
to be a Poisson distribution.
Cognitive hierarchical model is based on a ‘subjective’ hierarchy, where each player as-
sumes that the rest of the population is distributed in a Poisson distribution in their ability
to make ‘rational’ decisions. However this work considering a more objective hierarchy,
where the rationality of players are distributed based on the topological characteristics
they encompass. The rationale behind this is that network topology reflects the access to
information and the cognitive capacity of players.
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Based on these theoretical foundations, it could also be argued that the cognitive capacity
of a person (player) is an inherent property of a person, and the amount of interactions
they engage in is a reflection of that cognitive capacity. Either way, based on the above
mentioned studies, it is reasonable to argue that the cognitive capacity, i.e rationality, of
a player is positively correlated to the amount of social interactions they undertake.
6.3 Modelling bounded rationality as a topological attribute
Although there have been attempts to model the rationality of players, they have mostly
been concerned with proposing a rationality model that identifies the rationality as a con-
stant for all players under a particular strategic decision making context. For example,
Wolpert [264] proposes a model to derive the rationality of an abstract player by solv-
ing the Maxent (maximum entropy) Lagrangians that model the probability distribution
of a human player as a Boltzmann distribution. However, as the cognitive hierarchical
model [46] and related empirical observations suggest the rationality of players in a popu-
lation is typically distributed in a heterogeneous distribution instead of all players having
the same level of rationality for a particular strategic decision-making environment. A
social-interaction based modelling of bounded rationality would account for this hetero-
geneity.
Indeed, capturing the heterogeneity of the rationality of players using the quantal response
equilibrium has been studied before [219, 93], particularly with models such as the het-
erogeneous QRE and truncated QRE models [219]. It has been demonstrated that the
cognitive hierarchical model [46] is a special case of truncated QRE model. However,
these models too limit themselves to varying the heterogeneous rationality parameter λi
to fit the empirical results, modelling or applying it as an arbitrary parameter without any
physical interpretation, while acknowledging that the rationality would be heterogeneous
in a population of players. While this approach increases the versatility of the rationality
parameter, it limits the predictive capacity of the QRE model. Therefore, in this work a
model is proposed with more predictive power, at least in relative terms for players within
a population, as long as the assumption that the rationality of a player could be mapped
(by a linear or non-linear non-decreasing function) to their amount of social interaction is
justified. The model that is proposed defines the rationality parameter λi for each player
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(node) as a function of social interactions.
At a very basic level, the number of social ties a player has (i.e, the degree of a node)
could be an indicator of the amount of social interaction a player engages in. However,
the amount of interaction would also depend on the tie strength attributes, such as the
amount of time spent, the volume of information exchanged, between each pair of players.
Furthermore, the correlation between the amount of interaction of a player with other
players and the rationality of a player could be linear or non-linear. To model such a
dependency, therefore, a generic function f is used, to which the weighted degree (on
simply the degree, if tie strengths are considered equal) of a node is an input, as shown in
Eq. 7.1.
λi = r.f(
n∑
j=1
wij) (6.2)
Here λi is the rationality of node i; r denotes a network rationality parameter that would
be a property of the network and represent the general level of rationality in the system.
It should be noted that the average rationality of the system, λ¯, is proportional to this
parameter, as any change in r will result in a corresponding proportional change in every
λi. The weight wij denotes the weight of the link connecting node i with each neighbour
j, while n is the number of neighbours that node i has. In this work, the function f is
modelled as simple linear, convex or concave functions, though in future studies empirical
data could be used to fit a more accurate function for a given decision making context. The
linear, convex and concave functions that are used are f(x) = x, f(x) = x2 and f(x) =
√
x
respectively, due to the simplicity and the computational efficiency of those functions and
also due to the fact that they facilitate the [0 :∞] range of possible rationality values of the
rationality parameter. Under this model, a node may behave completely randomly if the
network rationality parameter is set to r = 0 or when the node is completely disconnected
(ie. degree is zero). On the other hand, a node may make choices as predicted by the
Nash equilibrium as the network rationality parameter r →∞, or when the degree of the
node is extremely large.
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6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Calculating QRE equilibrium of a strategic interaction
The logit function given in Eq. 8.2 is used for computing the quantal response equilibrium,
as often done in literature [91, 268].
P ij =
eλiE
i(sij ,P)
κ∑
k=1
eλiE
i(sik,P)
(6.3)
Here, P ij is the probability of player i selecting the strategy j. E
i(sij ,P) is the expected
utility to player i in choosing strategy j, given that other players play according to the
probability distribution P (which is also denoted P−i in some literature to highlight the
fact that entries ‘belonging’ to player i should be discounted when the other players are
considered collectively). The total number of strategies that player i can choose from is
given by κ. The rationality parameter λi can vary from zero to infinity.
For a two-player prisoner’s dilemma game, it is possible to derive Eq. A.4 and Eq. A.5
from Eq. 8.2 to represent the probabilities that the two players would cooperate.
p1c =
eλ1(p
2
cu
1
11+(1−p2c)u112)
eλ1(p
2
cu
1
11+(1−p2c)u112) + eλ1(p2cu121+(1−p2c)u122)
(6.4)
p2c =
eλ2(p
1
cu
2
11+(1−p1c)u221)
eλ2(p
1
cu
2
11+(1−p1c)u221) + eλ2(p1cu212+(1−p1c)u222)
(6.5)
Using the utility values set as (u111 = 3, u
2
11 = 3, u
1
12 = 0, u
2
12 = 5, u
1
21 = 5, u
2
21 = 0, u
1
22 =
1, u222 = 1), these can be simplified to:
p1c =
eλ1(3p
2
c)
eλ1(3p2c) + eλ1(4p2c+1)
(6.6)
p2c =
eλ2(3p
1
c)
eλ2(3p1c) + eλ2(4p1c+1)
(6.7)
Here, p1c and p
2
c are the probabilities of player 1 and 2 cooperating, respectively, and λ1,
λ2 denote the rationality parameters of player 1 and 2, which are derived using their
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respective degrees, the rationality function and the network rationality parameter used,
as prescribed in Eq.7.1, with identical link weights set to unity. The two equations have
two unknowns p1c and p
2
c . Thus, these two equations can be solved and the probability of
cooperation and defection can be calculated for a particular pair of players with varying
rationality parameters. The resulting probability distributions provides the QRE for the
particular pair of players.
It is already known that the only Nash equilibrium for this game would occur when both
players defect (that is, p1c = 0, p
1
d = 1 and p
2
c = 0, p
2
d = 1). The payoffs of the prisoner’s
dilemma game were set to the static values, u111 = 3, u
2
11 = 3, u
1
12 = 0, u
2
12 = 5, u
1
21 =
5, u221 = 0, u
1
22 = 1, u
2
22 = 1, in the simulations conducted in this section, unless otherwise
specified. Fig. 6.2 shows the variation of the cooperation probability when the rationality
parameter λ is gradually increased, under the QRE model, with the above payoffs set in
the payoff matrix.
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Figure 6.2: The variation of the cooperation probability of a player in the PD game, when the rationality parameter
λ is increased under the QRE model.
A similar procedure was followed to calculate the QRE for other games used in this study,
using the respective payoff matrices as appropriate.
6.4.2 Measuring the divergence of QRE from Nash equilibrium
In order to measure the divergence of each strategic interaction of the Prisoner’s dilemma
game from the Nash equilibrium, the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence[63] is used. In
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probability theory and information theory, the KL divergence is used to measure the dis-
tance between two probability distributions. In this work, the two probability distributions
concerned are the strategic distribution at the Nash equilibrium and the strategy distribu-
tion at the quantal response equilibrium. By applying the Kullback-leibler divergence, the
asymmetric distance between these two distributions can be measured. This measure can
be used to quantify the divergence of each interaction from that of Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, this measure is an asymmetric measure as it does not follow the triangular inequality.
In order to come up with a symmetric measure divergence, the average divergence of NE
and QRE from the average of those two distributions could be utilised. In order to use
the KL divergence as a metric, it can be used as a symmetric measure by measuring the
KL divergence of the respective QRE strategy distribution from the averaged probabil-
ity distribution of NE and QRE. Next the KL divergence from the NE to the averaged
probability distribution of NE and QRE is also calculated. The average of these two KL
divergence values is considered as the divergence metric of a particular QRE from NE.
Following equations depicts the KL divergence of the QRE from NE.
DKL(P ||Q) =
∑
i
P (i)ln
P (i)
Q(i)
(6.8)
Based on this asymmetric measure, the Jensen-Shannon divergence [84] is adopted as a
symmetric metric to measure the divergence of QRE from NE.
JS(P ||Q) =
(∑
i P (i)ln
P (i)
M(i) +
∑
iQ(i)ln
Q(i)
M(i)
)
2
(6.9)
Here P and Q are the probability distributions of Nash equilibrium and QRE respectively.
M is the average of the Nash and QRE probability distributions. The average Jensen-
Shannon divergence between the Quantal Response and Nash equilibria as an indicator
of the system rationality, based on the assumption that the more ‘selfishly rational’ the
players are on average, the less this divergence will be. Therefore, system rationality ρ is
given by Eq.6.10. The negative sign indicates that the lower this divergence is, the higher
the average system rationality. Note that in Eq.6.10, a pair of players are represented by
a link k in the corresponding social network and there are M links in the social network
in total.
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ρ = − 1
M
M∑
k=1
JS(Nashk||QREk) (6.10)
Elaborating on this further, for the prisoner’s dilemma game considered, the Nash equi-
librium would be the state where both players defect, thus the probability distribution at
Nash equilibrium would be P1 = 0,1 and P2=0,1 where P1 and P2 are the probability
distributions of the two players respectively. The first probability is the cooperation prob-
ability and the second one is the defection probability. Thus, these two distributions would
denote the probabilities when both players defect. Suppose the quantal response equilib-
rium for a particular rationality parameter is P1QRE = 0.3, 0.7 and P2QRE = 0.4, 0.6.
Thus, the average probability distribution for the two players would be M1 = 0.15, 0.85
and M2 = 0.2, 0.8. Therefore, in order to use the Jensen-Shannon divergence to measure
the average divergence of the two distributions, the divergence of NE and QRE to the av-
eraged distribution can be calculated and then the average of those two divergence values
could be considered.
Thus, the resulting Jensen-Shannon divergence metric value is:
KL(NE||M) = 0 + 1.log 1
0.85
+ 0 + 1.log
1
0.8
= 0.3857 (6.11)
KL(QRE||M) = 0.3.log 0.3
0.15
+ 0.7.log
0.7
0.85
+ 0.4.log
0.4
0.2
+ 0.6.log
0.6
0.8
= 0.1767 (6.12)
Thus, the average divergence metric for that particular interaction would be = (0.3857 +
0.1767)/2.0 = 0.2812. The average divergence of all such interactions in the networks
can be regarded as the ‘system divergence’ of the network. The negative value of the
divergence could be regarded the system rationality within the context of this work. The
average system divergence is used as the main metric of quantitative analysis in this work.
It would give an indication of how ‘far’ the network has diverged from Nash equilibria in
its constituting strategic interactions.
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6.4.3 Measuring scale-free correlation
Throughout this chapter, the proximity of a network to the appropriate scale-free degree
distribution is used to denote whether a network is converging to a scale-free topology.
There are several well-known methods used to fit a curve into a power-law[59]. The least
square method is used, particularly since the degree distributions involve non-negative
integers. The coefficient of determination (R), also known as the R-squared value, given
in Eq. 6.13, can be used to measure the correlation of given points the corresponding
points in the fitted line.
R =
∑
i
(f(Xi)− Y )2
(Yi − Y )2
(6.13)
where f(Xi) denotes the corresponding fitted power-law curve for each degree Xi, Yi
denotes the actual corresponding histogram value for each degree in the degree distribution
and Y denotes the average of all input histogram values. Usually, the degree and histogram
values are converted to the logarithmic scale in performing this calculation. In addition
to the coefficient of determination, we also used the degree distribution and the respective
power-law curve was also used to measure the accuracy of the power-law curve fitted using
least square method.
6.5 Analysis and Results
Using the topological model for bounded rationality presented in Eq.7.1, the following
questions are addressed: (i) Which topological features in a socio ecological system facili-
tate the highest system rationality, given a particular heterogeneous rationality distribu-
tion among players? (ii) Is there a connection between the emergence of scale-free features
in socio-ecological systems, and the need to optimise for better system rationality? (iii)
What would be the evolution of the average system divergence from Nash equilibrium,
when a population is evolved under the Barabasi-Albert model? (iv) Provided that con-
vergence towards Nash Equilibrium is used as a driver for preferential attachment, how
would the topological properties of a network evolve? (v) Is there a connection between
the emergence of multiple equilibria in systems with heterogeneous rationality, and the
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topological structure of such systems? In answering these questions, it is important to first
define system rationality. Of course, the average of rationality parameters of all players in
a system, λ¯, is one indicator for system rationality, however this definition disregards the
topological effects. Therefore, this work will use an independent measurement of system
rationality ρ, which is defined as the average Jensen-Shannon divergence of Nash and QRE
equilibria over all pairs of players, with a minus sign to account for the fact that the higher
this divergence, the lower the system rationality. Details of the computation of ρ are given
in the Methods. It is obvious that systems which have the same λ¯ may have different ρ,
since the later is topologically dependent.
6.5.1 Comparing network topologies based on their average divergence
from Nash equilibria
To answer the first question mentioned above, three different network models are chosen
for comparison: the scale-free network model, Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random network model and a
regular (well-mixed) network model. The networks that was analysed contained 500 or
1000 nodes with average degrees of 4, 6 or 8. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was applied in
this analysis, since the focus was on games with a single equilibrium first. The rationality
of each node was calculated using the linear, convex and concave functions separately.
Note that only the equilibria are required, and it was not necessary to actually simulate
the games. Based on the Eq.6.1, the QRE was derived for each pair of players (each link).
The network rationality parameter r was set to 0.2, 0.002 and 0.5 for the linear, convex
and concave functions, respectively. The single Nash equilibrium for prisoner’s dilemma
occurs when both players defect. Therefore, once the QRE for each pair of players is
obtained, the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Quantal Response and Nash
equilibria for the network was computed.
Following the parametrised Prisoner’s dilemma game suggested by Santos et. al[223], the
payoffs of the Prisoner’s dilemma game were set to u111 = 1, u
2
11 = 1, u
1
12 = 0, u
2
12 = b, u
1
21 =
b, u221 = 0, u
1
22 = 0, u
2
22 = 0, where 2 > b > 1, which is the only parameter of the game,
represents the cheating advantage of the defectors over cooperators.
Table A.1 depicts a typical set of results. In this particular experiment, the number of
nodes is N = 1000 and the number of links is M = 2000. The results are averaged over 100
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Table 6.1: The average Nash-QRE divergence (−ρ) of network topologies for different rationality functions. The
rows represent the rationality functions while the columns contain the topology of the population. The network
rationality parameter r was set to 0.2, 0.002 and 0.5 for the linear, convex and concave functions, respectively. The
average rationality parameter of nodes, λ¯ is also shown. Note that the ‘average’ divergence and ‘average’ rationality
parameter were averaged separately: once over all nodes (N = 1000) and again over 100 different instances of the
same topological class. The parameter b was set to 2.
Scale-free Random Well-mixed λ¯
Linear 0.298 0.334 0.352 0.8
Convex 0.412 0.424 0.428 0.008
Concave 0.306 0.325 0.337 2.0
instances, and in each instant, a different topology belonging to the same network class
was used, while the number of nodes and links was kept constant. A degree-preserving
re-wiring technique was used to create different instances of the same topological class.
All scale-free networks had a scale-free exponent of 2.0 with a 90% R-squared correlation.
Fig. 6.3 depicts the variation of the average Nash-QRE when the parameter b is varied,
under the three types of the topological rationality functions considered. According to the
results given in Table A.1 and the Fig. 6.3, it is evident that the Nash-QRE divergence is
minimum for the scale-free topology class under all three types of rationality functions. As
expected, the convex rationality function gives the highest variations of average Nash-QRE
divergence among different topology classes. The divergence is highest for the well-mixed
topological class. Thus, it is possible to conjecture that one reason for the prevalence of
scale-free topology [9] in real-world socio-ecological systems in which strategic decision
making takes place is that this topology facilitates the highest system rationality for a
given heterogeneous rationality distribution among players.
6.5.2 Evolution of system divergence under the Baraba`si-Albert model
The results obtained in the previous section suggest that scale-free network topologies fa-
cilitate strategic interactions that are closer to Nash equilibrium, in comparison to Erdo˝s-
Re`nyi random and well-mixed networks. This could imply that the real-world networks
evolve to be scale-free networks in order to operate closer to Nash equilibrium in strate-
gic interactions. Since the preferential-attachment and growth based model proposed by
Baraba`si-Albert is often used to generate scale-free networks, this model could be used to
further test this hypothesis by observing the variation of QRE in a network being grown
based on the Baraba`si-Albert model, along with a topologically distributed bounded ra-
tionality.
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Figure 6.3: The Nash-QRE divergence with varying β under (a) Convex. (b) Concave and (c) Linear topological
rationality functions. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was used in simulations.
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Methodology
In order to test this hypothesis, a network was generated using the Baraba`si-Albert model,
where growth and preferential-attachment are the two main factors making a network
evolve. For every 10 nodes added to the network, the average Nash-QRE divergence or
the system divergence of each intermediate network that is generated after playing a single
iteration of the Prisoner’s dielmma game. This was done by averaging the Jensen-Shannon
divergences of the QRE probability distributions of strategies resulting from the interac-
tions of the network and the probability distribution of strategies at Nash equilibrium.
Next, the evolution of the system divergence against the network size. This experiment
was repeated for linear, convex and concave rationality functions. As with the previous
experiment, the network rationality parameter was adjusted under each rationality func-
tion to distribute the rationality values over the network.
Results and Discussion
Fig.6.4 depicts the evolution of the average Nash-QRE divergence of a scale-free network
that is grown by applying the Baraba`si-Albert model, under different types of topologically
derived rationality functions.
As shown in Fig. 6.4, it is evident that when a network is grown using preferential attach-
ment, the average Nash-QRE divergence of the entire network shows a downward trend,
suggesting that the strategic interactions among the players approach Nash equilibrium.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 depict the evolution of the scale-free exponent and the scale-free cor-
relation of the network under growth. According to these figures, the scale-freeness of the
network increases and stabilises as it grows. These results confirm the earlier observation
presented in Table 6.1 and the hypothesis that the scale-free nature of a network growing
under preferential attachment model has a correlation with the tendency of nodes to opti-
mise the outcome of their strategic interactions by converging towards Nash equilibrium.
Thus, based on these observations, it can be argued that the growth in Baraba`si-Albert
model could be driven by the population’s tendency to increase its rationality and thereby
optimise the strategic interactions.
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Figure 6.4: The variation of average Nash-QRE divergence of the network over the number of nodes in the net-
work. The network is grown till 1000 nodes, based on the Baraba`si-Albert model. Convex and concave and linear
topological rationality functions used. The network rationality parameters 0.002,0.5 and 0.2 were used respectively.
6.5.3 Network growth model based on bounded rationality and conver-
gence towards Nash Equilibrium
Based on the results discussed so far in this chapter, it is possible to identify an apparent
correlation between the scale-free topology generated using the preferential attachment
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Figure 6.5: The variation of the scale-free exponent of the network over the number of nodes in the network. The
network is grown till 1000 nodes, based on the Baraba`si-Albert model. Linear topological rationality function used
with the network rationality parameter being set to 0.2.
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Figure 6.6: The variation of the scale-free R-squared correlation of the network over the number of nodes in the
network. The network is grown till 1000 nodes, based on the Baraba`si-Albert model. Linear topological rationality
function used with the network rationality parameter being set to 0.2.
based Baraba`si-Albert model[25] and the tendency of the nodes in a network to converge
towards Nash equilibrium. Inspired by this outcome, this sub-section is dedicated to the
proposition that a network growth model takes the tendency to operate towards Nash
equilibrium as a form of preferential attachment. In other words, the hypothesis sug-
gested is that when a new node joins a network, it is more likely to establish a link with
an existing node that would produce an interaction, which could optimise the outcome of
the interaction. Since self-interested players would move towards Nash equilibrium when
they try to optimise their outcomes, this means that a new node is more likely to establish
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a connection with an existing node, where the interaction would have less divergence from
Nash equilibrium compared to other nodes. Such a growth model could be relevant for
networks formed in order to perform strategic interactions, such as collaboration networks.
Methodology
Algorithm 9 details the steps that were used to grow a network using preferential at-
tachment interpreted as the tendency to optimise the payoff of a node in its strategic
interactions. The prisoner’s dilemma game was used to compute the QRE and the Jensen-
Shannon divergence from NE in each interaction. The network was grown till 1000 nodes.
The evolution of the scale-free exponent, the R-squared correlation of the scale-free expo-
nent and the network assortativity [176] measured over time to observe the characteristics
of the resulting network. The network rationality parameter r was set at 0.1, while a
linear function of degree was used to determine node rationality.
Algorithm 5: Preferential attachment model based on the convergence to Nash
equilibrium in strategic interactions.
Data: Network size-n
Result: Network generated from a strategic interaction based preferential
attachment growth model.
1 create an empty network;
2 create new node;
3 add the node to the network;
4 while The size of the network is less than n do
5 create new node i;
6 measure the Nash-QRE divergence of interacting with each node within the
network;
7 calculate the probability p of connecting to each node j in the network
(negatively proportional to the Nash-QRE divergence);
8 foreach node j in network n do
9 create a link i− j based on the probability p;
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Results and Discussion
Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8 depict the evolution of the scale-free exponent, R-squared correlation
of the respective power-law curve and the assortativity values of the intermediate networks,
over the network size. The network rationality parameter was set to 0.2, 0.002 and 0.5 in
linear, convex and concave rationality functions were used, respectively.
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Figure 6.7: The variation of scale-free exponent and the R-squared correlation of the respective power-law curve, over
network size, when the network is grown using the convergence to Nash equilibrium as an indication of preferential
attachment.
As depicted by figures 6.7 and 6.8, the growth model defined by interpreting preferential
attachment as the tendency to converge towards Nash equilibrium generates networks
that evolving into scale-free networks. This is evident from the evolution of the scale-free
exponent and the R-squared correlation of the respective power-law curve. In most real-
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Figure 6.8: The variation of network assortativity over network size, when the network is grown using the convergence
to Nash equilibrium as an indication of preferential attachment.
world scale-free networks, the scale-free exponent is between 2 and 3 and there exists a
significant positive R-squared correlation between the actual degree distribution and the
power-law fitted curve, reminiscent to the characteristics of the network generated from
this model. This may be suggested as further evidence of the validity of a topological
interpretation of the bounded rationality of networked population players.
Additionally, the non-negative assortativity values of the networks resulting of this par-
ticular growth model is significant since the Baraba`si-albert model does not produce as-
sortative or disassortative networks. However, most real-world social, collaboration and
biological networks are observed to be either assortative or disassortative [175]. In partic-
ular, collaborative networks that operate on strategic interactions show strong assortative
tendencies [175]. Thus, a topologically distributed rationality based interpretation of the
preferential attachment model may be useful in generating networks with real-world char-
acteristics of scale-free nature and assortative mixing.
6.5.4 Optimising network topology for maximum system rationality
In the results obtained so far, it an be observed that the scale-free topological class aids
the convergence towards Nash equilibria on average, when compared to other topological
classes. Conversely, it is possible to test whether it is the evolutionary pressure on any
given system that forces it to move towards Nash equilibrium on average, while allowing
the system to rewire itself, that results in the system evolve into a scale-free topology.
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Therefore, this subsection elaborates on the topological optimisation that was performed
using the Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random network class as the null model, and the resulting topo-
logical evolution that was observed. In order to perform the optimisation based on the
convergence towards Nash equilibrium, a variant of the simulated annealing technique [3]
was applied.
Methodology
In this particular set of experiments, bounded rationality was measured using a convex
function of degree (because the convex function f(x) = x2 facilitated rapid topological
evolution compared to the other functions) with the network rationality parameter being
set to r = 0.1. The scale-free R-squared correlation of each intermediate network was
measured in order to observe the emergence of scale-free characteristics. Moreover, the
clustering coefficient and the average path length of the intermediate networks were also
measured, since these are the parameters that could be utilised to identify the small-world
nature of the networks [9]. Relatively higher clustering coefficients and lower average path
length are indications of small-world characteristics emerging [9].
The process begins with an Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random network of size N = 1000 and M = 2000.
In each iteration, 0.03% (i.e M/300) randomly selected links were rewired so that the av-
erage Jensen-Shannon divergence from Nash equilibrium decreases. The iterations were
continued until the network had been rewired M times (i.e 300 iterations). Algorithm 6
explains the optimisation technique that was employed.
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Algorithm 6: Network optimisation using the convergence towards Nash Equilib-
rium and simulated annealing.
Data: Random network
Result: Network optimised to minimise the average divergence between Nash and
QRE equilibria
1 while counter is less than 300 do
2 increase counter; randomly select a link l1;
3 measure the Nash-QRE Jensen-Shannon divergence of the interaction denoted
by the link l1;
4 randomly select a node j to connect with node i of link l1;
5 measure the Nash-QRE Jensen-Shannon divergence of a potential link l2
consisting of nodes i and j;
6 if the Nash-QRE KL divergence of the link l1 is lower than that of l2 then
7 drop the link l1;
8 create the link l2;
9 save the current network;
10 Repeat until (M/300) link replacements have been made
For each intermediate network, the scale-free R-squared correlation, the average clustering
coefficient and the average path length were recorded. The definition and computation of
these metrics is well-understood and therefore they are not explained here [9]. If there are
multiple equilibria, the lowest divergence for each pair of players was used.
Results and Discussion
The results obtained from the simulated annealing optimisation are shown in Fig. 6.9 and
Fig. 6.10. As depicted by Fig. 6.9, the scale-free R-squared correlation shows an upward
trend when the network evolves. Meanwhile as Fig.6.10 shows, the clustering coefficient
clearly increases while the average path-length decreases over time, indicating that the
small-worldness also increases over time. Even though these results are for networks with
size N = 1000 and M = 2000, similar results were obtained for networks with average
degrees 4, 6 and 8, attempting all possible permutations. From these results, it is clear that
when network topology is optimised towards maximum system rationality (i.e converegence
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Figure 6.9: (a) The evolution of R-squared scale-free correlation of a network over time, when it is optimised to
minimise the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash-QRE equilibria, using simulated annealing. (b) The
evolution of −ρ, average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash-QRE equilibria, of the network over time. (c)
The evolution of the average pay-off over time. Network size is N = 1000,M = 2000. The prisoner’s dilemma game
was used in simulations.
towards Nash equilibria on average is favoured), scale-free and small-world features emerge
in systems with random topology.
Interestingly, it was also found that the average trend towards system rationality does not
imply that the average pay-off for the players will also increase. In fact, for Prisoner’s
Dilemma at least, the opposite is true, as Fig.6.9 indicates. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the premise behind Nash equilibrium in prisoner’s dilemma is that
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Figure 6.10: The evolution of the clustering coefficient and average path length of a network over time, when it
is optimised to minimise the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash-QRE equilibria, using simulated
annealing. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was used in simulations. Network size is N = 1000,M = 2000.
given the uncertainty about the other player’s decision, each player will make a selfish de-
cision which would ensure that they are not worse off than the other player, even though
the expected utility of that decision is lower than both cooperating. That is indeed the
‘dilemma’. The drive towards Nash equilibria in this case does not imply an increase in the
‘common wealth’ of the system [122]. This would be explained further in the discussion
presented at the end of this chapter.
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Emergence of scale-freeness and small-worldness in games with multiple equi-
libria
So far, the simulations have been performed on games with single pure Nash equilibria.
However, most normal-form games consist of multiple pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
When the assumption is made that the bounded rationality of a population of players is
heterogeneous, the existence of multiple equilibria adds an extra layer of complexity. In
order to observe how the rationality parameter would affect the quantal response equilibria
in a game where there exists multiple equilibria, a set of coordination games that have two
pure Nash equilibria were used. These included (i) the stag-hunt game, where the two pure
Nash equilibria occur when either both players coordinate or both players defect (ii) the
meeting game, where the Nash equilibria occurs when both choose one location or when
both players choose the other location to meet (iii) The matching-pennies game [168],
where the Nash equilibria occurs when the symbol on the penny each player comes up
with (head/tail) does not match.
The stag-hunt game [237, 127, 223] was simulated with the payoffs set to u111 = 5, u
2
11 =
5, u112 = 0, u
2
12 = 3, u
1
21 = 3, u
2
21 = 0, u
1
22 = 3, u
2
22 = 3. The stag-hunt games contains two
pure strategy Nash equilibria. The same optimisation process described in the algorithm
6 was followed. Note that since there are multiple equilibria, the lowest divergence for
each pair of players was used to compute the average Jensen-Shannon divergence. Again,
the scale-free R-squared correlation of each intermediate network was recorded in order to
observe the emergence of scale-free characteristics.
As depicted by Fig. 6.11[A], the scale-free correlation shows an upward trend when the
network evolves. The corresponding average divergence −ρ is shown in Fig. 6.11[B], which,
as expected, is minimised during the process. Interestingly, the average-payoff of players,
shown in Fig. 6.11[C], increases as well. This is in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, where the increase in the selfish-rationality of the system, represented by ρ, does
not increase the average pay-off. As noted before, depending on the nature of the game,
the average selfish rationality corresponds to the common good in some games, and does
not in others. Regardless, the main observation that the topological optimisation towards
high system rationality results in the emergence of scale-free characteristics is true also
for games with multiple equilibria. This was further confirmed by conducting experiments
with other two-player games, such as battle of the sexes and matching-pennies. The payoffs
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of the meeting game was set to u111 = 5, u
2
11 = 3, u
1
12 = 0, u
2
12 = 0, u
1
21 = 0, u
2
21 = 0, u
1
22 =
3, u222 = 5. For the matching-pennies game, an asymmetric payoff matrix was used with
the payoffs u111 = 0, u
2
11 = 2, u
1
12 = 5, u
2
12 = 5, u
1
21 = 4, u
2
21 = 4, u
1
22 = 2, u
2
22 = 0. The
results obtained for these two games are not shown here, while they were quantitatively
similar.
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Figure 6.11: (A) The evolution of the R-squared correlation to power-law degree distribution (scale-freeness) of the
network over time, when it is optimised using Nash-QRE divergence and simulated annealing. (B) The evolution
of the average Nash-QRE divergence of the network (−ρ) over time. (C) The evolution of the average pay-off over
time. Network size is N = 1000,M = 2000. The stag-hunt game was used in simulations.
Further, for all the above mentioned games, the average clustering coefficient and the
average path length during this optimisation process was observed. Similar to the re-
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Figure 6.12: The evolution of the clustering coefficient and average path length of a network over time, when it
is optimised to minimise the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash-QRE equilibria, using simulated
annealing. The stag-hunt game was used in simulations. Network size is N = 1000,M = 2000.
sults obtained for Prisoner’s Dilemma, the average path length decreases and, the average
clustering coefficient increases, when the network is optimised towards higher system ra-
tionality. Fig. 6.12 shows the evolution of the average path length and the clustering
coefficient for the stag-hunt game based simulations. In summary, all of these results con-
firm that when a network is topologically optimised towards increased system rationality,
scale-free and small-world features emerge for a range of single and multiple equilibria
games. Conversely, it was also verified that among the three topological classes that were
considered (scale-free, random and regular), it is the scale-free class which showed the
highest system rationality ρ for all the above-mentioned multiple-equilibria games.
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6.5.5 Network topology and fraction of links with multiple equilibria
Moving further on the analysis of games with multiple equilibria, this sub-section discusses
on the actual prevalence of multiple equilibria in games in which multiple equilibria are
possible, and how the interplay between heterogeneous rationality and network topology
influences this prevalence. In particular, the fraction of links with multiple equilibria in the
landscape defined by varying scale-freeness and varying average rationality is computed,
indicated by the network rationality parameter r. It has been previously shown that in two-
player games, the players go through phase-transitions of knowledge of opponents when
the rationality parameter increases [98]. Initially, a single pair of players playing stag-hunt
was considered to verify that the rationality of both players would influence the number of
multiple equilibria in the system. The quantal response equilibria equations were solved
for a range of λi values for both players, as described in Methods. Fig.6.13 depicts the
results observed. For a given player, when the opponent’s rationality is relatively high
(λ2 = 1.0 or λ2 = 2.0), multiple equilibria can exist and the probability of coordination
goes through a phase transition, as predicted by Harre` et al. [98]. If the rationality of
the opponent is relatively low (λ2 = 0.1), a phase transition does not occur. Therefore, it
can be verified that for a single pair of players, multiple equilibria does not always occur
and that the rationality levels of both players influence whether there could be multiple
equilibria. Hence, it is clear that in a socio-ecological system (represented by a complex
network) with a heterogeneous rationality distribution, on which a multiple-equilibria
game is played, only a fraction of links would actually support multiple equilibria.
Next, a socio-ecological system of players were considered with a heterogeneous rationality
distribution who engage in such a game with multiple equilibria and analyse how the
system topology (particularly the level of scale-freeness) would influence the number of
multiple equilibria. Therefore, a range of scale-free networks were generated with varying
scale-freeness and identical size N = 1000 and M = 2000. In order to do this, perfect
scale-free networks were generated using the Baraba`si-Albert model [9], and introduced a
measure of ‘randomness’ in each network by randomly rewiring m < M number of links.
While varying m, the scale-freeness of each resulting network was measured by fitting a
power-law degree distribution and measuring the fitness, as mentioned before. For each of
these networks, Eq. 7.1 was used to generate a heterogeneous rationality distribution, and
then for each pair of nodes, computed the QRE equilibria as shown in Methods. Then,
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Figure 6.13: The variation of player 1’s coordination probability when the rationality parameter of player 2 is fixed
(at either 0.1, 1.0 or 2.0) and the rationality parameter of player 1 is varied. When the rationality of the opponent
is small, there is only one equilibrium and otherwise, there are multiple equilibria. The stag-hunt game was used.
the number of links which would have multiple were counted (in this case, two) equilibria,
and finally thus computed the proportion of links in the entire network which had multiple
equilibria. For this experiment, we used a convex rationality function. We repeated the
whole process was repeated for different network rationality parameter values, beginning
from r = 0.01 (low average rationality) to r = 0.3 (high average rationality).
The simulation results were obtained for two particular values of network rationality,
r = 0.01 and r = 0.3, in Fig. 6.14[a] and Fig. 6.14[b], for the stag-hunt game. In these
figures, the fraction of links where multiple equilibria is possible were plotted against the
‘scale-freeness’ of the network, represented by the scale-free R-squared correlation. Eighty
different networks of increasing scale-freeness were shown in each plot. It was observed that
for relatively lower network rationality (r = 0.01), the scale-freeness of networks has clear
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(c) Battle of the sexes, r=0.01
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(d) Battle of the sexes, r=0.10
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Figure 6.14: The variation of the fraction of links with multiple equilibria of networks with varying scale-freeness,
under smaller (0.01) and larger (0.30 or 0.10) network rationality parameter values. The results for the stag-hunt
game, battle of the sexes and matching pennies games are shown.
positive correlation with the fraction of links with multiple quantal response equilibria.
That is, when the scale-free nature of the network increases, it becomes easier for links
to attain multiple equilibria. By contrast, when the network rationality is relatively high
(r = 0.3), the fraction of links with multiple equilibria has a negative correlation with
the ‘scale-freeness’ of the network. That is, the emergence of scale-freeness encourages
single equilibria among the pairs of players in the population. In fact, to generalise this
result, the correlation between the fraction of links with multiple equilibria and the ‘scale-
freeness’ (R-squared correlation) of the network could be computed for several network
rationality parameter (r) values. A change of the sign of this correlation can expected to
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be seen for r between r = 0.01 and r = 0.3. Fig. 6.15[A] depicts the results of such an
experiment, where 16 different values of r from r = 0.01 to r = 0.3 are used. From this
figure, it is evident that indeed such a change of sign occurs when r ≈ 0.1. Moreover,
this change of sign is not gradual but appears to be, again, a sudden transition. Note
that the same set of 80 scale-free networks were used to generate each data point in this
plot, with differing values of r. Thus, the correlation of scale-freeness with the fraction
of links with multiple quantal equilibria goes through a phase-transition when the overall
network rationality, represented by the network rationality parameter r, is increased. On
the other hand, as Fig.6.15[B] shows, for the same level of ‘scale-freeness’ the fraction of
links with multiple equilibria increases with rationality parameter r. This is also confirmed
by Fig.6.14 which shows that the range of fraction values is much higher when r = 0.3
compared to r = 0.01. These results are summarised in a 3D plot (Fig.6.16), which shows
the fraction of links with multiple equilibria in a stag hunting game for a range of scale-free
networks with differing ‘scale-freeness’ and rationality parameter r. The dominant trend
shows the fraction increasing then stabilising against rationality; however, it is important
to note that the positive correlation with scale-freeness for lower r values and the negative
correlation with scale-freeness for higher r values. These correlations are relatively less
visible however, and it is for this reason, they have showed separately in Fig. 6.14 which
clearly identifies the correlation tendencies.
These results are vital in understanding the relationship between network topology and
cognitive decision making in systems with bounded rationality. They suggest that when
the socio-ecological system as a whole has less average rationality (i.e players are more
likely to make random decisions), the scale-free structure of the system helps players to
have a higher number of rational choices. Yet, if the system becomes more rational on
average, the same scale-freeness becomes a hindrance to players having a higher number
of rational choices. If a society is increasingly becoming ‘selfishly wise’ (i.e, rational in
the game theoretic sense), there will come a time where a slight change in the average
rationality will have a huge bearing in the number of rational choices the players may
have. In this set of experiments, when r ≈ 0.1, slight changes in rationality will hugely
impact the fraction of multiple equilibria. Finally, the observations suggest that even
though a particular strategic decision making scenario may potentially encompass multiple
equilibria, the actual prevalence of multiple equilibria in a population is topologically
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Figure 6.15: (a) Correlation between the scale-freeness of networks and the fraction of links with multiple equilibria,
against the network rationality parameter, for the stag-hunt game. (b) The variation of the fraction of links with
multiple equilibria of networks with varying network rationality parameter using the stag hung game. Three scale-
free networks with differing R-squared correlations of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7 were used.
dependent and connected to the average rationality of that population.
To verify whether the results observed were specific to the stag-hunt game or could be
generalised to other games with multiple equilibria, similar experiments were conducted
with the meeting game (battle of the sexes) and the matching-pennies game described
earlier. The same set of scale-free and partially scale-free networks which were used in the
experiments with stag-hunt game were used. The typical results are shown in Fig. 6.14
[Parts C,D,E,and F]. These figures indicate that these observations made earlier are generic
and not specific to the stag-hunt game alone, and that in any game with multiple equilibria,
the scale-free features facilitate the prevalence of multiple equilibria when average network
rationality is lower, and hinder the prevalence of multiple equilibria when average network
rationality is higher.
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Figure 6.16: A three-dimentional plot showing the fraction of links with multiple equilibria against ‘scale-freeness’
(R-squared correlation) and network rationality parameter r, for the stag-hunt game. Please note that the apparent
stratification is simply a result of the limited number of r values used. To increase clarity of the figure, we only
show a section of the scale-freeness range used are shown.
6.6 Discussion
Real world socio ecological systems consist of players whose rationality is bounded. A
range of existing theories and hypotheses such as social cognitive theory, the social brain
hypothesis and the cognitive hierarchical model have implied that the rationality of a player
might be correlated to the amount of social interactions they undertake. Based on this
assumption, this chapter proposed a topological model of bounded rationality. This model
was then used to understand the relationship between the topology of socio-ecological sys-
tems and their dynamics. In particular, attention was paid to the scale-free characteristic
and its influence on social network dynamics. Given a particular heterogeneous distri-
bution of rationality among players, it was considered how the topological characteristics
encourage system rationality. Since the Nash equilibrium predicts the strategies that play-
ers with perfect rationality would choose, the Jensen-Shannnon divergence of Nash and
the quantal response equilibrium states was computed for each pair of players in a given
CHAPTER 6. TDBR 164
social system, and the average of these divergences was used as a measure to quantify
the system rationality. A number of well known games were considered, including the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the stag-hunt, the meeting game and the matching pennies game to
simulate scenarios where cognitive decisions must be made.
The topological analysis of bounded rationality resulted in some significant findings.
Firstly, a number of network classes were compared, including scale-free, Erdo˝s-Re`nyi
random, and lattice networks (representing well mixed populations). Based on this com-
parison, it was shown that among these classes, it is the scale-free networks which facilitate
the best convergence towards Nash equilibrium (highest system rationality), on average.
It may be argued that this might be one reason why many real-world social systems are
scale-free.
Exploring the possible relationship with the scale-free networks and bounded rationality
further, the variation of the average Jensen-Shannon divergence was measured while a
network is grown according to the Baraba`si-Albert[25] model. The resulting observations
suggest that network growth has a negative correlation with the Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence, suggesting that the networks converge towards Nash equilibrium as they grow. This
observation is used to indicate that there could be a game-theoretical explanation on why
there is preferential attachment in networks. Exploring further on the same argument, a
network growth model is proposed that interprets ‘preference’ in preferential attachment
as the tendency to optimise a strategic interaction by converging towards Nash equilib-
rium. The resulting network of this growth model displays both scale-free and assortative
tendencies. However, it has to be noted that this the convergence towards Nash Equi-
librium may not be the sole reason for the abundance of the scale-free and small-world
topologies. There may be other more complex explanations for this behaviour. However,
the convergence towards Nash equlibrium could be one possible reason for the abundance
of scale-free and small-world topologies.
Seeking further evidence for this conjecture, the topological evolution of social systems
was simulated using the simulated annealing technique, beginning from a random network
topology. It became apparent that when evolutionary pressure is applied on social sys-
tems to converge, on average, towards Nash equilibria, scale-free and small world features
emerge. This finding could have significant implications, since it provides an alterna-
tive explanation for the prevalence of scale-free networks in many real world systems and
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societies.
Following this, the topological analysis of bounded rationality was extended to games
with multiple equilibria. Again, it was demonstrated that when evolutionary pressure is
applied on systems to converge, on average, towards Nash-equilibria (regardless of which
equilibrium state a particular pair of players converge towards), scale-free and small world
features emerge. Further, the likelihood of the existence of multiple equilibria among the
players of a system with a bounded heterogeneous rationality distribution was considered.
It was observed that a delicate balance exists: when the average rationality (this must
be distinguished from what the system rationality, which is computed from the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between QRE and Nash equilibria) is low, the scale-free nature of the
system encourages the emergence of multiple equilibria, while when the average rationality
is high, the scale-free character in fact hinders the existence of multiple equilibria. There-
fore, the number of rational choices available to players, from which they cannot deviate
without loss, depends on the social network topology as well as the level of rationality
prevalent in the system.
It is important to stress that rationality of players and that of a system have been defined
in a very specific way in this work. It could be argued that rational players are those who
try to maximise their average individual pay-offs. If players attempted to do this within a
heterogeneous system, they may well make choices that are contrary to Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, a system which converges towards Nash equilibrium will not necessarily have
increasing average pay-offs. Indeed, in the case of prisoner’s dilemma game, the conver-
gence towards Nash equilibrium results in decreasing average pay-offs. Thus, it could be
argued that such a system is, on average, not becoming more rational. However, in an
environment where there is a lot of mistrust and/or competition, the priority of the players
will be to make sure that their average pay-offs are better than other players with whom
they compete - that is, they would want to ensure that they are not cheated by others.
The self-interest, and the relative well-being in the system, therefore gains prominence
over the absolute well being, represented by the cumulative pay-off. In such systems, the
convergence towards Nash equilibria, on average, means the players are getting better at
preserving their relative self-interest, and thus becoming more rational in a selfish sense.
The findings that are present here are related to this sense of rationality, and not the
‘common good’ of the system [122]. However, in games other than prisoner’s dilemma (for
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example, in the stag-hunt game), it is found that the average pay-off indeed could increase
as the system converges towards the (multiple) Nash equilibria, depending on the actual
values of pay-offs for each scenario. Thus, the public good of the system matches with the
selfish rationality of players. Therefore, it is important to realise that the results that were
obtained are applicable in terms of average selfish rationality of players, which sometimes
matches with the common good of the system and sometimes does not. In any case, it
is quite conceivable that players would put their relative well being over their absolute
well being, since human beings perceive their level of well being primarily by comparing
themselves with their local neighbours. In summary, it remains a vital research question of
great scientific and practical significance to understand how the cognitive decision making
of players and the resultant dynamics in socio ecological systems are shaped by both the
topology of such systems and the bounded rationality of actors in such systems.
It is widely known that network topology affects the strategic decision making scenarios
of self-interested players [224, 223]. However, game theoretic models have been proposed
to model network growth[207], suggesting that network formation can be regarded as a
strategic decision that a node makes. This topological rationality model suggests that
there could be a simultaneous and cyclic inter-dependency between network topology
and strategic decision making of self interested agents, based on heterogeneous bounded
rationality. Thus, strategic games maybe more sensitive to the local context than gener-
ally assumed, when they operate over a spatially distributed network of players. This is
highlighted by identifying such games as network-based games, in comparison to network
game models where a two-player game is simply iterated over a network [223]. Thus,
understanding how node rationality is affected by network topology may be significant in
contextualising an abstract gaming model. There may also be other centrality measures
and topological characteristics that may serve as better indications of the rationality of
a node in its social context. Further, quantifying the information flow along a link with
an opponent may provide a better indication of a node’s rationality of that particular
opponent, instead of merely depending on the physical topology. More empirical studies
are required to confirm the possible correlation between the bounded rationality of players
and their network topological placement and properties.
In this work, a topological model for bounded rationality in networked games was proposed.
Bounded rationality provides an implicit mechanism for capturing the effect of network
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topology and information diffusion on networked game dynamics. The next chapter dis-
cusses several potential applications of such a bounded rationality model in the domain
of computer networks, presented as case studies.
Chapter 7
Applications of topologically
distributed bounded rationality in
network-based games
The previous chapter introduced a topological model of bounded rationality, which im-
plicitly captured the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked
game dynamics. In this chapter, the topologically distributed bounded rationality (TDBR)
model is applied to three different strategic decision-making scenarios in computer net-
works as case studies.
7.1 Introduction
In strategic decision-making scenarios, different agents or players may demonstrate het-
erogeneous non-optimal rationality. The rationality of an autonomous agent may depend
on the amount of information at hand, cognitive capacity and the computational time
available. When a strategic game is played over a spatially distributed network of players,
the cognitive capacity and information availability may be reflected in the topological ar-
rangement of the players. Based on this assumption, in a previous chapter, a topological
model for quantifying the bounded rationality of strategic players was developed. This
chapter discusses the potential applicability of this model using several real-world scenar-
ios in computer science. By analysing the results obtained from these case studies, it is
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shown that the suggested topologically distributed bounded rationality (TDBR) can be
effectively used to improve the accuracy and predictive capacity of Nash equilibrium based
game theoretic models[131].
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section, Section 7.2, gives a background
of the relevant areas of study, including the proposed topologically distributed bounded
rationality model. Then, the following discuss three case studies where a topological
model of bounded rationality may be applicable. These case studies include peer-to-
peer network formation, network security and network routing-based applications where
topologically distributed bounded rationality may be applicable. Further, how the existing
game theoretic models on these domains can be extended using a topologically distributed
bounded rationality model is examined. Finally, the conclusions based on these case
studies are presented.
7.2 Background
Game theory is widely used to study and model strategic decision-making scenarios [28],
ranging from politics and market economics to ecosystems and information routing. Nash
equilibrium is considered to be the most important theoretical cornerstone of game the-
ory, which predicts the existence one or more equilibrium states in a strategic game from
which no player has an incentive to deviate [174]. One of the key underlying assumptions
of the Nash equilibrium is that players are fully rational, meaning they are fully aware
of opponents’ strategies and the respective payoffs [91], and there are not any cognitive
or temporal limitations to their decision-making ability. However, most real-world strate-
gic decision making scenarios involve players with non-optimal or bounded rationality,
prompting them to deviate their behaviour from that of the Nash equilibrium [97]. The
possible limitations, such as the amount of information at hand, cognitive capacity and
the computational time available, may force a self-interested autonomous player or agent
to have bounded rationality and therefore to make non-optimal decisions [88].
At the same time, studies in psychology and cognitive science suggest that the rationality
of individuals may be correlated to the level of their social interactions [21, 75, 46]. In
particular, the level of information available about the environment and their cognitive
capacity may affect the rationality of an autonomous agent, which may be reflected in
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the social structure of that agent. There have been numerous attempts to model the
non-optimal rationality in strategic games, based on models such as near-rationality and
quantal response equilibrium [55, 90, 264, 219]. However, they do not attempt to quantify
the heterogeneity of rationality that is prevalent in the populations of real-world players
in a predictive manner, based on the physical and observable characteristics of the players.
Based on this premise, the previous chapter argued for a topologically distributed bounded
rationality model, that attempts to quantify the distribution of rationality of players placed
in a heterogeneous network.
One of the criticisms that can be made against the quantal response equilibrium is the
usage of the rationality parameter as an arbitrarily set parameter [268]. Quite often, it is
used as a model to fit empirical results by varying the rationality parameter [53].
Social cognitive theories [21] and the social brain hypothesis [75, 76] suggest that there is
a strong correlation between the cognitive capacity of a player and the amount of social
interaction that the player may have. Based on this argument, a topological model of
bounded rationality has been proposed [125]. In this topological rationality model, the
rationality parameter λ of QRE model is defined as a function of social interactions [125],
in order to incorporate the topology of a node as a measure of its bounded rationality,
as shown in Eq. 7.1. In a more general context, the cumulative weights of a node’s
connections to its neighbours quantify the social interactions it may have in the context
of the social network. If the weights of the links are all identical and unified, the degree
of the node can be used as a relative measure of its social interactions.
λi = r.f(
n∑
j=1
wij) (7.1)
Here, λi is the rationality of node i. r denotes a network rationality parameter that is a
property of the network. The higher the network rationality parameter, the greater the
sensitivity of the nodes’ rationality to the amount of social interactions that they would
have. Thus, it is possible to argue that the network rationality parameter provides a
measure of the rationality level or the overall network rationality of the entire network
of players. The weight wij denotes the weight of the link connecting node i with each
neighbour j, while n is the number of neighbours that node i has. Under this model, a
node may behave completely randomly if the network rationality parameter is 0 or when
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the node is disconnected (i.e. the degree is 0). However, a node may behave according
to the Nash equilibrium as the network rationality parameter r →∞, or when the degree
of the node is extremely large. Thus, this model captures the two extremes of rationality
and the discrete levels of rationality in between those two, given by the aggregate of link
weights of each node. In the case studies considered, unweighted networks (or networks
with an identical link weight of unity) are used. This makes it possible to directly capture
the topological implications of the strategic interactions of a population of players where
the bounded rationality levels are topologically influenced.
This chapter attempts to discuss the potential applications of this model using real-world
applications used as case studies. Such case studies are useful in identifying the real-
world implications and potential applications of this interpretation, enabling the quantal
response equilibrium model to be used as a predictive model, in addition to being used
for fitting empirical results with an arbitrarily set rationality parameter. The case studies
considered are all related to computer network-based applications. There are abundant
real-world network data relating to such applications, making it possible to validate the
simulated results. Further, all these applications involve the decision-making of humans or
human-computer interaction, making them susceptible to the inherent bounded rationality
of humans. In addition, the computer agents that are engaged in these applications too
may not have the necessary information, computer power or computing time to make fully
rational decisions, thus making them behave as bounded rational players.
7.3 Applications of topologically interpreted bounded ratio-
nality
7.3.1 Peer-to-peer network formation
The first case study (application) is the network formation on peer-to-peer overlay rout-
ing networks. These networks are formed by self-interested players who want to share
resources amongst themselves. These players may be human or software agents and they
have limited visibility of the network based on their topological positioning. Peer-to-peer
overlay networks make a good candidate to study heterogeneous bounded rationality as
it has been observed that different players operate with different levels of rationality. For
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instance, free-running or free loading behaviour is prevalent in such networks where some
players act in an extortionate manner exploiting others while other players contribute
towards the common good [213, 37]. In a non-cooperative game theoretic perspective,
free-runners could be thought as rational players while contributors could be regarded
as irrational players, under the assumption that rationality is based on the tendency to
maximise one’s own utility. Such heterogeneity of rationality is more prevalent when the
network is formed by human players and could even be relevant to autonomous agents
due to the limitation of information that they might have about the overall network [269].
This heterogeneity of rationality may be captured by a topological distribution of bounded
rationality, similar to the one discussed in the previous chapter.
Methodology
In order to test how a topologically distributed bounded rationality would affect the for-
mation of a peer-to-peer overlay network, an existing game-theoretic overlay network con-
struction model [57] that defines a network construction game is used. In this particular
network construction model, each node is assumed to be running the link state (LS) pro-
tocol, where each node periodically performs link addition and link dropping. The total
cost of a node being part of the network is a function of cost paid for maintaining links
and the distances from the node in concern to the other nodes in the overlay network.
The strategy adopted by a node is the subset of other nodes in the network that the node
chooses to connect to. The Eq.A.6 calculates the cost incurred by a particular node by
being part of the overlay network.
Ci(s) = α
∑
jNBi
tj +
n−1∑
j=0
dG[s](i, j) (7.2)
Here, NBi is the set of neighbours of node i, tj is the cost incurred to connect to node
j and dG[s](i, j) is the distance from node i to node j in the overlay network G[s]. The
distance between two nodes is calculated by measuring the shortest path between them in
the overlay and then adding the distances of the intermediate links along the underlying
base network. Here, α can be regarded as the relation between the cost of establishing a
link and the change in distance to other nodes caused by the addition of that link. Also,
the cost can be regarded as the inverse of the pay-off obtained by a node. The higher
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the cost, the lower the pay-off. The algorithms that define the link addition and dropping
protocols [57] under perfect rationality are described under Algorithms 7 and 8.
Algorithm 7: Link Addition for node i
1 Randomly select node j not in the neighborhood of i;
2 Compute Costnew with j included;
3 if Costold − Costnew > 0 then
4 Add the link;
Algorithm 8: Link Dropping for node i
1 NodeToDrop = -1;
2 Mincost = Costold;
3 forall the node j in the neighbourhood of i do
4 Compute Costnew without j;
5 if MinCost− Costnew > 0 then
6 MinCost = Costnew;
7 NodeToDrop = j;
8 if MinCost− Costnew > 0 then
9 Drop the link between i and NodeToDrop.
The resulting network that evolves based on the assumption of perfect rationality could be
regarded as the Nash equilibrium solution [57] under the network construction game. The
decision to create a link or not is a pure strategy (with probability 1 or 0) and these algo-
rithms assume that all nodes operate with perfect rationality, suggesting that each node
possesses the cognitive capacity, information and the computational time to calculate all
the costs (and therefore payoffs) under each strategy. However, in a real-world population
of players that form a peer-to-peer overlay network, this may not be the case. The players
would have varying bounded rationality, possibly making them operate in a non-optimal
manner. Thus, the above algorithms could be modified by introducing a topologically
distributed bounded rationality in making the decision to create a link or to drop a link.
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Here, the opponent of each node can be regarded as the overlay network itself, as the
creation and dropping of links affects the network and the respective costs and payoffs
would be derived from the network that is formed. The modified link addition and link
dropping protocols, based on a topologically distributed bounded rationality parameter in
a quantal response equilibrium is given in Algorithms 9 and 10.
Algorithm 9: Link addition for node i under bounded rationality and QRE.
1 Randomly select node j not in the neighborhood of i;
2 Compute Costnew with j included;
3 Payoff = Costold − Costnew;
4 Compute the rationality parameter λi based on node degree;
5 Compute the probability of creating the link pa using λ and QRE;
6 Generate a random probability p;
7 if p < pa then
8 Add the link;
Algorithm 10: Link Dropping for node i under bounded rationality and QRE.
1 NodeToDrop = -1;
2 Mincost = Costold;
3 forall the node j in the neighbourhood of i do
4 Compute Costnew without j;
5 Payoff = Mincost− Costnew;
6 Compute the rationality parameter λi based on node degree;
7 Compute the probability of dropping the link pd using λ and QRE;
8 Generate a random probability p;
9 if p < pd then
10 MinCost = Costnew;
11 NodeToDrop = j;
12 if MinCost− Costnew > 0 then
13 Drop the link between i and NodeToDrop.
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To add a link in the modified algorithm 9, the probability pa is calculated by using the
equation Eq.A.7. The probability of dropping a link used in Algorithm 10 is calculated
using the Equation A.8. These probabilities depend on the rationality of each node, thus
the hubs have made more rational decisions in adding and dropping links in comparison
to leaf nodes. Note that the opponent of each node, that is the node at the receiving end
is assumed be in an always connected state, and the decision to create or drop a link is
only made by the active node of the link in that particular instance.
pa =
eλi.P
eλi.P + eλi.0
(7.3)
Here, pa is the probability of adding a new link. λi is the bounded rationality of node i,
which is measured using a convex function of the node degree with the network rationality
parameter set to 0.01. P is the payoff of creating the link, which is the difference between
Costnew and Costold. The node would thus obtain a payoff of P if the link is created and
a payoff of 0 if not. This simple subgame with an incorporation of a rationality parameter
could be used to model a node with non-optimal bounded rationality.
pd =
eλi.P
eλi.P + eλi.0
(7.4)
In Eq.7.4, pd is the probability of dropping a new link. λi is the bounded rationality
of node i, which is measured based on a convex function of the node degree with the
network rationality parameter set to 0.01. P is the payoff of dropping the link, which is
the difference between Costnew and MinCost. Thus, P could be regarded as the expected
payoff of dropping the link in concern, in comparison to the payoff 0 of keeping the link.
Using these two sets of algorithms and corresponding equations, peer-to-peer overlay net-
works were generated using perfectly rational nodes (Nash equilibrium) and bounded
rational nodes whose rationality levels are topologically distributed. Next, the topological
properties in each class of networks were compared, particularly the scale-free exponent
and the R-squared correlation to the power-law degree distribution. Real-world peer-to-
peer overlay network topologies such as Gnutella were observed to show scale-free topology
[227]. By comparing the topologies of each of the generated networks, it is possible to com-
pare each network construction game in its ability to generate networks that map closer
to the real-world overlay networks.
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In the experiments conducted, scale free networks of 500 nodes served as the underlying
base networks. Since the Internet has been observed to be scale-free in nature [9], using
scale-free networks as the underlying networks is justifiable. Next, an overlay network was
generated randomly over the physical base network. Then, the link-state algorithms given
above were iterated over time under both the Nash equilibrium and QRE algorithms. The
resulting networks were compared on their scale-freeness. As previously mentioned, the
parameter α used in the cost function Eq.A.6 is an indication of the relationship between
the cost of creating a link and the change in distance to other nodes that occurs due to the
creation of that link. For instance, if α ≤ 1, that means that it is always more beneficial to
create a link than having to traverse at least two nodes to reach a non-neighbouring node.
If α is significantly large, a link addition would only happen if it substantially reduces
the distances to the other nodes in the overlay network. By varying α, it is possible to
construct different overlay topologies. Networks generated using three different α values
were compared. This makes it possible to observe how the perfectly rational and bounded
rational nodes would construct overlay networks under varying cost-benefit ratios of cre-
ating links.
Results and Discussion
Figure A.2 depicts the comparison of networks formed as a result of nodes operating
at Nash equilibrium and topologically distributed rationality induced quantal response
equilibrium, respectively. The two parameters compared are the scale-free exponent and
the R-squared correlation to the respective power-law degree distribution. The scale-
free exponent is observed to be between 2 and 3 in most real-world scale-free networks,
including peer-to-peer overlay networks [9, 227]. The correlation gives an indication on
the proximity of the network to an actual scale-free network with a power-law degree
distribution. Three α values, 0.6, 1.5 and 10, are considered in network generations to
observe how the topologies vary under varying cost-benefit ratios of link creation.
As evident from Fig.A.2, the networks that result from quantal response equilibrium with
topological distributed bounded rationality demonstrate scale-free topological features,
reminiscent of real-world peer-to-peer overlay networks [227, 9]. The higher R-squared
correlation in QRE-based networks indicates that they fit better with a power-law degree
distribution. The relatively higher scale-free exponent is also characteristic of real-world
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(a) Scale-free exponent, α = 0.6
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(b) R-squared correlation, α = 0.6
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(c) Scale-free exponent, α = 1.5
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(d) R-squared correlation, α = 1.5
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(e) Scale-free exponent, α = 10
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(f) R-squared correlation, α = 10
Figure 7.1: The evolution of the scale-free exponent and the R-squared correlation of the Nash equilibrium and
the QRE networks with topologically distributed bounded rationality. The α value was set to 0.5, 1.6 and 10,
respectively.
peer-to-peer overlay networks. It has been observed that for very large α values, the
resulting Nash equilibrium network may show scale-free characteristics [57]. However, in
real-world peer-to-peer networks, it is unlikely that the cost of creating a link would be
substantially large when compared to the reduction of distance to the other nodes [54].
The results suggest that the QRE-based network may show scale-free characteristics for
lower α values as well, suggesting that a topologically interpreted bounded rationality,
along with QRE, could be used to model network formation among peers more accurately
than Nash equilibrium based-network formation games where players are assumed to have
perfect rationality. On the other hand, this application and the results could be used as
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evidence of the validity of a topological distribution of bounded rationality in a networked
populations of strategic players.
7.3.2 Protection against security threats in networks
In the second case study, a scenario is considered where game theory is used to model
the level of security of the nodes in a computer network. Setting the security level of a
particular network agent is a compromise between the amount of resources that can be
allocated for providing security and the level of security desired [132]. Moreover, there
could be a compromise between computational and data transfer time and the security
level provided [132]. Since these are often conflicting interests, game theory could be
effectively used to model to identify the security level set at each node within the network.
Protection against security threats has previously been interpreted in a game-theoretic
setting [55]. In this case study, attention is paid to how the nodes of a network would
setup their security against potential Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. A
DDoS attack initiates with an attacker looking for vulnerable machines to get hold of
and subsequently use to launch a larger scale attack. The vulnerability of nodes to be
susceptible to such invasion would depend on the security level set at each node. Even
though the attack is automated, the setting up of security is often a decision that is made
with human cognition and experience, which makes it a decision made with bounded
rationality.
Consider network of size n, where each user is vulnerable against the initial stage of a DDoS
attack. The level of computer security adopted by each user is denoted by si. The nodes
that would be compromised would be those with the lowest security level min(si) = smin.
An assumption is made such that the cost born by each user i to implement his security
policy is a monotonically increasing function of si. All compromised users would incur a
fixed cost of P ≥ si, irrespective of the minimum security level smin. It is assumed that
users probe the security levels of other users and adjust their security levels accordingly.
While this representation of a security model against the initial stage of a DDoS attack is
fairly simple, it has been used in modelling similar scenarios [55]. It can also be used to
accurately model the DDoS attacks that have been carried out in real networks [55]. The
network size does not play a significant role in this model, unlike in real-world attacks.
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Thus, this model would be more appropriate for networks of reasonably small size, such
as corporate and university networks.
The Nash equilibrium derived for this game occurs when all users within the network
choose an identical security level si = P . The proof of this can be given as follows [55].
Suppose users 1, .., k such that 1 ≥ k ≤ n apply a security level of smin ≤ si for all ii, ..., n.
Therefore, each user i1, .., k is compromised, thus their utility would be ui = −P .
Now suppose user i in 1,....,k increases their security level to si = smin + h where h ≥ 0.
Then, user i’s utility would be −smin−h. Since the original distribution of security levels
form a Nash equilibrium, any change in strategy should decrease the utility of player i for
any h ≥ 0, which brings out the inequality:
− smin − h ≤ −P (7.5)
This can be reduced to smin ≥ P by continuity. However, it was originally hypothesised
that smin ≤ P . For both these inequalities to hold smin should be equal to P . Since for
any i, smin ≤ si ≤ P , suggesting that si has to be P. Thus, the Nash equilibrium occurs
when si = P for all i users. Therefore, for this particular network security game, the Nash
equilibrium occurs when all users have identicial security level of P and thus the identical
utility of −P . A more detailed explanation of this proof has been presented by Christin
et al. [55].
Although the Nash equilibrium predicts that all users within a network would have an
identical security level, real-world network security systems operate otherwise [249, 89].
Security levels tend to follow a heterogeneous distribution within a network of users.
Topological bounded rationality may be used as a means to account for this heterogeneity.
In order to incorporate bounded rationality to this game setting, this game is extended so
each user decides whether to apply a security level or not. Accordingly, the opponent of
each potential player is the network itself. If a user does not have any security applied,
si = 0 and thus the payoff ui would be 0. The players who engage in the security game
probe others and adjust their security levels accordingly. Thus, such players would have
the identical utility of ui = U as other users who participate in the network security game.
If U > 0, again the Nash equilibrium would occur when all players have identical security
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level of U . Now, suppose that each user would make this decision based on a rationality
level λi, which is proportional to the degree di of that user. Thus, the probability of a
player being part of the security game is:
pi =
eλi.U
eλi.U + eλi.0
(7.6)
where, λi = f(di), where f is a monotonically increasing function of user i’s degree, and
0 ≥ λi ≤ ∞. When the user is not part of the network, they would still have the probability
of 0.5 of participating in the network game and earning a utility of U/2. However, when
the node degree increases, the probability of participation would reach 1, with an expected
utility of U . Thus, this model suggests that the users have a utility of ui[U/2, U) and thus
the security level si distributed in the range si[−U/2,−U). Therefore, with a topological
interpretation of bounded rationality, it could be argued that the heterogeneity of security
levels in real-world networks could be accounted for. Moreover, it is common that the
servers that are highly connected are more secure than individual workstations that may
not have high level of security [146]. Similarly, a topological distribution of bounded
rationality suggests that the highly connected users in a network are more likely to have
a higher level of security than less connected users.
7.3.3 Routing in a peer-to-peer overlay network
The next application that is considered is routing in a peer-to-peer overlay network. As in
the case of peer-to-peer network formation, the peers would have non-perfect and hetero-
geneous rationality in a peer-to-peer routing scenario. This is evident from the existence of
free loading or free-riding in peer-to-peer overlay networks [37]. In a peer-to-peer resource-
sharing network, each node relies on other nodes to forward its requests, and in turn it
is expected to forward the requests sent by other nodes [37]. However, the self-interested
nodes may refuse to forward requests in order to conserve local bandwidth.
It is suggested that incentive mechanisms and reputations systems can be used to facilitate
cooperation as a robust and subgame-perfect equilibrium in a network of self-interested
players. However, in real-world peer-to-peer networks, collaboration seems to sustain as a
strategy even without any particular incentive or reputation mechanisms in place [208].
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A variation of the random matching game is adopted as a means of modelling peer-to-
peer routing. This game has been previously used to model peer-to-peer routing in the
literature [37]. In each round, players are randomly matched, and then each pair plays
a single round of the prisoner’s dilemma game [216]. Since the prisoner’s dilemma game
has been widely used to model the behaviour of self-interested agents, this model could be
used to model peer-to-peer networks that consists of self-interested players. Based on the
same premise, it is possible to define a peer-to-peer routing game. When each request is
propagated, the intermediate nodes would play a single instance of the prisoner’s dilemma
game with the original node that generated the request.
Once a request originates from the node s, the request is forwarded to the immediate next
node in the routing path, then a single instance of the prisoner’s dilemma game is played
between those two nodes. If the second node cooperates, that is if it forwards a request,
it gets a pay-off of -2 while it gets a pay-off of 0 if it defects and ignores the request. Node
s gets a pay-off of 0 in both instances. If the request is forwarded, then game is repeated
with s and the next node in the routing path until the destination node is reached. Thus,
if each routing node is at Nash equilibrium, it would always choose to defect as it gives
a higher pay-off of 0. This creates the scenario where there is ‘tragedy of the commons’,
where the collaborative environment cannot function at all due to all players behaving in
a self-interested manner [189]. However, this is contrary to observed peer-to-peer routing
networks where collaboration is sustained even without incentives or a reputation system
in place.
Next, this game is further modified by introducing topologically distributed bounded ra-
tionality and QRE. The non-zero probability of an intermediate node deciding to forward
a request is given by:
pf =
e−2.λn
e−2.λn + e0.λn
(7.7)
where pf is the probability of forwarding the request and λn is the rationality of node n.
With this probability distribution, a purely non-rational node with λn = 0 would forward
a request with 0.5 probability while a fully rational node, where λn− > ∞, would never
cater for another’s request. If the rationality is topologically interpreted, this model would
suggest that the probability of forwarding a request is distributed in a probability distri-
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bution of (0:1/2], where hubs would have a higher tendency of not forwarding incoming
requests than leaf nodes.
Methodology
In order to test the implications of a topologically influenced bounded rationality on the
peer-to-peer routing game described above, the following experiment was devised. The
random matching routing game was run on a scale-free network of nodes by generating
broadcast requests from each node. Each node sends requests to all other nodes within the
network along the shortest paths. An assumption was made that nodes have the necessary
routing information contained in them, in order to forward the requests. The fraction of
such requests generated from all the nodes in the network that successfully made it to the
destination, was measured. The rationality was calculated based on a convex function of
node degree. The network rationality parameter was varied to observe how the routing
game responds to the overall rationality level of the network. Then, the results obtained
were compared with those of a structured lattice network with comparative link-to-node
ratio and a real-world Gnutella peer-to-peer overlay network.
Results and discussion
The Figure A.3 depicts the results obtained by comparing the lattice and scale-free net-
works on their ability to facilitate peer-to-peer routing under varying network rationality
conditions. The network rationality parameter is shown in logarithmic scale. As the figure
shows, the scale-free topology facilitates a considerable fraction of requests under a topo-
logically influenced bounded rationality and over a wide range of network rationality. On
the other hand, lattice topology allows a significantly smaller fraction of messages to be
routed, due to its homogeneous and low average degree and the higher average path length.
Most real-world peer-to-peer overlay networks show scale-free topology [227]. Thus, this
result may indicate that by being distributed in a scale-free topology, overlay networks
obtain the ability to sustain message routing, provided that the nodes have heterogeneous
and topologically distributed rationality levels. The real-world Gnutella network, which
also shows scale-free characteristics, facilitates message forwarding over a significant range
of network rationality. The scale-topology goes through a sudden transition in the fraction
of requests allowed when the network rationality parameter increases beyond a particular
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point. Both structured and non-structured topologies are applied in peer-to-peer over-
lay networks [148]. These results suggest that if the rationality of agents is topologically
distributed, non-structured topologies such as scale-free topologies may be more robust
against free-riding behaviour. This may be due to the heterogeneity of rationality that
they would facilitate and the lower average path lengths of that they would encompass,
limiting the number of iterations in the random matching game.
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Figure 7.2: The variation of the fraction of overlay requests that are successfully routed against the network
rationality parameter. The results of scale-free and lattice topologies are compared with that of a Gnutella network.
7.4 Discussion
Nash equilibrium predicts that there exists a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria in a
strategic decision-making scenario from which no player would benefit deviating. Quantal
response equilibrium is a generalisation of Nash equilibrium where the rationality of a
player is taken into account to accommodate for the errors made in making decisions.
QRE encapsulates a rationality parameter that can be used to manipulate the level of
rationality of a given player.
Combining the above two theoretical frameworks, it has been suggested that the rationality
parameter could be regarded as being proportional to the amount of social interactions
a node may have. Thus, in a weighted network, the rationality of a node would be
proportional to the sum of weights of links connected to that node, while in an unweighted
network, it could regarded to be proportional to the node degree. In this work, only the
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unweighted networks are considered. According to this model, the sensitivity of rationality
to network topology is denoted by a network rationality parameter r.
In order to validate and demonstrate the applicability of a topologically distributed ra-
tionality model, three different real-world case studies were considered. The first case
study was peer-to-peer network formation. A game theoretic network formation algo-
rithm that operates with the assumption of Nash equilibrium was adopted. Next, it was
extended using QRE and topologically distributed bounded rationality. The resulting
network properties demonstrate that the QRE-based network is closer to the scale-free
nature of the real-world peer-to-peer network formations. This suggests that the topolog-
ically distributed rationality model is useful in modelling peer-to-peer network formation
more accurately. This is presented as evidence of the validity and applicability of the
topologically distributed bounded rationality model discussed in the previous chapter.
In the second case study, the topologically distributed bounded rationality model was
applied to a scenario where game theory is used to model the security levels of nodes in
a network. Under a topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it can be shown
that the highly connected nodes or hubs have more stringent security policies than the
leaf nodes, reminiscent of the real-world networks. In comparison, the Nash equilibrium
solution suggests that each node in a network would have identical security level, which is
not the case in real-world networks.
In the final case-study, network routing was simulated using the randomly matched pris-
oner’s dilemma game. Accordingly, it was demonstrated that, under topologically dis-
tributed bounded rationality, a scale-free network would facilitate the exchange of messages
over a broad range of network rationality levels better than a well-mixed population. The
results suggest that a topological bounded rationality could be useful in developing game
theoretic models that would represent real-world scenarios more accurately than models
that assume perfect rationality. Thus, a topologically distributed rationality model may
be a useful tool in modelling real-world strategic decision making scenarios among pop-
ulations of players. More real-world applications and empirical studies are essential to
explore the applicability of the topologically distributed bounded rationality model.
In the previous chapter, we proposed a topologically distributed bounded rationality
model. In this chapter, we discussed the potential applications of the topologically dis-
tributed bounded rationality model. The next chapter proposes an information transfer-
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based bounded rationality model as a more refined and dynamic bounded rationality
model, where the bounded rationality of a node with respect to a given interaction is
assumed to be proportional to the incoming information flow.
Chapter 8
Information theoretical
interpretation of bounded
rationality in network-based games
The previous two chapters elaborated on a topologically distributed bounded rationality
model, where the bounded rationality implicitly captures the network topology as a vital
aspect in determining the output of strategic interactions. In this chapter, this model is
extended to define the bounded rationality of a node with respect to a particular strategic
interaction as being proportional to the directed incoming information flow among each
pair of players.
8.1 Introduction
The bounded rationality of a player is dependent on the level of information available, the
amount of computational time available and the cognitive capacity. Thus, if all players
have uniform cognitive capacity and computational time, then it is the amount of infor-
mation available that determines the bounded rationality of a player. Previous chapters
focused on a bounded rationality model that used the spatial arrangement of nodes as
a basis for deducing the rationality of nodes. While that approach can be justified by
approximating the social interaction of nodes based on their topological characteristics,
186
CHAPTER 8. INFORMATION THEORETICAL INTERPRTATION OF BR 187
such as the node degree, it is still a static property of nodes for a particular topological
structure. However, what actually matters in determining the rationality of a node with
respect to a particular opponent in a strategic interaction is the incoming information flow
from that opponent. Thus, it is more accurate to take into account the incoming directed
information flow rather than considering the static topology of the network. This would
mean that the rationality of nodes would not only depend on the spatial dimension but also
the temporal dimension. Thus, an information flow based rationality could be considered
a dynamic rationality rather than a static rationality. In this chapter, an attempt is made
to model the bounded rationality of players using information theoretic measures. As a
measure of bounded rationality, an information theoretic measure called transfer entropy
[143] is used. Transfer entropy is used to measure the directed information flow between
two processes; thus, it makes an ideal candidate to quantify the bounded rationality arising
from the directed information flow from a potential opponent, within a strategic interac-
tion. In this work, random boolean networks [74] are used as the underlying information
network to quantify the transfer entropy. They allow the generation of state sequences for
each node in the network, which can then be used to measure the directed information
flows among interacting nodes. Information flows can be thought of as a more refined
form of network topology, where the actual interconnections among nodes are represented
by directed information exchanges.
8.2 Background
8.2.1 Information transfer and transfer entropy
The information transfer between a source and a destination is defined as the information
provided by the source about the destination’s next state that was not contained in the
destination’s own past. The information transfer is measured by transfer entropy [143]
and it is mainly proposed to address the issue of symmetry in the measure of mutual
information. Transfer entropy is a directed measure that takes into account the directed
information flow from a source to a destination. The transfer entropy from a source Y to
destination X is defined as the average mutual information between the previous state of
the source yn and the next state of the destination xn+1, conditioned on the semi-infinite
past of the destination xn.
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TY→X = lim
k→∞
〈
log2
p(xn+1|xkn, yn)
p(xn+1|xkn)
〉
(8.1)
This formulation is also known as the apparent transfer entropy. Apparent transfer entropy
measures the effect of information transfer from a single source only. If the information
transfer is affected by the interaction of multiple sources, it does not account for that
cumulative effect. Within the scope of this work, the focus is placed on the apparent
transfer entropy as it is the information transfer from a single source to a destination is
considered in quantifying the rationality level.
8.2.2 Random boolean networks
Random boolean networks (RBNs) were originally developed as genetic regulatory net-
works [74]. They are also known as Kauffman networks. Random boolean networks are
generic since they are not bound by any particular functionality or connectivity of the
nodes that are contained in them. They can be used to model the fundamentals of living
systems in an integrated and holistic manner. RBNs can be considered as generalisations
of boolean cellular automata (CA), where the state of each node is affected by all the
other nodes in the network and not necessarily by its immediate neighbours.
The classical RBN (CRBN) model proposed by Kauffman suggests that living organisms
could be constructed from interconnected random elements without using specifically pro-
grammed elements. An RBN consists of N nodes with either zero or one state and each
node would have average K number of connections. The connections are wired randomly.
These connections do not change within the phase where the states of the nodes are dy-
namically changed. The states are updated synchronously, where the states at t+1 depend
on the states of the nodes at t.
The random network is initialised with a random state. Then the states are dynamically
changed until a stable state is reached. The state space of finite value 2N , making the
system repeat a state eventually. At that state, the RBN is said to have reached an
attractor. If the attractor is of a single state it is called a point attractor and if the
attractor it consists of two or more states, it is called an attractor cycle.
For a given RBN, each node would have 22
k
possible boolean functions. Also, each node
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would have possible
(
N !
(N−K)!
)N
combinations for K different links. Therefore, all possible
networks for given N nodes with average degree K would be [86]:
(
22
k
N !
(N −K)!
)N
(8.2)
At the inception of the RBN, the nodes are initialised with a probability r of having the
state 1. This probability is called the bias of the RBN. If r is closer to 1 or 0, the network
has low activity and if r is closer to 0.5, the network has high activity.
8.2.3 Phase transitions in random boolean networks
RBNs have been observed to have three clear types of dynamics: ordered, chaotic and
critical. At relatively low connectivity and low activity, the network is at the ordered phase,
while at relatively high connectivity and high activity, the network is at the chaotic phase.
At the ordered phase, the network demonstrates high stability towards perturbations and
strongly converges towards similar macro states in state space. At the chaotic phase,
the network demonstrates low stability of states to perturbations and displays divergence
of similar macro states. At the critical phase [142], the network displays uncertainty in
the convergence or divergence of similar macro states and there is a percolation of nodes
remaining static and updating their states.
In order to quantify the phase transitions in the RBNs, a normalised Hamming distance
can be used. Suppose a random initial state A of the network is considered, and then the
value of a single node is inverted to produce B. Afterwards, if both A and B are run for
many time steps, the normalised Hamming distance of the two networks at would be:
D(A,B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ai − bi| (8.3)
The normalised Hamming distance between their initial and final states could be used to
obtain the convergence/divergence parameter δ:
δ = D(A,B)t→∞ −D(A,B)t=0 (8.4)
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Here, δ < 0 suggests the convergence of similar initial states, and δ > 0 implies the
divergence of similar initial states. For infinitely large networks, when r is fixed the
critical average degree Kc is given by:
Kc =
1
2r(1− r) (8.5)
Accordingly, when r is set to 0.5, the phase transition would occur at the average degree
K = 2.0. Thus, the phase transition in state dynamics can be observed when the topology
is held constant by fixing K (for K > 2) and by altering the activity level. Instead, the
average degree can be held constant and the activity level can be altered to obtain a phase
transition. In the experiments carried out in this work, both the average degree K and
the bias parameter r were varied to obtain RBNs of varying topological characteristics
and activity levels.
8.3 Quantifying bounded rationality as an information the-
oretic measure
The bounded rationality of players occurs due to the limitation of information that they
have on the actions of other players. Provided that the computational time available and
the cognitive capacity of players are homogeneous, it is the access to information about
the environment that determines the rationality of players.
On the other hand, the information transfer and storage measures used in information
theory try to quantify the information exchange and information contained by a particular
player. In this work, an attempt is made to utilise this quantification of information as
a measure of rationality in a strategic decision-making environment. As the source for
quantifying information, random functions are used in the random boolean networks. Since
these networks contain varying topological structures, this approach makes it possible to
observe the effect of topology on the network games via the information transfer that
happens on top of the network structure.
Network topology has previously been used to model the bounded rationality of nodes
[125]. Accordingly, if a particular node has a higher degree or connectivity, it is assumed
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to have a higher bounded rationality and vice versa. Justification for this interpretation
can be found in theories such as the social cognitive theory [21]. However, even though
a particular node may have a higher degree, what actually matters is the amount of in-
formation that flows along those interconnections. Using a social network example, the
frequency of interaction of two individuals may vary and the amount of information ex-
changed would vary accordingly. Thus, using the quantified information flow as a measure
of rationality is more viable than using a topological measure. The network topology is
the physical network while the actual information flow is the logical network on which
the flow of information may occur. By considering the actual information flow on top
of the physical network, it is possible to derive a more accurate measure of the bounded
rationality of the players in the network.
Another analogy that could be used to explain the difference between the network topology
and the information flow are the road and traffic networks. The road network is analogous
to the physical network topology that connects the nodes, while the traffic network is
the traffic flow that actually operates on top of that physical network. The amount of
traffic information contained at a particular junction or a node can only be accurately
measured by quantifying the traffic flow, not just be measuring the number of roads that
are connected to that particular node. Certain roads may have a lot of traffic while
others contain a relatively low amount of traffic. Thus, to accurately measure the amount
of traffic-related information and to make traffic-routing decisions based on that traffic
information, each node in the road network would actually have to base its rationality on
the traffic flow. Following from this analogy, it is possible to further justify quantifying
the bounded rationality of a node in a network game on the information transfer and the
information content contained in a node, rather than based on the number of physical
interconnections that a node may have.
8.3.1 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy as a
link parameter
In this work, transfer entropy is utilised in two different approaches to quantify rationality.
The first approach is to consider the information transfer from specific neighbours. In that
approach, the rationality of each neighbour is quantified as a link-related parameter. With
this approach, it is possible to evaluate whether it would be effective for a player to consider
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the rationality of opponents at an individual level and not apply a common rationality level
for all the opponents. This could be used to observe whether it is the rationality towards
individuals opponents or the common rationality towards all opponents that drives the
interactions towards a Nash equilibrium. This approach of quantifying bounded rationality
could be considered as a specific rationality approach, where the bounded rationality is
specific for each an every opponent of a particular node.
8.3.2 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy as a
node parameter
The other approach of quantifying rationality that is considered here is averaging the
incoming information flows towards a node. In a social network perspective, this would
be analogous to a player considering all of the information that they gather from their
neighbours and then summarising it to decide on an overall rationality that may be used
in interactions with all of the players. Thus, the bounded rationality obtained from this
approach is a general bounded rationality that is common to all neighbours of a particular
player. By comparing these two approaches of quantifying bounded rationality on infor-
mation transfers, it is possible to deduce whether it is more beneficial for a player to have
specific bounded rationality towards all opponents or whether it is more beneficial to have
a general rationality by considering all incoming information from all opponents.
8.3.3 Transfer entropy from direct neighbours
In the experiments conducted in this work, the information transfer obtained only from
the direct neighbours was considered. However, in a social network, information flow can
occur from any of the nodes within the network. Nodes that are multiple hops away
may contribute to the decision-making of a node. Even though the impact of the direct
neighbours may be more significant, the contribution of the indirect neighbours may also
still be significant.
8.3.4 Transfer entropy from indirect neighbours
One of the advantages of having an information theoretic approach to quantifying bounded
rationality is that information transfers can be measured between any two nodes in a
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network that are not necessarily physically connected. Thus, it is possible to easily extend
the neighbour-based bounded rationality calculation model to encompass the multilevel
neighbours until the very edge of the network is reached. This approach could be used to
predict the strategic interactions of nodes that are not currently linked with each other.
8.3.5 Quantifying bounded rationality based on transfer entropy from
multi-hop neighbours
Theoretically, it is possible to consider the information flow from all neighbours within
the network to a particular node in concern in order to determine its rationality from
information flow. If the rationality of a particular node is Rn, and if the information
transfer from a particular node i to node n is depicted by T (i → n) and the topological
distance from node i to node n is di,n:
Rn =
N∑
i
f(T (i→ n), di,n) (8.6)
Thus, the accumulation of the rationality contribution from each neighbour within the
network provides the cumulative rationality derived from the information flow from each
node within the network. The scenario that is considered in this work can be regarded as
a special instance of this model where di,n = 1 and the function f = 1/deg(n).T (i → n),
where the information flows of each immediate neighbour are averaged over the number
of neighbours.
8.4 Using information theoretic measures to predict the
equilibria of potential interactions
One of the key advantages of using the information transfer as a rationality metric is that it
can be used to infer the rationality of an interaction that has not already happened. If the
network is not static and is growing, there may be new interactions that are taking place
among nodes that are not already connected with each other. Suppose the information
transfer measured using transfer entropy from a node i to node n is is denoted by Ti→n,
the rationality of the potential interaction could be quantified as Ri→n = f(Ti→n), even
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though these two nodes are not physically connected. Thus, for an external observer, it
is possible to predict the interaction that could occur between node n and node i before
the actual link is established using the quantal response equilibrium model. Thus, this is
another potential advantage of deriving the bounded rationality of a node with respect
to a potential opponent, based on the information flow from the opponent to the node in
concern.
In the following section, the methodology that was used to test the effect of network
topology on the local information dynamics and thereby the equilibria of the interactions
is described.
8.5 Methodology
In this work, random boolean networks are used as the basis for generating information
flows and measuring information flows. For the experiments conducted in this research,
networks with two hundred and fifty nodes were used. Two hundred and fifty networks
were generated to normalise the effect of randomisation. Since the objective is to observe
how the topological changes affect the information flows and therein the bounded ratio-
nality of the nodes, the average degree of the networks was varied from the ordered phase
to the chaotic phase. The directed information flow derived based on the transfer entropy
normalised over the average transfer entropy of the network was used as the rationality
parameter.
Next, the equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma game along each link was measured using
the quantal response equilibrium model. The divergence of each interaction from Nash
equilibrium was measured using the Jensen-Shannon divergence measure. By measuring
the average divergence, it is possible to compare networks on their deviation from the
optimal behaviour shown in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, this approach helps to compare
and contrast the divergence from the Nash equilibrium at each phase; namely, the ordered,
critical and chaotic phases of random boolean networks. Since random boolean networks
are used to model living organisms, it is possible to infer the optimality of the strategic
interactions that may occur at different phases of complex systems.
Then, the divergence values obtained from the link based rationality and node based
rationality was compared at each phase in the random boolean networks. This helps to
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determine whether it is the information transfer along the links or averaged over nodes
that would be more effective in optimising the outcome of a game.
The payoff values of the prisoner’s dilemma game were set to T = 5, R = 3, P = 1 and S
= 0, respectively. When the rationality parameter is gradually increased, the probability
of cooperation decreases from 0.5 to 0, reaching Nash equilibrium. Figure 8.1 depicts the
variation of the probability of cooperation when the rationality parameter is increased. As
shown in the figure, the rationality value range of [0:5] adequately captures this variation
of rationality.
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Figure 8.1: Variation of divergence based on the average degree and the bias parameter.
Thus, the transfer entropy values are rescaled to the range of 0 to 5 to account for the
variation of players from complete random behaviour to completely rational behaviour.
8.6 Results
Fig. 8.2 depicts the variation of the average divergence from the Nash equilibrium in each
interaction, when the average degree K and the bias parameter of the random boolean
networks are changed.
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Figure 8.2: Variation of divergence based on the average degree K and the bias parameter r.
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8.7 Discussion
Based on the results depicted, it is evident that the average divergence of a node is the
least when the random boolean network is at the chaotic phase. It is at the chaotic phase
that the complexity of a system emerges. In RBNs, the chaotic phase emerges when
the average degree K is greater than 2 and the network has high activity, with the bias
parameter is around 0.5. Thus, it can be argued that it is a tendency to optimise the
strategic interactions that makes the complexity emerge in real-world systems. The two
parameters that are varied, the bias parameter and the network topology, both affect
the divergence from Nash equilibrium of each interaction. The results find that when the
topology and the activity of the network reach the chaotic phase, the strategic interactions
tend to be optimal, rather than when the network operates at an ordered phase. Thus, the
results indicate that the complexity that emerges in the real-world systems may be a result
of their tendency to optimise the strategic interactions. As future work, the robustness of
this result could be studied, particularly in relation to the applied boolean networks such
as gene regulatory networks.
Apart from these findings that were based on random boolean networks, this work suggests
the possibility of using the directed information transfer metric of transfer entropy as a
basis for deducing the rationality of a player with respect to a particular opponent. The
bounded rationality derived based on transfer entropy is a dynamic rationality instead
of the static rationality distribution suggested in the topologically distributed bounded
rationality model. Since information flows depict a more refined form of interconnections
among nodes, the transfer entropy-based bounded rationality has the potential to be
a more accurate bounded rationality measure. While topological bounded rationality
presents a rationality distribution that is distributed over space, the transfer entropy based
rationality model results in a bounded rationality measure that is distributed over both
space and time. Since transfer entropy has been effectively used to measure the directed
information flow in myriad real-world social networks [69, 188], this would open up a novel
approach in modelling rationality in strategic interactions such as online auctions, trading
in financial markets and political campaigns.
This chapter concludes the second segment of thesis where the bounded rationality is
conceptualised as a topological and information transfer-based measure. The modelling of
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bounded rationality provides an implicit mechanism to capture the influence of topology
and information diffusion on networked game dynamics. The following chapter concluded
the thesis.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
Socio-economic systems and evolving populations are often modelled as networked games.
Such networks consist of non-trivial topological features and demonstrate emergent prop-
erties such as scale-free and small-world behavior.
In this work, the effects of the complex network topology and information diffusion on
the strategic interactions of autonomous agents in socio-economic systems are analysed.
Further, the reciprocal effect of such strategic interactions on the topology of the complex
networks is also investigated.
This work is based on three fundamental scientific fields, namely; Information Theory,
Game Theoretic Analysis and Social Network Analysis. Based on these three pillars, the
question of how the network topology and information diffusion affects the outcomes of
strategic games is addressed. This fundamental research question is further broken down
into a number of sub questions and is respectively addressed in each of the subsequent
chapters. Following is a brief summary on the existing gaps and challenges in these fields,
that are addressed in this work.
1. Topological effect on the evolution of cooperation Even though self-interested players
should never cooperate according to the Darwinian worldview, the real-world pop-
ulations do demonstrate cooperation. One of the key issues addressed in this work
is how the network topology and the information diffusion among players affect the
evolution of cooperation in a population of players.
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2. Topological effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies The evolutionary sta-
bility of strategies defines a particular strategy’s ability to eradicate a competing
strategy. In this work, we study how the network topology affects the evolutionary
stability of strategies.
3. Optimising the topological distribution of strategies to maximise the global payoff
In a population of self-interested players, the collective payoff may depend on the
distribution of strategies among the network topology. In this work, we study the
optimum placement of competing strategies to maximise the collective payoff of a
population.
4. Topological distribution of bounded rationality While Nash equilibrium assumes that
the players in a network are perfectly rational, in the real world players demonstrate
non-optimal or bounded rationality. In this thesis, we study the implications of
the hypothesis that the heterogeneous rationalities of players in a network can be
inferred by the network topology.
5. Applications of Topologically distributed bounded rationality While most of the
real-world applications of behavioural game theory are modelled with players with
perfect rationality, in the actual scenarios, the players demonstrate heterogeneous
rationality levels. Thus, in this work we attempt to answer the question whether
incorporating bounded rationality helps in improving the existing game theoretic
models.
6. Information Theoretical interpretation of bounded rationalityDirected information
transfer can be measured using transfer entropy in information theory. On the
other hand, behavioural game theory suggests that the rationality of a player is
proportional to the information availability. Combining these areas of science, we
try to bridge the gap between game theory and information theory by suggesting
that the rationality of a player is proportional to the cumulative incoming transfer
entropy.
These existing gaps and challenges are addressed with the following set of contributions.
1. Network topology under information diffusion constraints plays a key role in the
evolution of coordination.
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2. The evolutionary stability of strategies is dependent on (i) The network topology
(ii) The evolutionary method used and (iii) The initial configuration of strategies.
3. The global collective payoff of a network of players is optimal when the evolutionarily
stable strategies occupy the hubs and the evolutionarily weak strategies occupy the
leaf nodes.
4. When the bounded or non optimal rationality of players are defined as a function
of network topology, the networks of players evolve into scale-free and small-world
topologies, in their attempt to optimise the strategic interactions.
5. The prevalence of multiple equilibria in strategic interactions is affected by the net-
work topology.
6. Topologically distributed bounded rationality may be used to improve the accuracy
of the real-world applications of behavioural game theory.
7. Information theoretic measures, such as transfer entropy can be used to quantify
the bounded rationality of strategic players in a network. This would give rise to an
interpretation of rationality, which varies both spatially and temporally.
A more detailed explanation on the contributions of this thesis is given as follows.
9.1 Summary of contributions
9.1.1 The influence of network topology on the evolution of coordination
in networked games
As the first component of the study on how the network topology affects the dynamics
of networked games, the evolution of coordination is studied in complex networks under
varying topologies. Specifically, the evolution of coordination is studied by varying the
information flow and the topology of the network.
In this regard, the evolution of coordination in social systems was analysed by simulating
the coordination game on an ensemble of complex network topologies. A comparative
study was conducted, for network topologies that are commonly found in social systems,
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using four different classes of well-known network models. Namely, these included; scale-
free, small-world, hierarchical-modular and Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random networks. As a reference,
an approximation of well-mixed population/lattice was considered.
In all classes of networks considered, it was observed that if nodes are unaware of the
payoffs of their neighbours and cannot adapt, the relative payoff for coordination has to
be relatively high, for the average payoff of coordinators to be higher than the average
payoff of non-coordinators. However, when the nodes are aware of the payoffs of their
neighbours and can evolutionarily adapt, coordination emerges as the winning strategy,
even for relatively lower levels of coordination payoffs. Therefore, this work suggests that
not only the network topology, but also the information diffusion among nodes is critical
in the prevalence of the coordination in self-organising networks. The effect of network
topology and information flow on coordination may provide a possible explanation to the
dilemma on the existence of coordination in real-world networks where self-interested and
competitive agents interact with each other.
This study produced a number of key observations and findings. For instance, it was
observed that when there is no evolution, the relative coordinator payoff, β, has to be above
2 for coordinating nodes to have higher average payoff than non-coordinators. However,
after the payoff information-based evolution and adaptation, there emerges a range of β
less than 2 for which coordinators still remain a majority. Another interesting observation
was that in most topologies, after sufficient evolution and adaptation, the proportion of
coordinators goes through a phase transition when the relative coordinator payoff, β, is
increased. Further, it was noted that it was the peripheral hubs that first completely
adopt coordination and drive the evolution of coordination. Another key observation was
that noise and time lags in payoff information was found to adversely affect the evolution
of coordination, although the level of this effect depends on topology.
In addition to the aforementioned general findings, there were some topology-specific find-
ings that were uncovered within the scope of the evolution of coordination. Most impor-
tantly, the evolution of coordination is most pronounced and the transition in terms of
relative coordinator pay-off β is sharpest in small-world networks. This may explain why
most collaboration networks depict small-world nature. On the other hand, the emergence
of coordination after evolution is least rapid in scale-free networks. Scale-free networks
are the most sensitive to noise in pay-off information and the evolution of coordinators is
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most affected by noise, while small-world networks are not as sensitive. Similarly, scale-
free networks are the most sensitive to time lags in information regarding the pay-off.
After the evolution of coordination, the average pay-off of coordinators is higher than the
initial stage in scale-free and hierarchical networks, while it is lower than the pay-off at
initial stage for small-world and ER random networks. It is important to note that the
proportion of coordinators at the end was found to be higher than during the initial stages
in all classes. The degree of hierarchy in hierarchical-modular networks and the degree of
small-worldness in small-world networks both seem to aid the emergence of coordination.
Comparing these topology-specific findings, we could argue that scale-free networks and
small-world networks display contrasting characteristics in terms of the evolution of co-
ordination. The hierarchical-modular class tends to display features similar to scale-free
networks, while the ER random networks display features similar to small-world networks.
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that topological features, qualified here by the four
classes of networks, influence the evolution of coordination in social systems in non-trivial
ways.
There are several key implications from the results obtained in the attempt to study the
evolution of coordination. It is widely known that both small-world and scale-free fea-
tures are observed in real-world social systems, although in various degrees. Based on the
simulation results obtained in this work, it is shown that while the emergence of coordina-
tion can be aided equally readily by both features, scale-freeness increases the sensitivity
of the system to noise and time lags in information diffusion, while networks which are
exclusively small-world are relatively unaffected. This would imply that systems, that are
small-world but not scale-free are likely to evolve into being dominant in coordination
and sustain it under difficult information-diffusion conditions. This argument is further
supported by the observation that the small-worldness itself, measured by the clustering
coefficient and the diameter of the network, seems to aid the transition in terms of relative
coordinator pay-off. This observation has been further corroborated by other studies in
different game contexts. Experiments were conducted with several network densities in
different classes of networks, and it was shown that the sparser the network, the easier the
emergence of coordination, other parameters being unchanged. Therefore, the smaller the
number of games played within a network, the easier it seems for coordination to evolve
as the winning strategy. Thus, these results are useful in understanding the behaviour of
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spatially connected social systems.
In conclusion, based on the results obtained in the first component of the research con-
ducted, it is possible to conclude that the network topology under information diffusion
constraints plays a key role in the evolution of coordination in networked populations of
players. Further, the results observed strongly suggest one arc of the cyclic interdepen-
dence between form and function, which indicates that the function of the network, in
terms of coordination, follows the form or the topology of the network.
While coordination is a significant strategy in evolving games, the effect of network topol-
ogy on generic strategies is relevant in all strategic interactions. Thus, as the next logical
step of this study, the influence of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strate-
gies was examined.
9.1.2 The influence of network topology on the evolutionary stability of
strategies
This subcomponent of the research focuses on how the network topology of a population of
players affects the evolutionary stability of a strategy. In order to simulate this, a particular
subclass of strategies known as zero-determinant strategies, which has been demonstrated
to be evolutionarily unstable against the Pavlov strategy, were played against each other.
From the perspective of the relationship between the form and function, we attempt to
test whether the function in the form of evolutionary stability is affected by the form or
the topology of the social structure.
Based on the results gathered from the simulations conducted, it is evident that network
topology has an effect on the evolutionary stability of a particular strategy. Another
important finding of this research is that the topologically influenced evolutionary stability
is a weak evolutionary stability, not a strong evolutionary stability. In other words, the
stable strategy would not be able to completely eradicate the competing strategy and the
competing strategy would still be able to survive within the confines of the network.
Further, the results obtained in this study suggest that the topological effect of evolution-
ary stability is determined by the evolutionary process used. When using the death-birth
Moran process to evolve the population, topology does not seem to have a significant effect
on the evolutionary stability of strategies. However, when the strategy adoption process
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suggested by Santos et al. [223] is applied, topology does seem to have a significant effect
on the evolutionary stability of a strategy within a population. The strategy adoption
process takes into account the cumulative payoff of each node in determining whether a
strategy should be replaced or not. As such, this result suggests that an evolutionarily
unstable strategy could survive when it occupies the hubs surrounded by leaf nodes as-
signed with an evolutionarily stable strategy. In a heterogeneous network of players, hubs
tend to have more strategic interactions with their opponents in comparison to leaf nodes.
Thus, a hub with an evolutionarily unstable strategy would continue to be irreplaceable
by the neighbouring nodes’ strategies, as it would continue to have a higher pay-off than
its immediate neighbours.
The evolutionary process adopted may have significant implications in the real-world net-
works of strategic players. The death-birth Moran process is more suitable in a biological
context where the lifetime of a player is significantly less than the evolutionary time span.
It could be effectively used to model the evolution of species where the strategies are
hard-wired to the players and the evolution occurs through the replacement of players
with replicas of better performing players. However, in a social context, the evolution of
strategies may be driven by the adoption of strategies by the players based on the per-
formance of their neighbouring players. In other words, a stochastic strategy adoption
process could be used to model the evolution of strategies when the lifetime of a player
maybe considerably larger than the time-span of evolution. Examples of such situations
include the interactions that occur in corporate sectors and financial markets. In these
instances, it is often observable that, in their struggle to survive, the players continually
adopt the strategies of other players. Thus, the strategy adoption evolutionary update
process may be more relevant when the evolution of strategies is applied in a social con-
text. Accordingly, the topological effect on the evolutionary stability of strategies may be
more prevalent in a social context, than a biological context.
Further, it is important to note that not only the topology but also the initial distribution
of the strategies within the network plays a significant role in shaping the evolution of
the strategies. For instance, when an evolutionarily unstable strategy occupies hubs as
opposed to the leaf nodes at the initiation of the evolution, it manages to become an even
more prominent strategy within the network over time, resembling a weak evolutionarily
stable strategy. Again, this particular observation indicates that the function, which is the
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evolutionarily stability of strategies, is partially determined by the form or the topology
of the network.
Even though the main focus of this work was on the Zero Determinant and Pavlov strate-
gies, it was possible to replicate similar observations with other well-known strategies
such as the general cooperator and cooperator strategies, competing against the Pavlov
strategy. This could mean that the variation of evolutionary stability due to topological
stability of strategies is a more general phenomenon which may be applicable to most
strategies that are competing with each other.
This study suggests that it is possible to identify three basic factors that determine the
topological stability of strategies in a non-homogeneous network. These factors are the
network topology, the evolutionary process and the initial distribution of the strategies.
By varying these three factors, an evolutionarily unstable strategy may be able to survive
and may even operate as a weak evolutionarily stable strategy in a population of players
connected in a non-homogeneous topology. Based on the observations in this work, the
topological stability of strategies may be more prevalent in a social context of the evolu-
tion of strategies than in a biological context. Further, all three of the factors indicate
that the function of a socio-economic system, in terms of the evolutionary stability, is
determined by the network structure, which in an abstract form is the network topology
of the system. These findings indicate that it is paramount to account for the network
structure in determining the evolutionary stability of a strategy among a population of
players.
Though the evolution of strategies is usually studied from an individualistic point of view,
the optimisation of common or public utility of a population is also a significant problem
to address. Accordingly, the next research subquestion attempts to optimise the strategy
placement with the objective of maximising the public utility in a network.
9.1.3 The influence of network topology on the optimisation of public
good in complex networks
Under this research subquestion, focus was given to the influence of network topology in
maximising the common or public good in a population of interacting agents. In order to
simulate such a scenario, the iterative prisoner’s dilemma game was adopted as a public
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goods game in which agents play prisoner’s dilemma repeatedly and adapt their strate-
gies with the goal of increasing the total network utility. Evolution was simulated by
implementing a version of the genetic algorithm optimisation, where each member of the
population is a network with a particular distribution of strategies. Thus, the evolution
of networks were considered as social structures, rather than the evolution of individuals.
It was found that networks, which prefer a certain type of strategy to be at their hub over
another type, evolve for high network utility. As such, the evolved networks preferred co-
operation over defection, general cooperation over zero-determinant, Pavlov over general
cooperation, and Pavlov over zero-determinant at their hubs. This indicates that when
societies compete, those that can efficiently order individuals according to their strate-
gies have better chances of gaining higher overall payoffs. This is a significant result in
understanding cooperation for public good.
As a future step in this direction, similar experiments can be conducted with other op-
timisation techniques, such as simulated annealing and the ant-colony optimisation. A
broader range of memory-one and other strategies can be considered (tit-for-tat, for ex-
ample). Furthermore, experiments could be performed on particular application domains,
such as defence and project management, to better demonstrate the utility of these results.
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that the network topology or
the structure is key in determining the optimum global wealth of a population based on
the placement of strategies.
The initial segment of the thesis attempted to study the effect of network topology on
different aspects of networked games such as the evolution of coordination and the evo-
lutionary stability of strategies. The next segment mainly focuses on defining the non-
optimality or bounded rationality of strategic players based on network topology and in-
formation transfer. Bounded rationality implicitly captures the effect of network topology
and information flow in strategic interactions.
9.1.4 The influence of network topology on the bounded rationality of
networked players
Under the purview of the topological effects on networked games, this work evaluates
how the network topology affects the rationality of strategic players. In real-world socio-
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economic systems, interactions occur among players whose rationality is bounded. There
are several theories and hypotheses that suggest that the rationality of a player may be cor-
related to the amount of social interactions they undertake. These theories include social
cognitive theory, social brain hypothesis and the cognitive hierarchical model. Accord-
ingly, it was assumed that there exists a correlation between the rationality of a player
and the amount of social interactions they undertake. Based on this fundamental and
reasonable assumption, a topological model of bounded rationality is proposed. Further,
this model is used to understand the relationship between the topology of socio-economic
systems and their dynamics. Particularly, focus is given to the scale-free characteristic
and its influence on social network dynamics. Given a particular heterogeneous distribu-
tion of rationality among players, how the topological characteristics encourage system
rationality is considered. The Nash equilibrium predicts the strategies that players with
perfect rationality would choose. Accordingly, the Jensen-Shannnon divergence of the
Nash and quantal response equilibrium states are computed for each pair of players in a
given social system. Subsequently, the average of these divergences was used as a measure
to quantify the ‘system rationality’. In this regard, a number of well-known games were
considered, including the prisoner’s dilemma, the stag-hunt, the meeting game and the
matching pennies game to simulate scenarios where cognitive decisions must be made.
The topological analysis of bounded rationality points to some interesting implications. In
the first step of this analysis, a number of network classes were compared, including scale-
free, Erdo˝s-Re`nyi random and lattice networks (representing well-mixed populations). In
comparison, it was shown that among these classes, it is the scale-free networks which
facilitate the best convergence towards Nash equilibrium (highest system rationality) on
average. Based on this observation, it may be argued that this might be one reason why
many real-world social systems are scale-free. This result suggests that the function of
socio-economic systems in terms of bounded rationality is affected by the form or topology
of socio-economic systems.
Further exploring the possible relationship between the scale-free networks and bounded
rationality, the variation of the average Jensen-Shannon divergence was measured while a
network was grown according to the Baraba`si-Albert model. The resulting observations
suggest that network growth has a negative correlation with the Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence, suggesting that networks converge towards Nash equilibrium as they grow. This
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observation suggests that there could be a game theoretical explanation on why there is
preferential attachment in networks. Exploring the same argument further, a network
growth model that interprets preference in preferential attachment as the tendency to
optimise a strategic interaction by converging towards Nash equilibrium is proposed. The
resulting network of this growth model displays both scale-free and assortative tendencies.
This is a key observation in the underlying argument that the structure of a socio-economic
system could be influenced by the strategic interactions, which is implicitly defined by the
bounded rationality of players.
Building further evidence for this conjecture, the topological evolution of social systems
was simulated using the simulated annealing technique, beginning from a random network
topology. It became apparent that when evolutionary pressure is applied on social systems
to converge towards Nash equilibria, scale-free and small-world features emerge. This
finding could be significant in its implications, since it provides an alternative explanation
for the prevalence of scale-free networks in many real-world systems and societies. Thus,
this result strongly suggests that the function of socio-economic structures influences their
form.
Subsequently, the topological analysis of bounded rationality was extended to games with
multiple equilibria. Again, it was demonstrated that when evolutionary pressure is applied
on systems to converge towards Nash equilibria (regardless of which equilibrium state a
particular pair of players converge towards), scale-free and small world features emerge.
Further, the likelihood of the existence of multiple equilibria among the players of a system
with a bounded heterogeneous rationality distribution was considered. It was observed
that a delicate balance exists: when the average rationality (as distinguished from what
system rationality, which is computed from the Jensen-Shannon divergence between quan-
tal response equilibrium and Nash equilibria) is low, the scale-free nature of the system
encourages the emergence of multiple equilibria, while when the average rationality is high,
the scale-free property in fact hinders the existence of multiple equilibria. Therefore, the
number of rational choices available to players from which they cannot deviate without
loss depends on the social network topology as well as the level of rationality prevalent in
the system. Thus, it is evident that the form or the topology of a socio-economic structure
affects the function of the network in terms of its capacity to facilitate multiple equilibria.
Within the context of this work, rational players are regarded as those who try to maximise
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their average individual pay-offs. If players attempted this within a heterogeneous system,
they may make choices that are contrary to the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a system
which converges towards Nash equilibrium will not necessarily have increasing average
pay-offs. Indeed, in the case of prisoner’s dilemma game, the convergence towards Nash
equilibrium results in decreasing average pay-offs. Thus, it could be argued that such a
system is, on average, not becoming more rational. However, in an environment where
there is a lot of mistrust and/or competition, the priority of the players will be to ensure
that their average pay-offs are better than other players with whom they compete; that is,
they would want to ensure that they are not cheated by others. The self-interest, and the
relative wellbeing in the system, therefore, gains prominence over the absolute wellbeing,
represented by the cumulative pay-off. In such systems, the convergence towards Nash
equilibria, on average, means the players are getting better at preserving their relative self-
interest, and thus becoming more rational in a selfish sense. The findings that are presented
here are related to this sense of rationality, and not the common good of the system [122].
However, in games other than prisoner’s dilemma (for example, in the stag-hunt game), it
was found that the average pay-off could indeed increase as the system converges towards
(multiple) Nash equilibria, depending on the actual values of pay-offs for each scenario.
Thus, the public good of the system corresponds to the selfish rationality of players.
Therefore, it is important to realise that the results that were obtained are applicable
in terms of average selfish rationality of players, which may or may not correspond to
the common good of the system. In any case, it is quite conceivable that players would
put their relative wellbeing over their absolute wellbeing, since human beings perceive
their level of wellbeing primarily by comparing themselves with their local neighbours. In
summary, it remains a vital research question of great scientific and practical significance
to understand how the cognitive decision-making of players and the resultant dynamics in
socio-ecological systems are shaped by both the topology and the bounded rationality of
actors in such systems.
It is widely known that network topology does affect the strategic decision making sce-
narios of self-interested players. On the other hand, game theoretic models have been
proposed to model network growth, suggesting that network formation can be regarded
as a strategic decision that a node makes. This topological rationality model suggests
that there could be a simultaneous and cyclic interdependency between network topology
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and strategic decision-making of self-interested agents based on heterogeneous bounded
rationality. Thus, strategic games maybe more sensitive to the local context when they
operate over a spatially distributed network of players than is generally assumed. This
is highlighted by identifying such games as network-based games, in comparison to net-
work game models where a two-player game is simply iterated over a network. Thus,
understanding how node rationality is affected by network topology could be significant in
contextualising an abstract gaming model. There may also be other centrality measures
and topological characteristics that may serve as better indications of the rationality of
a node in its social context. Further, quantifying the information flow along a link with
an opponent may provide a better indication of a node’s rationality of that particular
opponent, instead of merely depending on the physical topology. More empirical studies
are required to confirm the possible correlation between the bounded rationality of players
and their network topological placement and properties.
Topologically distributed bounded rationality poses an interesting avenue to study the
cyclic relationship between the network topology and strategic interactions. The fact
that the bounded rationality of players promotes the scale-free and small-world nature of
socio-economic structures suggest that the topology of the network is shaped by strate-
gic interactions. On the other hand, the variation of the existence of multiple equilibria
under different topologies suggests that the strategic interactions are affected by the net-
work topology. Thus, the topological distribution of bounded rationality model indicates
that the topology and the strategic interactions of socio-economic structures are cyclically
interdependent.
9.1.5 Applications of topologically distributed bounded rationality
Following the proposition of the topologically distributed bounded rationality model, three
different real-world case studies were considered in order to validate and demonstrate the
applicability of this concept. The first case study is peer-to-peer network formation. A
game theoretic network formation algorithm that operates with the assumption of Nash
equilibrium is adopted. Next, it is extended using quantal response equilibrium and topo-
logically distributed bounded rationality. The resulting network properties demonstrate
that the quantal response equilibrium-based network is closer to the scale-free nature of
the real-world peer-to-peer network formations. This may suggest that the topologically
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distributed rationality model is useful in modeling peer-to-peer network formation more
accurately. This also suggests that the function of a socio-economic structure is vital in
determining the form of that particular socio-economic structure.
Next, the topologically distributed bounded rationality model is applied to a scenario
where game theory is used to model the security levels of nodes in a network. Under
a topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it can be shown that the highly
connected nodes or hubs would have more stringent security policies than the leaf nodes,
reminiscent of the real-world networks. In comparison, the Nash equilibrium solution
suggests that each node in a network would have identical security levels, which is not the
case in real-world networks.
As the final case study, network routing is simulated using the randomly matched prisoner’s
dilemma game. Accordingly, it is shown that a scale-free network would facilitate the
exchange of messages over a broad range of network rationality levels when compared to
a well-mixed population under topologically distributed bounded rationality. The results
suggest that a topological bounded rationality could be useful in developing game theoretic
models that would represent real-world scenarios more accurately, in comparison to the
models that assume perfect rationality. Thus, topologically distributed rationality model
can be a useful tool in modelling real-world strategic decision-making scenarios among
populations of players. More real-world applications and empirical studies are essential to
explore the applicability of the topologically distributed bounded rationality model.
Both the network security and network routing applications demonstrate how the topology
of a network influence the strategic interactions of its nodes. Thus, the applications
of topologically distributed bounded rationality shows how the structure and strategic
interactions of socio-economic structures are interdependent with each other.
9.1.6 Information theoretical analysis of bounded rationality in network-
based games
This work extends the topological model of bounded rationality to an information flow-
based interpretation, where the directed information flow is used to quantify bounded
rationality of a particular interaction. Random boolean networks were used to generate
the information flows based on which the bounded rational agents interact. The optimal
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behaviour of the strategic interactions were compared under varying topologies and ac-
tivity levels of random boolean networks. Based on the observations, it is evident that
the average divergence of a node is the least when the random boolean network is at the
chaotic phase. It is at the chaotic phase that the complexity of a system emerges. In
random boolean networks, the chaotic phase emerges when the average degree is greater
than 2 and the network has high activity, with the bias parameter around 0.5. Thus, it
can be argued that it is the tendency to optimise the strategic interactions that makes the
complexity emerge in real-world systems. The two parameters that are varied, the bias
parameter and the network topology, both affect the divergence from Nash equilibrium
of each interaction. The results depict that when the topology and the activity of the
network reaches the chaotic phase, the strategic interactions tend to be optimal, rather
than when the network operates at an ordered phase. Thus, the results indicate that the
complexity that emerges in the real-world systems may be a result of their tendency to
optimise the strategic interactions.
Apart from these findings, that were based on random boolean networks, this work mainly
suggests the possibility of using the directed information transfer metric of transfer entropy
as a basis for deducing the rationality of a player, with respect to a particular opponent.
The bounded rationality derived based on transfer entropy is a dynamic rationality instead
of the static rationality distribution suggested in the topologically distributed bounded
rationality model. Since information flows depict a more refined form of interconnections
among nodes, the transfer entropy based bounded rationality has the potential to be a more
accurate bounded rationality measure. While topological bounded rationality presents a
rationality distribution that is distributed over space, the transfer entropy based rationality
model results in a bounded rationality measure that is distributed over both space and
time. Since transfer entropy has been effectively used to measure the directed information
flow in myriad real-world social networks [69, 188], this would open up a novel approach in
modeling rationality in strategic interactions such as online auctions, trading in financial
markets and political campaigns.
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9.1.7 Epilogue
The network topology and information flow of socio-economic systems play a critical role
in determining the dynamics and function of socio-economical systems modelled as net-
worked games. Whether it is the evolution of coordination, evolutionary stability of strate-
gies of the distribution of bounded rationality, the network topology and the information
flow of socio-economic structures are critical in determining the outcome of the strategic
interactions.
This work tries to analyse the different aspects of how network topology and information
flow affect the strategic interactions of populations of players that are topologically dis-
tributed. Firstly, the effect of topology on the evolution of coordination is studied. Even
though players in a population are thought to be self-interested, coordination is abun-
dant in populations of strategic players. It is shown the network topology, particularly
scale-free topology, plays a critical role in the emergence of coordination in populations of
players. Next, the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strategies was
observed. Evolutionary stability is the tendency of a strategy to dominate a population
against any competing strategy. The results suggest that the network topology, initial
distribution of strategies and the evolutionary update process is critical in determining
whether a strategy is strongly or weakly evolutionarily stable. Next, it was shown that
network topology and the placement of strategies is critical in optimising the common
public good in a population of players.
The rest of the thesis focuses on modelling the bounded rationality of agents in a network.
Two different models of bounded rationality are proposed that are based on network
topology and directed information flow, respectively. The topological model of bounded
rationality proposes a spatial distribution of bounded rationality while the information
flow-based bounded rationality model proposes a rationality distribution that is dispersed
both over space and time. A result of particular significance that the topological bounded
rationality models suggests is that the random populations evolve to be scale-free and
small-world in nature under strategic interactions with bounded rationality. The infor-
mation theoretic interpretation of bounded rationality proposes a more refined version
of bounded rationality that is dynamic in nature and is applicable on real-world socio-
economic systems such as financial markets and political campaigns. Though the topolog-
ical and information theoretic bounded rationality models introduced here are applied only
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in computer science related applications in this work, they could be applicable in other
domains and sectors such as healthcare, finance and education where social interactions
and strategic decision making is interwoven.
In conclusion, each of the subquestions addressed in this work confirms that the topology
and information diffusion in socio-economic systems modelled as networked games are
critical in determining the dynamics and evolution of such systems. Further, this study
suggests that there exists a cyclic interdependency between the topology, information
diffusion and the strategic interactions in socio-economic systems.
Appendix A
Modelling of social influence using
bounded rationality
A.1 Introduction
Influence modelling in social networks is a key research problem with many applications
over different domains. As a motivating example, consider the scenario where the present
discussion on global-warming is operating in online social media and in social networks
in general. With the issue of global warming, the actions of individuals, organisations
and governments are deeply influenced by several key individuals who may be scientists,
political figures and social figures. Thus, modelling the influence of such key players over
the rest of the network would be an important research problem as it affects the spread
of information over the network. This information spread may be key in determining the
subsequent actions that would affect the resolution or the aggravation of the issue at hand.
Numerous attempts have been made to model the influence in a social context. Two
classical models are linear threshold model and the independent cascade model [133]. Both
these models take into account the neighbourhood effect of adopting a particular state by
a node in the social network. Social influence modelling tries to address the optimisation
problem of finding the optimum configuration of seeds to maximise the social influence.
Under both these models, the optimisation problem of selecting the most influential nodes
has been shown to be an NP-hard problem[133, 134]. Therefore, greedy algorithm is often
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used to come up with an approximated solution [134]. Another approach to model social
influence has been to use the Page-rank algorithm based models, especially with respect
to measuring the influence of micro blogs[111]. Game theoretic influential models too have
been suggested to model social influence, where social influence is modelled as a strategic
game[58, 251]. However, these models assume the prevalence of perfect rationality in
players making their decision to adopt a particular state, even though in real-world players
are bounded rational [88]. In this work, we present a social influence model that is based
on the bounded rationality of players in a social network. In the proposed model, the
rationality of following an influencing node or adopting a strategy would be negatively
proportional on the distance from the seed.
Bounded rationality in social network suggests that players make non optimum decisions
due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a
state or an idea can be regarded as being ‘rational’, this chapter proposes an influence
model is proposed based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social
network[121]. The quantal response equilibrium model can be employed to incorporate
the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. The bounded rationality of
following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed would be negatively proportional to the
distance from that node. This model may be used in scenarios where there are multiple
types of influencers and varying payoffs of adopting a state. Different seed placement
mechanisms compared and contrasted to identify the optimum method to minimise the
existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. This is
ascertained by placing opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination
of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds and the closeness centrality of the
network would provide the maximum negative influence. Further, this model is further
extended to a strategic decision making scenario where each seed would be operating a
strategy in a strategic game.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the relevant background
knowledge is discussed. In particular, the focus is given on social networks, existing social
network influence models and game theory. Then, an influence model is proposed based on
bounded rationality and quantal response equilibrium model. In the subsequent section,
this model is extended into a strategic decision making scenario. Next, the propagation
of social influence is simulated when seeds are placed at different configurations. Then an
APPENDIX A. MODELLING OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE USING BR 218
efficient is proposed mechanism to find the optimum placement of seeds to counter the
influence of existing seeds, when there are multiple types of contending seeds. Finally, the
results are presented with the derived conclusions.
A.2 Background
A.2.1 Influence modelling in social networks
Modelling of influence in social networks have gained much interest in the recent past. This
is partly due to the potential that the emergence of online social networks present, in myr-
iad of fields from online marketing of products to political campaigns[51, 71]. Especially
due to advent of ‘viral marketing’ where word of mouth is used as a form of advertising
through social media, the importance of social influence modelling has become even more
prevalent[42, 71]. One key advantage in online social networks is it is possible to harness
the meta information about the social network such as the underlying topology and the
weights of the links, based on the data that is captured from the social interactions[71].
The key challenge in social influence modelling would be to identify the placement of
‘seeds’ or the influencing agents that would be able to create a cascading effect in the
network, where the maximum possible number of nodes in the network are affected. This
problem becomes even more complex when there are multiple types of contending seeds
are in operation[50, 58]. Two main classes of influence or diffusion models are found in
the literature, namely the linear threshold model and independent cascade model. Apart
from that, recent interest has emerged on network topological influence models based on
the Page-rank algorithm, and even based on game-theoretic models[111, 58]. Following is
a brief introduction to some of the common social influence models found in the literature.
A.2.2 Linear threshold model
One of the most common models used to model social influence is the linear threshold
model[133]. The assumption that is made in this model is that a node has a binary state
of being active or inactive, with respect to a particular state that it is under influenced.
Each node would have a random variable that dictates the fraction of nodes based on
whose state which, it will switch or keep its current state. Formally put, each node v
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would have a threshold θv[0, 1] that is randomly selected, which denotes the fraction of
neighbours of node v that has to be active in order for node v to be active and vice-
versa. Each node is affected by each neighbour w according to a weight bv,w such that,∑
wneighbour of v bv,w ≤ 1. A node is activated when the total weight of its active neigh-
bours is at least θv:
∑
wneighbour of v bv,w ≥ θv
The random assignments of threshold θv account for the lack of knowledge of intrinsic
latent tendencies of nodes to adopt neighbour strategies.
The classical linear threshold model is designed to show a single binary positive state.
However, in a social network, there could be opposing or conflicting influences in place.
To account for this possible negative influence, as extension to the linear threshold model
has been suggested called the Competitive linear threshold model (CLT) [105] that account
for the possible negative influences that maybe present in a network. Thus, instead of the
two states inactive and +active, there are three possible states in a CLT model, namely
inactive, +active and -active.
Notice that both the LT and CLT model assume that nodes switch in binary states and
not in a probabilities manner. The stochasitc nature is captured in the randomness of
the threshold. Also, even under the CLT model, it is not possible to model influencing
scenarios where more than one positive or negative influence is present. In other words,
there may be scenarios where multiple options are available for an individual in a social
network (such as an election), where the CLT model could not be applicable.
A.2.3 Independent Cascade model
In the independent cascade model [133], when a node v becomes active, it has a single
chance of activating each currently inactive neighbour w. Each activation attempt would
succeed with probability pvw. Here too, the agent states are defined as binary states while
multiple influence types are not considered. An extension for the independent cascade
model has been proposed which allow the inclusion of negative opinions[50].
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A.2.4 Page-Rank based influence models
One key feature of both the linear threshold model and independent cascade model and
their variants is that they consider only the local topology of a particular node and do
not directly consider how the global topology would affect the influence. However, an-
other interesting influence model that has come about recently is the Page-rank based
influence model, which considers the non-local topology in modelling influence. Page rank
algorithm was initially used by Google to rank the web pages based on rankings of their
neighbourhood[192]. It can effectively be used to measure social influence, particularly
in online social networks such as the blogsphere. Page-rank with prior has been sug-
gested as one such possible influence model[266], which has been used to measure social
influence in collaboration networks. It has also been used to evaluate microblog users’
influence[111]. However, Page-rank is generally sought after to quantify the influence or
the rank of each node rather than to identify to find the optimum seed arrangement to
maximise or minimise social influence.
A.2.5 Game theoretic influence models
There have been some recent influence models developed based on game theoretic prin-
ciples. These models assume the adoption of a state as a strategic decision in a social
network. One such model is a model Dynamic Influence in competitive environments
(DICE) [58]. It has been used to model scenarios where competing ideas operate simul-
taneously as well as sequentially. Further, the DICE model has been demonstrated to be
a generalisation of the classic linear threshold model and the independent cascade model.
Competitive diffusion process [251], which is another game theoretical social influence
model, models the diffusion of information under competing seeds by extending the linear
threshold model on 2-player games. Both these models assume perfect rationality of play-
ers, which may not be the case with real-world players. Thus, in the proposed model, an
attempt is made to extend the existing game theoretical models to incorporate bounded
rationality in following the seeds.
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A.3 Modelling social influence using bounded rationality
Based on the background theoretical knowledge, a social network influence model is pro-
posed based on game theory and bounded rationality of nodes. In order to do that, first
the social influence of nodes is modelled as an influence game, where there would be influ-
encing nodes or ‘seeds’ and followers operating in a network of players. The seeds would
continue to operate with a permanent binding to a particular state. This inclination may
be due to some external knowledge or an incentive the seed may have from the external
environment. In the context of a influencer-follower scenario, the bounded rationality of
a follower would be a ‘rationality of following’. Higher the rationality of a follower with
respect to a seed, higher the probability of it following the state of the seed. In this social
influence model, the fundamental assumption is that the rationality parameter of a par-
ticular follower is negatively proportional to its distance from the seed. This assumption
would account for the random noise that would be accumulated as the followers move
further from a seed. Based on the rationality of following, it is possible to measure the
probability of a follower being at the state of the influencing node or the seed node. Thus,
our model does not produce a binary outcome where the followers would be active or in-
active in binary states, rather the result would be a probability on which a follower would
adopt the probability of the influencer. In a game theoretic terminology, the follower’s
probability distribution would be a mixed strategy equilibrium, where the two strategies
would be whether to adopt the strategy of the seed or not. Formally put, the follower
probability pn,s of adopting the active state s of the seed would be,
Pn,s =
eβn,i.Us.Pi,s
eβn,i.Us.Pi,s + eβn,i.U−s.Pi,−s
(A.1)
where,
Pn,s - Probability of the follower node n being at state s (active state)
βn,i - Following rationality of node n with respect to node i
Us - Utility of adopting the state s
Pi,s - Probability of the influencer i being in state s (this is always 1)
Pi,−s - Probability of the influencer i being not in state s (this is always 0)
U−s - Utility of not being in state s (inactive state)
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This model captures the random noise of the followers with the assumption that the
rationality of a node of following the influencer is negatively proportional to the distance
from the seed or the influencer. Thus, βn,iα
1
dn,i
where dn,i is the distance along the shortest
path from the influencer i to node n along the shortest path. As the follower moves further
from the seed, the rationality parameter reaches 0, making them behave randomly. If the
followers are placed closer to the seed, then there would be higher rationality and thus
a higher probability of following the state of the seed. Another important factor to note
is the not only the distance from the seed, but also the reward or utility of adopting the
state too play a significant role in determining whether a follower would adopt the state of
the seed. Thus, the above model may be extended to accommodate for a scenario where
there are multiple seeds or influencers instead of a single influencing node.
Pn,s =
∑N
i=1 e
βn,i.Us.Pi,s∑N
i=1 e
βn,i.Us.Pi,s +
∑N
i=1 e
βn,i.U−s.Pi,−s
(A.2)
where N is the total number of influencers in the network. In the above model, each node
would have a separate rationality parameter for each influencer, based on the distance to
them. Thus, it would capture the varying network distances from each influencer to more
accurately predict the status of the follower.
This would imply that in a population that is closely knitted would have a higher tendency
of following a seed compared to a population that is sparsely connected. Further, small-
world networks[9] would tend to leverage social influence as they have relatively low average
path lengths[9].
A.3.1 Modelling social influence under opposing influencers using bounded
rationality
This particular bounded rationality based social influence model could also be used to
model the influence of a single type of influencers. Yet, in most real-world social influence
scenarios, there would be conflicting interests at play. There would be influencers with a
negative influence as well as positive influence on the same state. In addition to that, there
could be instances where there are multiple influencers that are mutually exclusive from
each other. A good example of this are political campaigns where there would be more
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than two candidates running. Thus, the above model can be easily extended to account
for two opposing types of influencers of states S1 and S2 as follows.
Pn,S1 =
∑N
i=1 e
βn,i.US1 .Pi,S1 +
∑M
j=1 e
βn,j .U−S2 .Pj,−S2
N∑
i=1
eβn,i.US1 .Pi,S1 +
N∑
i=1
eβn,i.U−S1 .Pi,−S1+
M∑
j=1
eβn,j .US2 .Pi,S2 +
M∑
j=1
eβn,j .U−S2 .Pi,−S2
(A.3)
Here,
Pn,S1 - Probability of the follower node n being at state S1
βn,i - Following rationality of node n with respect to the influencer i
βn,j - Following rationality of node n with respect to the influencer j
US1 - Utility of adopting the state S1
Pi,S1 - Probability of the influencer i being in state S1 (this is always 1)
Pi,−S1 - Probability of the influencer i not being in state S1 (this is always 0)
Pi,S2 - Probability of the influencer j being in state S2 (this is always 1)
Pi,−S2 - Probability of the influencer j not being in state S2 (this is always 0)
U−S1 - Utility of not being in state S1
US2 - Utility of adopting the state S2
U−S2 - Utility of not being in state S2
The rationality parameters with respect to each influencer would again be dependent on
the distance of the node in concern from each of the influencers. Note that the followers
can take either of the two states S1 or S2 under the influence of the two types of influencers.
However, it does not account for a neutral state where the followers may not follow either
of the two types of influencers. If a neutral state is considered, then the numerator should
only contain the exponent of S1, as in that case a node being influenced to be in state
−S2 does not mean it would automatically adopt S1. Further, it is possible to extend the
same model to take into account multiple types of influencers and not just two opposing
types, since every influencer state can be regarded as a possible strategy a follower could
adopt with heterogeneous rationality levels.
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A.3.2 Modelling strategic influence using bounded rationality
In addition to social influence, the same approach could be used to measure the influence
of strategic decision making scenarios. Game theoretic models are often used in observ-
ing the evolution of populations of players[83, 223]. The evolutionary dynamics of the
populations help to understand how each strategy would perform under different network
topologies[223]. If an assumption is made that certain nodes continue to stick to a partic-
ular strategy irrespective of its environment, due to some external knowledge or influence
external to the network, then they can be modelled as influencers while the rest of the
population can be regarded as followers that get affected by those influencing nodes. For
instance, when the prisoner’s dilemma game is player over a network, depending on the
topological position and arrangement of each node, different nodes would adopt coopera-
tion or defection[223]. However, if it is assumed that the cooperation or defection tendency
of each follower is affected by the influence by the seeds that stick to a particular strategy,
then the social influence of strategic games can be modelled using heterogeneous bounded
rationality and quantum response equilibria.
The Eq.A.4 and Eq. A.5 depict the two logit functions based on QRE with a strategically
influenced rationality parameter to derive the probability of cooperation in a networked
PD game.
p1,c =
eβ1,c(p2,c(u111+(1−p2,c)(u121)))
eβ1,c(p2,c(u111+(1−p2,c)(u121))) + eβ1,d(p2,c(u211+(1−p2,c)(u221)))
(A.4)
p2,c =
eβ2,c(p1,c(u112+(1−p1,c)(u212)))
eβ2,d(p1,c(u112+(1−p1,c)(u212))) + eβ2,d(p1,c(u122+(1−p1,c)(u222)))
(A.5)
Here, p1,c and p2,c are the probability of cooperating for player 1 and 2, respectively. The
rationalities β1,c and β1,d can be used to quantify the influence on player 1 on cooperating
and defecting respectively. These influences would be determined by the distances from
the influencers or seeds adopting each strategy. Similarly, β1,d and β2,d signify the influence
based rationalities of defection for player 1 and 2 respectively. Formally put,
βn,c α
N∑
i=1
1/dn,ic (A.6)
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where βn,c is the influence based rationality of cooperating in node n, dn,ic is the distance
of node n from the influencer i (which is a pure cooperator) and N would be the total
number of cooperator influencers within the network. The influence based rationality of
defecting can also be calculated in a similar fashion. Thus, each follower would capture
the influence of the cooperator and defector influence nodes within the network, through
the distance based bounded rationality for each strategy. Similar to the influence game,
this model can be extended to incorporate multiple types of influencers with multiple
strategies.
A.4 Optimizing social influence using bounded rationality
models
In this sub-section, a method to place the influencers in order to maximise their influence
on the population, based on the bounded rationality based influence models that were
suggested in the previous sub-section. For this purpose, two scenarios are considered.
One is where the network has only a single type of influencers and the requirement is
to select the placement of influencers to maximise their influence. This is termed as the
influence maximisation problem in the literature[133]. The other is the scenario where
the network two kinds of opposing influencers. Supposing the network is already occupied
with one type of influencers, and it is necessary to identify the optimum way of placing
the rivalling set of influencers, so that the influence of the originally placed influencers is
minimised. These optimisations would be applicable to the influencer-follower game that
was discussed earlier and also more general strategic decision making situations.
Firstly, let us consider a scenario where there is only one type of seeds or influencers in
a network in a influencing game. As discussed previously, the fundamental assumption
that is made here is that the bounded rationality of following is inversely proportional
to the distance of the followers from the influencing node. Thus, the influencers are
best placed in a network where the distance to the followers is minimum. The natural
candidate to locate that placement would be the closeness centrality of the network, since
closeness centrality[9] is used to identify the nodes that have average minimum shortest
path distance to the other nodes within the network. The Eq.A.7 depicts the equation for
calculating the closeness centrality of a node. When the influencers are placed according
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to the closeness centrality of network, the influence on the rest of the network would be
highest, when there is only one type of positive influence at play.
CH(x) =
∑
y 6=x
1
d(y, x)
(A.7)
where d(y, x) would be the distance along the shortest path from node x to node y.
Based on this premise, it is possible to formulate the most optimum method to place
the rivalling or conflicting influencers when there are multiple opposing influencers in
operation. Assuming that the original influencer or influencers are already placed in a
network, there would be two factors that affect the effectiveness of the rivalling influencers.
Those two factors are,
Active factor The distance from the rivalling influencers to the follower nodes in the
network
Passive factor The ability of the rivalling influencers to ‘block’ the influence of the orig-
inal influencers
The first factor could be measured using the closeness centrality of the network. This
would be called the ‘active factor’ within the context of this chapter, since the opposing
nodes would directly influence the other nodes to follow them. The second factor becomes
relevant since the rationality is spread through the network topology. If a node is occupied
by an opposing influencer, then it no longer would take part in spreading the influence
of the original influencers. From the perspective of the original set of influencers, the
opposing influencers would cease to exist in the network, in their quest to spread their
influence. Thus, simply by being placed in positions where the distance from the original
influencers to the followers could be increased, the rivalling influencers can minimise the
influence of the original set of influencers. In other words, the opponent influencers are best
placed in ‘between’ the original influencers and the followers of the network. Thus, another
well-known centrality measure, betweenness centrality[9] can be employed to identify the
topological positions where the influence of the original influencers would be minimised.
However, it is not necessary to measure the betweenness centrality values of all nodes in
the network to identify these positions. Only the betweenness centrality values for the
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original influencers would be sufficient to identify the topological positions where there
influence can most effectively be interfered. This would be called the ‘passive factor’
of negative influence since the opponent influencers reduce the influence of the original
influencers simply by passively occupying the high betweenness centrality nodes.
By combining these two active and passive negative factors, it is possible to derive a
method that could be used to identify the positions where it would be most effective to
place the negative influence seeds. The algorithm 11 depicts this method that is used
to optimally place the negative influencers in a network where there are already existing
positive influencers.
Algorithm 11: Optimum influence arrangement of negative influencing seeds, when
a network is already occupied with positive influencing seeds.
Data: Network topology, Seeds
Result: Optimum arrangement of opposing seeds
1 Measure the betweenness centrality values of the nodes from the original set seeds;
2 Measure the closeness centrality of the entire network;
3 Calculate the average of these two measures;
4 Order the nodes in descending order based on this averaged measure;
5 Place the opposing seeds in the order of the combined measure;
A.4.1 Complexity analysis
Influence maximisation is an optimisation problem that is tries to optimally place the seeds
in order to the influence spread. Under the independent cascade model and linear threshold
model, the influence maximisation becomes an NP-hard problem[133]. Therefore, in order
to solve them, it is necessary to employ a greedy algorithm to find the optimum seed
arrangement. The greedy algorithm of optimising influence spread outperforms the degree
and centrality based heuristics[133, 134]. Still, it requires an approximation using the
Monte-Carlo simulations of the influence cascade model over a number of interactions to
obtain an accurate estimation of the influence spread. Thus, it may be inefficient in a
sufficiently large network with multiple seeds involved.
Using the proposed bounded rationality based influence model, it is possible to devise a
deterministic algorithm that can be used to identify the optimum set of influencers without
depending on heuristics. The time complexity of finding the optimum placement of a single
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type of influencers would be O(V,E) where V would be the number of vertices and E would
be the number of edges in the network, which is the time complexity of calculating the
closeness centrality. The time complexity of optimising the negative influence when there
are opposing influencers would be O(V,E) + O(VS , E), where VS would be the initial set
of seed nodes. Based on the proposed influence model, it is possible to measure the actual
optimisation problem in polynomial time. Also, instead of an approximation, it is possible
to derive an exact solution using the bounded rationality based influence model.
A.5 Methodology
In this sub-section, the methodology that is used to perform simulations to demonstrate
the applicability of the bounded rationality based influence model is discussed. First, three
different network topologies are compared, scale-free, ER random and well-mixed, in how
they would facilitate the influence spread under a bounded rationality influence model. In
order to do that, a seed was placed at the hub of each network and measure the average
probability of following the seed, over the network. The network with the lowest diameter
would be the one that facilitates most influence. The two states that are considered are
either active or inactive states where active refers to adopting the state of the influencer.
However, since the QRE model gives a probability distribution of whether a node would
follow the influencer or not, the outcome would not be a binary state distribution, rather
a probability distribution of being in the active state. The payoff of adopting the state of
the seed is set to be 1 and not adopting the state is set to 0.
pn1 =
e(βni .p
1
i .1)
e(βni .p
1
i .1) + e(βni .p
0
i .0)
(A.8)
Here pn1 would be the probability of node n being in state 1, where state 1 denotes being
active and 0 denotes being inactive. βni would be node n’s ‘rationality of following’ with
respect to the influencer i, which would be dependent on node n’s distance along the
shortest path from the influencer i. Therefore, βni = c/dni where c is a constant and dni
is the distance of node n from node i along the shortest path. 1 and 0 are the payoffs of
state 1 and 0 respectively.
Next, in order to test how the payoff of following affects the probability distribution of
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following the seed, the same experiment was performed while varying the payoff of the
active state. A scale-free topology was used for this simulation and the variation of the
average probability of following over the payoff of the active state was observed.
Then, the effectiveness of the algorithm to reduce the influence of the hub by placing
opposing influencers in the network was evaluated. To test this, two different scenarios
were considered. In the first one, the hub is placed with the original influencing node and
4 opposing influencers are distributed according to different configurations. In the first
configuration, they are placed in the remaining hubs in the order of the degree. In the next
two configurations, the opponents are placed in the order of betweenness from the hub
and the closeness centrality of the network, respectively. In the fourth configuration, the
opponents are placed in the order of the combined measure that we presented in algorithm
11. The variation of negative influence was compared and contrasted by observing the
adoption probability under these four configurations. The same experiment was then
repeated for multiple conflicting influencers on both sides. The original set of influencers
were randomly distributed and four opposing influencers are placed according to the four
configurations mentioned above. This experiment was repeated over twenty iterations to
account for the effect of randomness in the initial configuration of influencers. It is assumed
that the followers would adopt either of the active or the negatively active states, thus
they wouldn’t be in an inactive state. It should be noted that an inactive state could also
be incorporated by extending the QRE model that is used. The payoffs of following each
type of influencers were set to 2 and 1 respectively. In each type of influencer, the payoff
of not following the influencer would be a negative payoff of -2 and -1 respectively. Eq.
A.9 shows how the probability of a node being in state s, which is the state of the original
set of influencers, being calculated using QRE and distance induced bounded rationality.
pns =
∑N
i=1 e
(βni .p
s
i .2) +
∑M
j=1 e
(βnj .p
s
j .−1)∑N
i=1 e
(βni .p
s
i .2) + e(βni .p
−s
i .−2) +
∑M
j=1 e
(βnj .p
s
j .−1) + e(βnj .p
−s
j .1)
(A.9)
Here, pn1 would be the probability of node n adopting state s. βni would be the rationality
of following the influencers of state s where N is the number of such influencers. Also,
βnj would be the rationality of following the influencer of state −s where M would be
the number of such influencers. The values +2 and -2 are the payoffs of either following
or not following the influencers of state 1. Similarly, +1 and -1 are the payoffs of either
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following or not following the influencers of state −s. The rationalities of following would
be inversely proportional to the distance from each influencer. For instance, the rationality
βnj of following an influencer of type j is set as c/dnj where c is a constant and dnj is the
distance from node n to influencer j.
Then it was observed how the strategic game based influence would operate in a bounded
rationality based influence model. In particular, the optimum method to reduce the in-
fluence of already existing influencers was evaluated. The Prisoner’s dilemma game was
used with four cooperators distributed randomly in the network while four defectors try
to negatively influence to minimise cooperation in the network. The rationality of coop-
eration and defection would be negatively proportional to the distance to each influencer.
As with the previous experiment, different opponent placement strategies were compared
with the optimum placement strategy that was discussed in 11. The payoffs of the PD
game were set such that u111, u122 = 4, u121, u212 = 0, u122, u211 = 5 and u221, u222 = 1.
The equations Eq. A.4 and Eq. A.5 are used to calculate the probability of cooperation in
each iteration. For each node, the rationality of cooperation and defection are calculated
by taking into the cumulative effect of influencers of each type. For example, for node
n the rationality of cooperation would be
∑N
i=1 fraccdni , where c is a constant and N
would be the number of cooperators in the network while dni would be the distance to
each cooperator from the node.
These experiments could be used evaluate how the bounded rationality based influence
modelling can be applied in a influencer-follower scenario or a strategic game scenario,
where there are a dedicated set of influencers or seeds and the rest of the population is
following them. It should be noted that although we consider only two types of rivalling
influencers or strategies, the bounded rationality based influence model could be expanded
for multiple types of influencers and strategies as well.
A.6 Results
The Table A.1 shows the comparison of the average following probability under the three
network topologies considered. As the table shows, the scale-free topology facilitates the
highest average following probability compared to the ER random and lattice topologies.
This is due to the fact that a scale-free network of a comparative size and average degree
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may have a lower diameter compared to a ER-random or a lattice network.
Table A.1: The average probability of following the seed in different topologies
Network topology Average probability of following
Scale-free 0.95
ER Random 0.89
Lattice 0.51
The Fig. A.1 depicts the variation of the following probabilities in a scale-free network,
when the seed is placed at the hub and when the payoff for adopting the state of the seed
is increased. As shown in the figure, there is a clear positive correlation between the payoff
of the active state and the influence spread. Thus, this shows that not only the topology
of the network and the positioning of the seed(s) but also the payoff of the active state is
critical in determining the spread of influence.
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Figure A.1: The variation of the probability of following against the payoff of the active state.
Next, the results of the experiment when two conflicting types of influencers are placed
in a scale-free network, are discussed. The original influencer is placed in a hub and
four opposing influencers are place according to four different configurations. Namely,
they are placed according to the degree centrality of the network, betweenness centrality
from the hub, closeness centrality of the network and a combination of the second and
third measures (as discussed in algorithm11). Fig. A.2 shows the comparison when the
influencing seed is placed the hub in opposition to four counter influencers in the same
four configurations. As the figure shows, the combined measure method proposed in
algorithm 11 gives the best results in terms of maximising the negative influencer, thereby
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reducing the average probability of following. The table A.2 shows the average probability
of following when the opposing seeds are placed in the four different configurations. The
results reiterate that it is the negative seed placement method discussed in the algorithm
11 that provides the optimum reduction of the influence from the original seed.
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Figure A.2: The variation of the probability of following against the distance from seed placed at hub in a scale-free
network. Four opposing seeds are placed in the order of (i) degree, (ii) betweenness from the hub, (iii) closeness
centrality, (iv) combination of both of (ii) & (iii).
Table A.2: The average probability of following the seed in different topologies. The opposing seeds are placed in
four different configurations.
Opposing influencer configuration Average following probability
Degree 0.29
Betweenness (hub) 0.21
Closeness 0.79
Combined measure (2 & 3) 0.19
Fig. A.3 depicts the variation of following probability against the average distance from the
influencing seeds when multiple original influencers are placed randomly. The results are
averaged over twenty independent runs. As the figure depicts, it is the combined measure
used to determine the placement of the opposing seeds that mitigate the influence of the
original set of influencers, most effectively. This is further confirmed by the comparison
of average probabilities of following, given in table A.3.
Next, the results for the same set of experiments repeated for a strategic decision making
scenario are presented, where the PD game is played over a scale-free network. Fig. A.4
shows the results for the scenario when the coordinator seed is placed at the hub and
the defecting seeds are placed according to the four different configurations discussed
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Figure A.3: The variation of the probability of following against the average distance from seeds placed at random
positions in a scale-free network. The opposing seeds are placed in the order of (i) degree, (ii) betweenness from the
hub, (iii) closeness centrality, (iv) combination of both (ii) & (iii). The results are averaged over twenty independent
runs.
Table A.3: The average probability of following the randomly placed seeds in different topologies. The opposing
seeds are placed according to four different configurations.
Opposing influencer configuration Average following probability
Degree 0.30
Betweenness (seeds) 0.19
Closeness 0.95
Combined measure (2 & 3) 0.04
above. Similar to the influencer-follower game, the strategic decision making scenario
too is most affected when the opposing strategies are placed according to the combined
measure. Table A.4 shows the average probability of cooperation in those four types of
configurations of placing the defectors. The placement of opponent strategies purely based
on the betweenness centrality from the hub adopting the pure coordinator strategy too
facilitates an effective reduction of cooperation in the overall network.
The Fig. A.5 depicts the variation of cooperation against the average distance from mul-
tiple cooperator seeds that are placed randomly. The defector seeds are placed according
to the four configurations discussed previously. Here too, the combined method of plac-
ing the opposing strategies make the highest reduction in the cooperator strategy in the
network, further emphasised by the average cooperator probabilities shown in Table A.5.
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Figure A.4: The probability of cooperation against the distance from the cooperator seed placed at hub in a scale-
free network. Four defector seeds are placed in the order of (i) degree, (ii) betweenness from the hub, (iii) closeness,
(iv) combination of both of (ii) & (iii).
Table A.4: The average probability of cooperation in different topologies when the cooperator seed is placed at the
hub. The defector seeds are placed in four different topologies.
Opposing strategy configuration Average probability of cooperation
Degree 0.226
Betweenness (hub) 0.209
Closeness 0.335
Combined measure (2 & 3) 0.206
A.7 Discussion
In this work, a novel social influence model is proposed based on the bounded rational-
ity of agents in a social network. First, the social influence is modelled as an influence
game where there are two types of players, influencers and followers. The followers are
assumed to be following the influencers based on a bounded rationality, which is inversely
proportional to their distance from the influencers. Based on this model, it is shown that
scale-free networks facilitate social influence compared to ER random and lattice networks.
Then this model is extended to scenarios where there are multiple and opposing seeds. A
method was proposed to optimally place the negative seeds to minimise the influence of
the original set of positive influencers. In this method, the opponents are placed according
to the order of a combined centrality measure, which is the average of the betweenness
centrality from the original seeds and the closeness centrality of the nodes within the
network. It is found that in general, placing the opponents in the order of betweenness
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Figure A.5: The variation of coordination against the average distance from cooperators that are randomly placed
in a scale-free network. Four opposing seeds are placed in the order of (i) degree, (ii) betweenness from the hub,
(iii) closeness, (iv) combination of both of (ii) & (iii).
Table A.5: The average probability of cooperation when the cooperator seeds are randomly placed in different
topologies. The opposing seeds are placed according to four different configurations.
Opposing strategy configuration Average probability of cooperation
Degree 0.36
Betweenness (seeds) 0.35
Closeness 0.44
Combined measure (2 & 3) 0.25
centrality from the original seeds, thereby ‘interfering’ their influence to the rest of the
network, is more effective than choosing the nodes that have higher closeness centrality
within the entire network to place the rivalling influencers. Moreover, the proposed com-
bined centrality measure performs best in maximising the negative influence, when the
original seed is placed at the hub, or when multiple original seeds randomly distributed.
Further, this influence model is extended to strategic decision making scenarios in a social
network. Here, each node is assumed to have a rationality of following each strategy
and that rationality is negatively proportional to the distance from each seed with that
strategy within the network. This approach makes it possible to model the network with
heterogeneous rationalities in nodes that are dependent on the number of seeds and the
distances from them. Using this model it is possible demonstrate that as with the influence
game, strategic games like the prisoner’s dilemma game could be simulated in a social
network with bounded rationalities that are influenced by the seeds that have permanently
adopted a particular strategy. The followers would adopt their respective strategies based
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on the bounded rationality of following each strategy and their respective payoffs. Based
on this model, it could be shown that the most efficient way to counter an existing strategy
is to place the opponent strategy seeds in the order of the combined centrality measure of
betweenness from the original strategy seeds and the closeness centrality of the network.
To our understanding, this is the first attempt to model the social influence using bounded
rationality and the QRE model. The applications of such a model could be myriad, espe-
cially it allows the computation of social influence in a computationally efficient manner.
Moreover, as it is based on game theoretic principles, it allows the payoff of following
an influencer or adopting a strategy to be a key variable in the modelling, which is not
present in the standard social influence models. Countering the influence of an existing
network is a critical problem that may have many applications in scientific, social and
political networks. Thus, the combined centrality measure of placing opponent nodes and
strategies may be quite useful in negatively affecting existing social influence. This model
can be even applied to model social influence in scenarios where there are multiple types
of influencers and strategies, such as in a political campaign. Further research is needed
to explore the applicability of this model in real-world social networks.
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